The Homo Politicus in Mr. Mani’s Jerusalem

In the third chapter of A.B. Yehoshua’s 1989 novel Mr. Mani, the reader meets the enigmatic and intellectual Yosef Mani. He calls himself a homo politicus, who “drifts” among the identities of 1917 Jerusalem, developing his politics and acquiring languages as though they were a “batch of keys to a house with many doors” (172). In fact, a deep reading of this chapter shows that the singular speaker – Ivor Horowitz, a British Jew investigating Yosef for anti-British activity – also displays fundamental signs of being a homo politicus. Jerusalem, with its tangle of competing cultural and religious groups, engenders such persons. In this paper, I will argue through a close reading of the text that both Ivor and Yosef capitalize on their cultural, linguistic, and national affiliations to serve their own interests as homo politicus – a partial byproduct of the Western nationalist psyche rising in the Jerusalem at the time.

First, a close look at Horowitz’s comments to his British colleague display his nature as a homo politicus: he makes a conscious political decision to evade his inherited identity as a Jew in favor of serving Great Britain. It starts early in the text – with Horowitz’s repeated explanation of his name’s spelling: “Horowitz, Colonel, with two ‘o’s’” (150). Horowitz’s need to clarify this alienates him, as Colonel Woodhouse appears to not immediately understand his Jewish name. Almost in response to this awkward start, Horowitz’s ensuing description of fellow Jews demonstrates a subtle grammatical effort to set himself apart. He tells the Colonel, “We never thought we’d encounter such a stormy winter in Jerusalem, which our [emphasis added] British imaginations had pictured” (150). This use of the third person continues in Horowitz’s discussion of the Western Wall, which Horowitz calls “that big white wall they [emphasis added] stand in front of, which is supposedly a remnant of their Temple” (151). Horowitz also does not fail to mention his characteristically British law studies at Oxford and later military service. Horowitz’s political goal here, as prosecutor, is to establish a congenial relationship with the Colonel who will judge Yosef Mani’s alleged treason. So, he uses powerful references to his British identity to try and win the elder Brit’s favor.

The focus of the conversation, however, is on Yosef Mani’s nimble ability to navigate the complex cultural and political world of Jerusalem, eventually using what he learned to serve his Zionist political aims. Yosef’s local affinities and Zionist roots are displayed in the same paragraph on page 178, suggesting an intentional connection by Yehoshua. In a single day, he spends his mornings in the Arab coffeehouse, teaches Arabic grammar in the afternoons, visits his Sephardic synagogue for midday prayer and ends the evening at the Zionist Club (178). His local roots are further made evident in the prosecutor’s description of Yosef’s physical movement throughout Jerusalem, the city where his “father and grandfather” are interred (187). Yosef moves between innumerable holy sites and ancient city gates with an insider’s ease, flitting from the “Mohammedan coffeehouse” to the meetings of Jewish dignitaries who have come to witness the “redemption of Zion” (Yehoshua 187). The author thus quietly describes Yosef’s political birth as a Zionist, albeit from an angle usually unexplored; as Klein notes in his piece on Arab Jews, historical research has “barely touched on Arab-Jewish identity” (20). The British used Yosef’s linguistic abilities to announce their political proclamations to locals in Palestine, work which clearly irked him. Horowitz’s narrative language conveys several examples of Yosef’s annoyance at the British presence in Palestine. Horowitz describes the British armed forces as the “British juggernaut thundering across the Holy Land” and Allenby’s army as creeping slowly into the “mountains of Judea” (183-184). In both statements, religious Jewish terms are used to describe the land. Yosef goes on to subvert the British cause by clandestinely preaching to local Arabs, in pursuit of his homo politicus goal of instructing them to form an identity, which may serve his own political needs.

