Are We Afraid of Beauty? (II)

Vesuivus
Pierre-Jacques Volaire, The Eruption of Vesuvius, 1771. At the Art Institute Chicago.

Some time ago, I asked in two successive posts whether we really were afraid of beauty nowadays and whether that had significantly altered our approach to thinking about virtue. I wrote a response that was brief and not as comprehensive as I had imagined; it was merely putting pen to paper for a thought that was begging to be let out. Since then, I have had the opportunity to read more widely on the subject, and a book that has caught my attention is Elaine Scarry’s On Beauty and Being Just, which was delivered as the Tanner Lecture on Human Values at Yale University in 1998.1 Scarry’s lectures are marvellous works, and excised of their drooling over the work of Matisse, asks an important question: how are beauty and justice connected? Can the beautiful be connected to the just? Scarry identifies two roles that beauty takes — first, as the progenitor of wonder; second, as creating what she terms the “pressure toward the distributional,”;2 — that are integral to our understanding and comprehension of the world. Through this essay, I will take some of Scarry’s ideas and apply them to areas of inquiry that I intend to probe further.

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  1. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999)
  2. Ibid, 67.

Homeric Beauty

In his paper ‘The Terminology for Beauty in the Iliad and the Odyssey,’1 Hugo Shakeshaft makes some interesting observations which are of particular interest to those attempting to find a conception of the good, the beautiful, and the ethical/virtuous in Ancient Greek political thought. If, as is stated, Aristotle did indeed borrow the word wholesale from Homer, it would only be prudent to return to Homer to see where it all started.

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  1. Hugo Shakeshaft, ‘The Terminology for Beauty in the Illiad and the Odyssey’, The Classical Quarterly 69, no. 1 (2019): 1–22.

More and the Nature of Work

For someone who complains so regularly about utopias, it is quite the travesty that I have never managed to find the leisure or the inclination to read Thomas More’s Utopia,1 even if small segments and portions have managed to make their way into my thought, perhaps inadvertently. I cannot deny that the text has been immensely influential; it is of primary interest to me because of the spatial and aesthetic sensibilities it embodies. If we had to make a real world anew, what would we include? What would we leave out from the domain of stipulation? These are important questions, but I am already getting ahead of myself. This piece focuses on my impressions and the concerns highlighted in the first book; I shall pick up the next day on issues in the penultimate and ultimate books.

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  1. Thomas More, Utopia, trans. Ralph Robinson, in Three Early Modern Utopias, ed. Susan Bruce, Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Are we afraid of beauty?

There are two claims in Joe Sach’s article1 that I promised I would return to in my previous piece, but chose not to because it was not wholly relevant to the line of argument it had taken on. However, I did not intend to abandon them. These two themes coalesce around a phenomenon that I have seen when I studied the history of art: that we have become viscerally afraid of beauty. Sachs lays out some of the groundwork:

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  1. Joe Sachs, ‘Three Little Words’, The St. John’s Review XLIV, no. 1 (1997): 1–22.

What is ‘kalon’?

Why should the student of politics be apprised of the beautiful? This question is answered perhaps obliquely in the Nicomachean Ethics, where the Aristotle remarks that of the four fundamental questions of the study of politics, one is the enquiry into what is “noble [kalon] and just” (NE 1144a12). But this very word, kalon, is the root of much debate, sometimes with acerbic overtones in academic settings that seem otherwise to be bereft of sharp rivalries and accusations and allegations of utter and complete incomprehension of the object, or in this case, the word being examined. Today, I shall endeavour to write about the word ‘kalon’ despite my utter and total lack of Greek, ancient or modern; with this goes any apologies that must be rendered for coming off as a total tool. The question that we are faced with is simple: why is kalon rendered in translations the way it is: varyingly, as noble, just, or good, or nothing but beautiful? Can we truly remove from the scope of Aristotle’s ethical and political thought any concern with aesthetics, and, if this being the case, is such an artificial separation detrimental to how we conceive of politics in practice and thought?

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Social Skills and Social Media

Another GRE essay …

The documentary ‘The Social Dilemma’ draws upon hundreds of hours of interviews from tech executives including the inventor of Facebook’s ‘like button’ to show how smartphones and tablets have been used by tech giants to manipulate and influence the lives of teenagers and adults alike. The alluring draw of instant and constant connectivity, the makers of the documentary claim, is something to be wary of, especially because of the subconscious ways in which technology seeks to influence our thoughts, feelings, interactions, and habits. In a particularly striking scene, the documentary depicts a hologram of a fictional user suspended in digital space like a biological specimen preserved in formaldehyde, ready to be dissected: that digital persona resembles the human only in form, but is a starkly different figure on the inside. The indelible and grave impact that portable devices and the software they run have on young people is most prominently shown in their social skills, which seem to become increasingly stunted and awkward.

