Adam Smith’s Hidden Debt to Thomas Hobbes

Hobbes Leviathan Frontispiece
Detail from the frontispiece for the first edition of the Leviathan (1651) by Thomas Hobbes; lead etching by Abraham Bosse.

Adam Smith and Thomas Hobbes are not usually mentioned in the same sentence together, much less positively. But this is a key line of argument in Joseph Crospey’s book, Polity and Economy, which subtly examines and points out the links between the two canonical thinkers.1 Crospey, a student of Leo Strauss, and later co-editor with Strauss of their edition of the History of Political Philosophy, wrote the book early in his academic career, and although he added a mini-biography of Smith in a later edition, did not change the first four chapters that comprise this deep-reaching analysis of Smith.

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  1. Joseph Crospey, Polity and Economy: An Interpretation of the Principles of Adam Smith (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957).

The Image of A New Barbarism

JerryColt
Gericault, The Raft of the Medusa, 1818–19. | If you look closely, you will see the individual manqué here, too, alluded to through the suspicion of cannibalism.

Michael Oakeshott is perhaps best known for his essay ‘On Being Conservative’, where he describes conservatism as a disposition. Opposed to the conservative, however, seems to be what Oakeshott terms the ‘individual manqué’, aptly described as “the image of a new barbarism.”1 Oakeshott’s characterisation of the manqué is one of the left-behinds, the ‘mass man’ who is anything but the man of the masses, but is a strange character in itself. “He is not necessarily ‘poor’, nor is he envious only of ‘riches’,” Oakeshott notes, adding that “he is not necessarily ‘ignorant’, often he is a member of the so-called intelligentsia; he belongs to a class which corresponds exactly with no other class. He is specified primarily by a moral, not an intellectual, inadequacy.”2 Even though the reader may be casually misled into believing that the mass man is the sort of individual who would be the working poor who may be the leading advocates for socialism and totalitarianism, Oakeshott emphasises that the issue with this manqué is a moral deficiency that no sort of educational attainment may solve: it is, at heart, a moral issue, one that cannot be dealt with immediately or brusquely unless its origins are traced.

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  1. Michael Oakeshott, ‘The Masses in Representative Democracy’, in Freedom and Serfdom: An Anthology of Western Thought, ed. Albert Hunold (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1961), 151–71, 163.
  2. Oakeshott, ‘The Masses’, 167–68.

A Critical Distance

Few things inspire both tempestuous passions and rabid indifference as the practice of politics today, stuck between rampant idealism of the sort that seeks to remove the human from humanity and the kind that seeks to base everything on licentiousness or expediency. There is, however, a third way, that I shall call spezzatura, studied nonchalance, which is essential for any student of political philosophy, and for any deep understanding of the principles of politics. All sorts of dubious ethical and moral reasoning is acceptable today in politics, and has been for a long time, not least since Cleon’s infamous speech that Thucydides recreated for the benefit of the reader, or that of the Athenian envoys later in his book. Expediency and self-interest are the sovereign monarchs of political activity, unfortunately so, but they can never have any sovereign claims in the field of political philosophy, for they are prima facie opposed to anything but a brutish despotism, one where the only state is that of a bellum omnium contra omnes, not one where the possibility of the polis as the highest sovereign association can exist. I do not intend to argue that the student of political philosophy should be ignorant of the history of ideas, or of history in general; nor should this seem to advocate that history is not an integral part of the tout ensemble of political philosophy, but only that a passionate fervour in political activity in the present moment is antithetical to the study of political philosophy, and that one should be cognisant of the present while maintaining a certain nonchalance about it to ensure that one is intent on answering the fundamental questions of political philosophy and their derivatives.

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