The reader is told that at night, Yosef “shut[s] his eyes and pictures himself orating to the Arab villagers … his heart bled for the Arabs …” (187). He speaks to the villagers in the local Arabic which even the British could not master, despite years of study at Oxford (Yehoshua 181,189). Addressing the group, he informs them of Balfour’s declaration, supplicating them to get “an identity, and be quick!” (Yehoshua 189). Detailing the declaration, he notes that the land will be divided in half – with one section “for us,” i.e., the Jews, and another for them (Yehoshua 189). He notes that the Englishman and Turk, while present then, would eventually depart – calling upon the Arabs to “sleep not” regarding their own interests. Clearly, as a Jew who attends daily prayer, avoids kindling fire on the Sabbath and has immersed himself in the Jerusalem meetings of passionate early Zionists, Yosef is conveying that the rapidly organizing Jews will overtake Arab claims to the same land. The fact that the Zionists meet at nighttime, forgoing sleep in their efforts to establish their national presence, only strengthens his call to his Arab brethren to “sleep not.” Far from acting this way to empower the Arab cause, Yosef symbolizes a homo politicus who knows that when competing groups establish their interests at the outset, it can reduce conflict. Yehoshua, writing some seventy years after these 1917 scenes, knows that the powerful Jewish organizing power in the land of Israel would eventually lead to bloodshed and conflict with local non-Jewish Arabs, whose practical national aspirations materialize decades too late.

Yosef toes the lines of a delicate political situation, navigating new nationalist predicaments. According to Klein, Ya’akov Yehoshua (the father of Mr. Mani’s author) described the residential courtyards of the Jews and Muslims of Jerusalem as “common,” before the British influence (21). Arab Jewish and Muslim relations were familial and friendly, bound by locale and language. The younger Yehoshua, our author, grew up in a Jerusalem where Jewish mothers poured their hearts out to Muslim women, and vice versa (21). Klein sums up these nostalgic recollections of a Jerusalem where local ties reigned supreme: “Nationalism suddenly intruded on their lives and those of their Muslim neighbors and imposed its hatreds and wars on them. The construction of the national “I” involved the rejection of prior identities, including that of being Arab Jews” (21). Yosef – a homo politicus at heart – appears to the reader as an early thinker on this issue, and he seeks to use his local and linguistic affinities to spread common knowledge about the national aims of Britain and European Zionism and the danger they pose to the peaceful, intercultural lifestyle which he likely views as integral to his Jerusalemite identity.

Works Cited

Yehoshua, A.B. Mr. Mani. 1989. Translated by Hillel Halkin, Doubleday, 1992.

Klein, “Arab Jews” (Class text, Prof. Behar)

Love, and Self-Deception, in The Knight from Olmedo

Usually, the objective of fiery romantic passion is to spend as much time as possible with one’s lover. In Lope de Vega’s 17th century play ​The Knight from Olmedo​, lovers Don Alonso and Doña Inés repeatedly describe each other within the context of their blazing passion. At one point, Don Alonso even exclaims about his feverish feelings toward his beloved: “My love does not grow cool. It burns!” (2.15). Given their burning passion, it would be expected that the two would strive to marry at once, or at least shun any opportunity to be without the other. Puzzlingly, a pattern emerges throughout the play which points to a more complicated reality: the pair, despite consistently voicing their love and passion for each other, are surprisingly inactive in their pursuit of marriage, or any physical union. Over time, the play comes to serve partly as a meditation on how people undermine their outspoken desires. Though evidently in love with each other, Don Alonso and Doña Inés deceive themselves about their relationship and chronically sabotage their success as a couple by imposing unnecessary obstacles to their own union.

Nothing proves so detrimental to objective reasoning as a fall into the depths of passion, and Don Alonso and Doña Inés evidently experience such a fall. The two are entangled in a deep love for one another, beginning with Don Alonso’s falling for Doña Inés at a festival at first sight and evolving onwards. The deep romantic passion experienced by both parties in the relationship helps to explain the pair’s later irrationality and deceptive actions. Regarding her unwanted suitor Don Rodrigo, Doña Inés says “His looks and flattering words turn me / To ice” (1.183-184). This is the direct opposite of the heated, passionate feelings she exhibits towards Don Alonso, including when she refers to her heart as “ablaze” when she thinks of him (1.599-600). Doña Inés’ choice of the word “ablaze” mirrors Don Alonso’s own speech at the beginning of Act One, when he says, “Those eyes that gazed on me has [​sic​] set / My soul on fire, ablaze with love” (1.11-12). Through these personal admissions of their passion, it becomes clear that their overwhelming emotions may cloud judgement. Doña Inés examines the possibility of this lowered faculty of sense in Act One, saying: “First love is irresistible. / When Nature rules, how can a girl / Be sensible?” (1.439-441). In other words, she is pointing out that the power of natural emotion can cloud objective reasoning. Yet, her own recognition of such a phenomenon also points to the fact that her later actions may not only be a result of muddied reason, but also driven by some unknown personal intention. A clear contrast develops between the examples of passion for each other and the puzzling choices both Don Alonso and Doña Inés make to construct obstacles to their union.