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Public Education and a Common Curriculum

Another GRE Essay …

Whether or not students ought to conform to a singular, monolithic curriculum until they matriculate at college depends on a litany of factors, most prominent of which are the nature of the nation and the extent to which education is available to all. Education has been an important part of thinking about the nation ever since the seeds of political thought were sown in the utopic world of Kallipolis in Plato’s Republic, in the more achievable Magnesia in the Laws, and in Aristotle’s Politics, most famous for recognising man’s nature as the polis animal. Through the recommendations put forth by Plato in the Republic and Aristotle in the Politics, I seek to argue that a nation should require all of its students to study a common core curriculum that can be customised with different options to better suit the needs of the nation and of students.

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Consequences and Intent

Yet another GRE essay.

Claim: An action is morally correct if the amount of good that results from the action is greater than the amount of bad that results from the action.
Reason: When assessing the morality of an action, the results of the action are more important than the intent of the person or people performing the action.

The consequences of an action is but one small part of the action itself, and the extent to which one ought to keep consideration of the consequences of the action as the focal point of ethical and moral judgment is itself up for some degree of debate. Whether or not the intent of the action ought to prefigure some modicum of judgement before which the actions are judged in terms of their consequences is a moral question that is best stated in the form of a dilemma. Here, I will seek to argue that while judging actions on the basis of the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ is important, in measuring the totality of the action and sizing it up for judgement, intent is a necessary bedrock upon which we must hoist our flag.

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Is the surest indicator of a great nation the achievements of its rulers, artists, and scientists, or the general welfare of its peoples?

Yet another GRE essay …

Writing in the fourth century BC, the Greek philosopher Aristotle made two crucial observations in his treatise Politics about the human condition in relation to our nature as political animals: first, that scarcity was the human lot and man could never break free of the competition for scarce resources, and second, that hierarchy in production and organisation could never be erased. It was only those who had the leisure to rule and then be ruled in turn that qualified as citizens for Aristotle’s ideal polis: political equality entailed some degree of material sufficiency and isolation from economic forces. Contemplation, Aristotle noted, could only happen in the absence of material wants, and thus Aristotle designed an entire schema of politics where the household, the oikos, aimed to be a self-sufficient unit that enabled its head to live a political or a contemplative life. That was the hallmark of a good polis, of the ideal city-state. But those subject to the will of the oikos-master, the head of the household, were slaves in Aristotle’s treatise: either slaves by virtue of their position in the household or slaves by virtue of being subject to economic forces and thus having no place, no oikos, where they could retire to at the end of the day. Thus, for Aristotle, the good life was mutually exclusive from the life of toil and penury: but it was only readily available to a few. The welfare of all, the summum bonum, as the medieval schoolmen following his stead called it, lied in everyone recognising their place in society and fulfilling their duty, and for some it meant labour, and for others it meant leisure for intellectual pursuits. I will seek to illustrate that the general welfare of the people is not mutually exclusive from the advancements of those who govern it or exercise intellectual labour in such contexts.

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Do sports stars and movie stars have an obligation to be exemplars of good conduct?

Another interesting GRE essay. The prompt was as follows: “Sports stars and movie stars have an obligation to behave as role models for the young people who look up to them. In return for the millions of dollars that they are paid, we should expect them to fulfill this societal responsibility.”

If I had more time, I would have certainly alluded to passages from Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.

It is man’s innate tendency to search for idols and to lionise those he sees as superhuman. But the extent to which this lionisation and idolisation is appropriate and healthy is up for question. According to the claim presented, sportsmen and thespians ought to be held to higher standards of conduct because they earn copious amounts of money and tend to provide inspiration, especially for the youth. However, this stance suffers from many issues: it correlates ethical action with high incomes; it assumes sportsmen and movie stars are paid for this expressed purpose; and that such payment construes a moral and ethical obligation to be well-behaved and pose as “role models” for the younger generation. I will seek to argue that this is not the case: that being a sportsman or a movie star has no relation to their ethical conduct or their excellence, that what happens off screen and off the field is of no bearing to these professions, and that the sum total of this expectation is misplaced because it pushes into the domain of obligation for a few what ought to be the domain of all.

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