Category: Indian Political Philosophy

The rest of the text deals with matters that pertain to more pressing theological concerns on the battlefield. The stated purpose of the text, namely convincing Arjuna to fight against his cousins, in what could ostensibly only be a matter of doubt about the ethicality of a war against one’s own family, is to put to rest and is no longer the focal point, the refrain of the text. The following analysis of the Gita is arranged thematically, starting with Knowledge, proceeding to Lawlessness, and finally considering Duty.

However, before I embark upon this analysis, permit me a few words about the message of moderation. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines moral virtue as the mean between ‘excess’ and ‘defect’ (II.6, 1106b23–27). Here, too, moral virtue is defined along those lines, particularly in 6:17. The discussion takes place in light of an exhortation to know the Self (distinct from the individual self), the ultimate Self, atman; but the way to do this is not to renounce the world. Arjuna is told, “But those who are temperate … will come to the end of sorrow” (6:17). The focus here is on temperance, in “eating and sleeping, work and recreation” (6:17), not on renunciation and monastic life. Moral virtue is possible and attainable in the vita coactiva. The text is an exhortation to know the Self, not to abandon society and its mores, whatever they may be; it is an exhortation to do the right thing because it is the right thing to do, not because one is attached to the results of such deeds. It is not a call to monastic life of the Buddhist sort that removes vitality from society by imposing an austere penance upon it, but rather provides the middle path as the way to follow.

Continue reading “The Middle Path: Notes on Books 5–18 of the Gita” →

The salient implications of the Gita for the student of political philosophy is brought to fore here, in the form of more practical advice, namely that the ends never justify the means; that means are important and the end of enlightened action, not their results (4:20), and moral action requires sacrifice (4:25–30). Consequently, it is established that the end of the vita activa is “service” (4:23), and freedom is only possible when opinion has been replaced with knowledge and means are the determinants of action, not ends (4:41). These have valuable implications for the students of politics, especially for those with a passing familiarity of the works of the Stoics, who, too, held that the means have considerable significance enjoined to them, and how something is done is of sovereign importance (keeping in mind, of course, that the end of such an act is not in itself wrong or morally devious in some matter).

Continue reading “Notes on Book IV: Wisdom in Action” →

My notes on the first two books of the Gita intended to establish the existence of a common tradition of thinking about political issues and questions of political philosophy and theology common to the West and the East. Having expressed my views on the subject, I turn my attention to the problem of political philosophy and the statesman himself, adopting a more exegetical approach to the text. Before I continue any further, though, I ought to define the field of enquiry more clearly, and for this I borrow from A.P. d’Entrèves’ definition: political philosophy consists of three aspects, namely, “the problem of authority, of obedience, of political obligation.”¹ The Gita, I must add, is remarkable because of its theological profoundness and as a guide for action even for the layman, but the field of inquiry above is much more restricted.

Continue reading “Notes on Book 3 of the Bhagavad Gita” →

Book 1: The War Within

The first chapter¹ sets up the stage for the conflict. In the first verse (1:1), Dhritarashtra asks his right-hand man, Sanjay, to tell him what is happening on the battlefield of Kurukshetra. Sanjay is blessed with the ability to livestream the events of any earthly location into his own head, and thus begins to narrate, to the best of his knowledge, the events of the battlefield. In this case, what the Gita sets up is essential: the symbolic value of examining the narrative set-up lies in the reminder that the Hindu tradition is, in this case, distinct and different from the Abrahamic tradition. The Gita certainly is Krishna’s word, and as such is revelation. But it is also somehow fallible, for the dialogue in which it is set up is relayed by a (fallible) human. Even though Sanjay manages to fade into the background, he does not completely disappear. That Krishna tells this to Arjuna is essential as well, because it is the categorical revelation that can be applied to one’s life if one chooses to do so and requires intellectual and moral effort. As far as revelation goes, it delves into the minutiae of the moment to provide general lessons.

Continue reading “Notes on Books 1 and 2 of the Bhagavad Gita” →

It seems to be the fashion nowadays to decry á la Lord Parekh the nonexistence of an Indian Hobbes, or generally speaking, a tradition of political philosophy that is truly and inalienable Indian. Yet, studies of Indian political philosophy in recent years have focused almost exclusively on modern Indian thinkers, particularly those of a certain bent — Ram Mohan Roy, Gandhi, Ambedkar, and Nehru. Ancient India is even more forlorn, marked by a desert whose glory may be occasionally acknowledged and more often commemorated through fantastical and absurd defences of the sort that claim nuclear weaponry finds its origins in texts of vintage, or in the positivism of Kautilya and the works of Manu, whose original meaning is more or less transformed into some species of a reductio ad absurdum to reflect the revolutionary and progressive pieties of the present.

Continue reading “Is There An Indian Political Philosophy?” →