Doña Inés imposes numerous obstacles to her relationship with Don Alonso, both by striving unnecessarily to adhere perfectly to social expectations and by deceiving others about her love. At the outset of the play, Doña Inés’ father informs her that he cannot think of a better husband for her than Don Rodrigo (2.251-254). While her father’s wishes are important, especially given the patent authority of men in 17​th​ century Spain, it appears that Doña Inés takes his wishes too seriously at her own expense. Doña Inés’ dilemma is grounded in her need to bow to her father’s wishes regarding her marriage, so his desire for her to marry Don Rodrigo is reason enough to insist to herself that she is out of options. Even after hearing about Don Alonso’s sizeable wealth and reputation from Fabia, Doña Inés says, “Oh, how can I become his wife / If father offers me to Don Rodrigo?” (1.711-714). Fabia objects to Doña Inés’ blind deference to social convention, responding: “You and your young man [Don Alonso] / Will overturn the sentence” (1.715-716). And Fabia proves to be somewhat correct.  While social obligations are key, especially in the deeply structured society of the play, passion, and love for one’s partner can bend the rules more than Doña Inés allows. In the subsequent example, it becomes evident that the social conventions on which Doña Inés places so much emphasis exist more as obstacles in her mind than impermeable barriers.

Doña Inés decides her only way out of her dilemma is through deception. So, she falsely confesses to her father “I am / Already married,” implying a decision to become a nun (2.262-263). Her father’s response, however, speaks volumes to his willingness to waver on his earlier opinion: he exclaims that he wants grandchildren, and his surprised tone suggests he is generally taken aback by his daughter’s rash decision. The possibility of his willingness to waver on his view of Rodrigo is only strengthened when Doña Inés’ father implores her: “Daughter, you wish / To poison me? There is still time” (2.440-441). At this point, it becomes evident that Doña Inés could tell her father with relative ease about her love for Don Alonso. In doing so, she would satisfy his professed desire for her to marry instead of devoting herself and their family bloodline to Christ. She consciously chooses, however, to take a circuitous route, masking her love for Don Alonso through deception. Perhaps it is the pervasive presence of social constraints in their society which Doña Inés has internalized, such that young women have little agency over their romantic choices. Yet, despite the confidence of those around her, including her sister, who later tells Don Alonso of the high possibility of their father’s favor for him, Doña Inés lacks sense in her approach to the situation. She deceives herself and her father instead of striving to be with her beloved, imposing unnecessary obstacles to her marriage to Don Alonso which are only compounded by his actions, or more precisely, ​inaction​.

Don Alonso’s inaction and lack of concrete plans for marriage create obstacles to his professed goal of a union with Doña Inés. In Act One, he mentions his “hopes of marriage” with Doña Inés, but such hopes for a real union with her seem to fade into a general indifference to such pursuits as the play progresses (1.145). In Act Two, Don Alonso recognizes a threat to his marriage prospects with Doña Inés, admitting, “… I should have a rival who / Has fallen for Inés and therefore seeks / To Marry her” (2.77-79). Yet, instead of proposing any concrete plan to unseat his romantic “rival” and resolve the proposed problem, Don Alonso chooses in subsequent lines to meditate on his “worship” of his beloved, as if she is an embodiment of the Divine (2.86). He says: “I worship her, I live / In her … I am / Her slave, I cannot live without her. / I come and go between Olmedo and Medina because Inés is mistress of / My soul, regardless of whether I live / Or die” (2.86-93).  In this passage, his plans are vague: he does not care if he lives or dies, since Doña Inés remains the “mistress” of his soul. Especially notable is his claim that he lives “in her,” which furthers the notion that he is disregarding the importance of, say living ​with ​her, since he already views their relationship as something which surpasses the physical realm. Later in the play, he remains notably vague on the future of their marriage. He tells her at one point, “To be thought of as your husband is /For me the greatest happiness” (3.316-317). In this puzzling word choice on Lope’s part, Don Alonso tells his beloved that merely being “thought of” as her husband provides him overwhelming contentment, implicitly disregarding the importance of a physical union. Arguably, Don Alonso deceives himself by disregarding the importance of a physical connection to Inés, and his view of death in relation to their union furthers this notion.

