There are two kinds of obligations with which we are concerned here: legal and moral obligation. Both are important in the context of the polis. Legal obligation is concerned with the observance of the law, broadly understood, in both letter and in spirit. Moral obligation, which we shall refer to as ‘duty,’ relates to broader questions of right and wrong and with hierarchy in general. Legal obligation is important, especially when the polis is ruled in accordance with a series of non-arbitrary rules, codified into laws, which are sovereign over the polis. Both these forms of obligation, in the context of the polis, find their articulation in Marcus Tullius Cicero’s treatise, On The Commonwealth.

Cicero uses the example of Xenocrates, “a very distinguished philosopher,” who is “asked what his pupils achieved” (1.2). Xenocrates replies, “they learned to do of their own free will what the laws would compel them to do” (1.2). Obedience of the laws — just laws, in any case — are important. Without the rule of law, the polis would be left to the rule of the arbitrary whims and fancies of men, who are in essence fallible. The statesman “imposes no laws on the populace which he does not himself obey,” Cicero warns the reader, because hypocrisy is a moral transgression like few others, especially in light of the law, which is to apply to all in the same manner (1.51). For a polis to exist, properly, juridicial equality is a must. The law is meaningless if it is applied arbitrarily; it is a guide for all, not for a section of the population.

The laws represent collective wisdom, the mos maiorum, that are integral to the existence of the polis. Cicero even defines the commonwealth, the res publica, in terms of two factors, the most important of which is “agreement on law” (1.39a). Cicero argued that the Roman Republic, when it existed in his idealised form, reflect the wisdom and care of generations of wise men dedicated to the state, and with those procession of excellent but fallible men, came about a constitution and res publica like no other. It could not, and did not, suffer the whims and fancies of a tyrant, or of a single person, but the collective wisdom of all. Cicero writes:

“Our commonwealth, in contrast, was not shaped by one man’s talent but by that of many; and not in one person’s lifetime, but over many generations. He [Cato the Elder] said that there never was a genius so great that he could miss nothing, not could all the geniuses in the world brought together in one place at one time foresee all contingencies without the practical experience afforded by the passage of time.” (2.2)

The obligation to follow the law, then, also stems from a recognition of its time-tested nature, and from custom and tradition, which are the bedrock of society.

This spills over into the related question of moral obligation or duty, the first of which is legal obligation. Cicero pointedly remarks:

“Our country did not give us brith or rearing without expecting some return from us or thinking that while herself serving our convenience she should provide safe refuge for our relaxation and a quiet place for rest; but she did so with the understanding that she has a claim on the largest and best part of our minds, talents, and judgement for her own use, and leaves for our private use only so much as is beyond her requirements.” (1.7)

It was not enough for one to do one’s civic duty by merely paying one’s taxes and voting when the time came and following the laws of the land — Cicero found it essential for the citizen to have more than that figment of a duty toward one’s own country. The obligations of excellence could only be expressed in terms of service to the res publica. There is a clear and distinct moral obligation to public service, to the common good, that those who rise above mediocrity must seek to fulfil, with filial piety and without concern for the self. The demands of public life are many, and its callings take many forms. Idleness, subterfuge, and rabble-rousing are not the objects of such work. Tyrants, especially the garden variety that are known as demagogues or populares, earn Cicero’s ire like few other things.

For a man of excellence, positions of state authority are “things that must be undertaken for the sake of performing one’s duty, not to be sought out for the sake of rewards or glory” (1.27). Moral obligation covers intent and act: one must think right and intentionally act, not in slavish submission but to preserve the vitality of the polis. One cannot sacrifice means to achieve a particular end: this sort of means-end compromise is never acceptable.