To Don Alonso, death does not prove a plain obstacle to his love of Doña Inés. It becomes evident that Don Alonso sees their pairing as something which could stand the test of death, and thus remains immortal. He says in Act Three: “I go, then, to my death, although / To die, I know, is not to lose you. / For if you still possess my soul, / How can I then depart and be alive?” (3.331-334). Here, Don Alonso is constructing an obstacle to his union with Doña Inés by implicitly disregarding the importance of their earthly, physical connection. After all, Don Alonso does not see death as an impediment to his passion for Doña Inés, for he sees their souls as already intertwined. His statement requires a deep faith in the everlasting nature of their passion for one another, especially given how humans lose their physical connection with loved ones when they die. Thus, it suggests a sort of falsity and a blurred conception on Don Alonso’s part of the heavy impact death can take on two lovers. And, despite having claimed he wants marriage earlier in the play, it appears to be a self-deception of sorts, in reality Don Alonso does little which brings the two closer to marriage since he believes so wholeheartedly in the eternity of their relationship.

Another notable example of Don Alonso’s choice to construct obstacles to his union with Doña Inés is his decision to leave and see his parents in Olmedo at an inopportune point in the play. Notably, his departure from Medina comes directly after he is advised by Doña Inés’ sister that he will be welcomed with open arms by their father. The sister insists with earnest, “My father is full of praise for you, / And well disposed. When he’s informed / You Love Inés and she loves you / He’ll welcome you with open arms” (3.250-254). Despite this critical information, which opens the possibility of marrying Doña Inés (which was his professed hope in Act One), Don Alonso ​continues ​his self-deception, leaving to see his parents in Olmedo, on claims that they will worry about him should he not arrive. Given the intensity of Don Alonso’s passion for Doña Inés and the recent news of her possible freedom to marry, it is puzzling that he should remain so insistent on avoiding even a slight delay in leaving for his hometown. In a soulful speech, he laments parting from his lover, despite truly not having to do so. Doña Inés says only a few lines later that her father “longs that you [Don Alonso] / Should marry Leonor,” which the sister, Leonor, had just plainly negated in her statement (3.276-277). Yet, Don Alonso does not object to Doña Inés’ point, despite his knowledge of her father’s approval. Instead of jumping at the opportunity to marry Doña Inés, Don Alonso chooses a circuitous route instead of any direct path to marriage.

Don Alonso and Doña Inés​ ​deceive themselves of their reality by constructing and imposing false obstacles upon their marriage prospects. Despite their passion for each other, and evident sadness and distress at parting, they (especially Don Alonso) remain inactive in making their union exist in a tangible sense. Though the two lovers practice self-deception of facts, and through constructing false social obligations which police their actions from ​within, it remains unclear why they do so. Possibly, their reluctance to move forward with physical plans to join each other in marriage could be an implicit fear of losing the passion which is so well-sustained through distance and rules; maybe they are trying to maintain the more exciting nature of their burning love by pretending it violates numerous obstacles which must be surmounted to be together.

Works Cited

Vega, Lope de, Gwynne. Edwards, and Lope de Vega. Fuente Ovejuna; The Knight from Olmedo; Punishment Without Revenge . Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Print.

The Impact of Sectarian Division on the Lebanese Cedar Revolution

The explosion which killed Lebanon’s former prime minister, Rafik Hariri on February 14th, 2005, sent shock waves through both the streets of Beirut and Lebanon’s precarious political situation. In the wake of the assassination, largely Shi’a protesters supported by Hezbollah took to the streets on March 8th to highlight the importance of Syria as a post-civil war peacekeeping influence in Lebanon. On March 14th, Sunni, Christian and Druze Lebanese counter-protested in huge numbers, demanding (eventually with success) the end of Syrian influence on their nation. The March 14th camp also placed blame on Damascus –– which had held military and political influence in Lebanon for decades –– for the assassination. This series of uprisings, though not a singular movement, has been widely termed the Cedar Revolution. In this essay, I argue that the Cedar Revolution represents an outburst of Lebanon’s resilient sectarianism, a partial result of Lebanon’s deep confessional divides and shaky historical solutions to the problem.

Sectarianism impacted the Cedar Revolution, both in division between the March 8th and March 14th camps, and even between factions of each camp. For example, the large March 14th camp was beset with internal division, despite apparent unity against Syria displayed during mass protests. Given, the March 14th protests demonstrated some early visual symbols of Lebanese confessional unity: “During the demonstrations, posters depicting a Muslim crescent together with a Christian cross and signed with a slogan ‘all Lebanese’ were distributed on the streets” (Kurtulus 199). Clearly, anti-Syrian sentiments in Beirut trumped sectarian concerns for a significant portion of the population (some one fourth of the population poured into the streets to protest Syria). Yet, as Kurtulus argues, the surface-level unity shown by citizens “brandishing their [Lebanese] flags,” among other symbols, often concealed the fact that different citizens were displaying the flag for different ideological goals. The development of the pro-Syrian March 8th and anti-Syrian March 14th blocs best exemplifies this wider division.

These different camps had disparate goals despite being historically branded as part of the same Cedar Revolution. Even the call for a withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which was somewhat supported even by the pro-Syrian camp, saw different March 8th and March 14th leaders tracing their reasoning for the pro-withdrawal stance to different official documents (Kurtulus). During an effort to set up a tribunal to try those associated with Hariri’s death, Shi’a government officials boycotted the efforts by the newly elected, anti-Syrian (March 14th) government, showing the resilience of sectarian divides (Kurtulus). The victories of anti-Syrian political groups also provoked the ire of pro-Syrian groups like Hezbollah –– showing how the very goals of the March 14th camp fed sectarian division in the country (Kurtulus). The 2005 Cedar Revolution and its aftermath consisted more of the flares of resilient sectarianism than deep political change.

The 1989 Taif Agreement –– which ended the Lebanese Civil War –– institutionalized sectarian divides by outlining a government with sectarian restrictions, which impacted Lebanon in the wake of the 2005 unrest. To start, the original agreement notes that “Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of sectarian restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided…Equally between Christians and Muslims” (Taif). Given that demographic groups in Lebanon do not actually align with Taif’s provisions, the document’s provisions almost predicted sectarian tensions as groups vie for power. Shi’a groups in Lebanon alleged that the agreement did not provide sufficient representation for their confessional community in the government (Hamdan). Their grievances included that the Taif Agreement undermined Shi’a executive power while enhancing the Sunni position through the newly empowered Prime Minister position (Hamdan). The Shi’a (e.g., Hezbollah and Amal) position regarding the Taif agreement is that it “has not distributed executive authority to the council of ministers and … that executive power was monopolized by the prime minister, beginning with the late Hariri,” though the bloc apparently offered little advice about how to reform the system. (Hamdan). The outlines of the Taif-based government evidently fanned sectarian flames as the March 8th and March 14thcamps debated which confessional community deserved the privileges to which position. The post-2005 government of Lebanon still finds itself caught in the resilient confessional divisions outlined in the Taif Agreement, wherein sectarianism better battled through open political competition is entrenched in law.

Resilient sectarianism also impacted Lebanese politics when the March 14th camp achieved electoral victories in the wake of the Cedar Revolution. The departure of the Syrian military and the break with Damascus which defined the Cedar Revolution’s outcome led many Sunnis in the March 14th camp to favor a new strengthening of the Lebanese state through the bolstered domestic rule of law, a national defense strategy and justice for Hariri’s killing: “The aim of this strategy was to strengthen the state at [Shi’a] Hezbollah’s expense … and blame it for exacerbating sectarian tensions” (Knudsen). The expulsion of Syria from Lebanese affairs was advocated by March 14th constituents not just out of concern regarding Syria’s impact on their brethren, but also out of spite for pro-Syrian March 8th sectarian groups like Hezbollah. According to one scholar, despite its electoral and policy victories, the March 14th government proved incapable of basic governance, let alone reform, and Lebanese politics again broke down along sectarian lines (Makhzoumi). This domestic division was also witnessed in the years following 2005, including when Israel attacked Hezbollah in 2006 –– which strengthened both Hezbollah and consequently, sectarian tension (Makhzoumi). Eventually, the March 14th government even blocked March 8th’s (i.e, Hezbollah’s) power by “banning its private telecommunications network” (Makhzoumi). This division eventually militarized, leading to the rise of Hezbollah’s militia, which countered the main Lebanese Army run by the March 14th government and eventually occupied much of Beirut at the expense of local stability (Makhzoumi). The fact that Hezbollah grew strong enough to pose a true threat to Lebanon’s central coercive apparatus is also indicative of the division in the country and the inability of the then-ruling March 14th camp to centralize power in the wake of the revolution.

The 2005 Cedar Revolution was less a revolution than a series of uprisings provoked by a powder-keg style assassination and resilient domestic sectarianism. When the successful ousting of Syria as an oppressive peacekeeper opened a power vacuum between the March 8th and March 14th camps, old sectarian tensions re-appeared. In a country with an uneasy balance of Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shi’a Muslims, even occasional successes such as the expulsion of unwelcome Syrians can quickly devolve into civil tensions. The two major ideological camps still compete for power and military influence. They also debate how to address justice for Hariri, a point of heated contention. These issues affect Lebanese politics to this day –– between 2014 and 2016 parliamentary gridlock between March 8th and March 14th groups made it difficult to elect a new leader. As recently as late 2019 mass protests erupted in Beirut concerning the latest political and socio-economic grievances (Chehayeb).

Works Cited

Bergman, Ronen. “The Hezbollah Connection.” The New York Times 10 Feb. 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/the-hezbollah-connection.html?auth=loginemail&login=email

Chehayeb, Kareem and Abby Swell. “Why Protesters in Lebanon are Taking to the Streets.” Foreign Policy. 2 Nov. 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/02/lebanon-protestersmovement-streets-explainer/

Harris, William. “Lebanon’s Roller Coaster Ride.” Lebanon: Liberation, Conflicts and

Crisis, edited by Barry Rubin. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. New York.

Hamdan, Amal. “The Limits of Corporate Consociation: Taif and the Crisis of Power-

Sharing in Lebanon since 2005.” Lebanon: After the Cedar Revolution. 2013.

Knudsen, Are and Michael Kerr. “Introduction: The Cedar Revolution and Beyond.”

Lebanon: After the Cedar Revolution, edited by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr. 2013.

Kurtulus, Ersun N. “‘The Cedar Revolution’: Lebanese Independence and the Question of Collective Self-Determination.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 25 Mar 2010. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13530190903007251?needAccess=true&

Makhzoumi, Fouad. “Lebanon’s Crisis of Sovereignty.” Survival. 25 Mar. 2010.

The Taif Agreement. 1989. https://www.un.int/lebanon/sites/www.un.int/files/Lebanon/the_taif_agreement_english_version _.pdf

An Unusual Zoom on Individuality

A most curious thing happened to me the other day. As I sat down to prepare for my Govt. 6 final exam, I opened my textbook, Classics of Moral and Political Philosophy, edited by Michael Morgan. As I began to comb through my notes, a phone notification interrupted me. It was an invitation to a Zoom link, with the cryptic title: “On Individuality.” Intrigued, I clicked on the link. Suddenly, several figures popped up on my screen: Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill and Socrates. First connecting to audio and trying to contain my excitement, I quickly joined the philosophers’ conversation, first considering their points and proceeding to argue my own. This essay entails my best recollection of the experience, recorded as a dialogue. Along the way, I found that I agreed with the outlook that individuality — encouraged through freedom to act as one pleases without encroaching on others — exists as a positive force in society because it gives us the ability to push the boundaries of action, perspective and ideology ever farther from our primitive origins. 

CLICK TO JOIN ZOOM MEETING: 

SOCRATES: In my life, gentlemen, I aroused a great deal of hostility among my contemporaries. I think you will find, though, that my open embrace of individuality was the bright spark which led to my later demise. My story, recorded in Plato’s Apology, goes something like this. At the ripe age of seventy, I was brought before a court in Athens (Morgan 46). The accusers’ affidavit charged me with committing injustice and being a “busy-body,” investigating things beneath the earth and in the heavens, making the weaker argument the stronger, and teaching these things to others (47). Now, gentlemen, your modern intellects may lead you to wonder why such things would merit either trial or punishment. Let me remind you that I lived in an age when belief was dogmatic, human experiences were projected onto the Divine, answers were gathered from the oracle and threats to the intellectual status quo were seen as a viable danger to the entire polis.

Now, you may not have met me before, but perhaps you know my ideology through my Socratic teaching style, which I established to cross-examine individuals who claim wisdom and expose the accuracy of their argument (50). Individuality is prerequisite to my style of teaching and examination: if there were no differences between us, there would be no arguments to be had. And I think we can agree that my defense in the Athenian courts shows the importance we implicitly assign to individual disagreement and dissent. After all, since even before the days of ancient Greece, we humans have erected forums in order to deduce the truth and produce justice. Without disputes and different thoughts from individuals, there would be no issues to settle, and society would remain ignorant and stagnant. 

MILL: A quick interruption, if you will allow me, Socrates. Though I am excited to hear the rest of your story, I thought I would point out that I too believe in the benefits of individual thought. I argue in my work On Liberty that by cultivating and calling forth individuality, we humans become a “noble and beautiful object of contemplation,” (1041). To argue that whomever our Maker is would endow us with faculties of reason and not want them to be “cultivated,” “unfolded” and enjoyed would be, well, preposterous. Please continue, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: Well, this Christianity of yours certainly sounds fascinating. We will have to touch on it after our present conversation. The details of my trial are unimportant [the jury found Socrates guilty], but the thoughts it provoked remain key (59). As I contemplated my life in its final hours, I came to understand that “the unexamined life isn’t worth living” (60). That is, what constitutes our greatest good as men is to discuss virtue every day (60). To me, individuality supersedes both age and finances (55). In many ways, the ability for men to express their own opinions is the great equalizer. To practice philosophy and draw closer to an understanding of virtue and goodness is only possible through thorough questioning, examination and testing and allows us to uplift our souls to the “best possible condition” (55). 

STRIER: Whether the daily questions, exams and tests I receive as a student will contribute to my virtue in society remains to be seen, Socrates, but that is a conversation for another day. Regarding individuality, I cannot help but agree with what the other gentlemen have argued thus far. You see, I live in an era when dogmatic thought, thoroughly unexamined philosophies of right and wrong and strict codes govern my speech and actions. On the modern forum, the Internet — for our purposes let us consider it like a large town square with little regulation besides the wrath of the masses — those who disagree with others may band together to silence them, criticize them, report them or purge their platform. This serves two primary purposes, one positive and one negative. On the positive side, the critical mass of readers and thinkers are able to quickly identify misinformation, provide stronger examples and make their better case known. Their better arguments are then easily spread among the masses. On the negative side, if too many people buy into popular dogma as truth or lose themselves among the swelling tide of those with similar opinions, their presuppositions about the truth will lead them to their conclusions, a dangerous situation in any era. 

I suppose, though, that I would rather live in a society where everyone can voice their individual opinions, even if many are false or unsubstantiated, than in one where individuality is entirely suppressed. To know that I can take to the common forum with my thoughts, or dress up how I please, is a privilege. When everybody can do so, and the most logical or best forms of thought or dress, as two examples, become popular, everybody in society can benefit. 

MILL: I cannot help but gloat in hearing your narrative, Jacob, though I have had to suspend my disbelief in order to consider your bizarre example of this digital “common forum.” Even this Zoom stuff is a tricky business. The reason for my satisfaction is that in my writings I suggested the danger of the “tyranny of the prevailing opinion,” a danger which appears to have persisted past the change of the millennium (1011-1012). I argued that there is a limit to the “legitimate interference” of collective opinion with individual independence (1012). To know where the line is and prevent society from compelling all its constituent individuals from fashioning themselves upon the general model is critical. As a matter of fact, I —

MARX: Enough! I have sat here, quietly, listening to you gentlemen agree with each other in good-humored unison, celebrating individuality as you would riches. Have you stopped to consider the many negative attributes associated with your lifestyles? Socrates, I will start with your narrative. I know from my own reading of the Apology that in your examinations of the wise person, citizen or foreigner you encounter on Athens’ streets, you had to forgo leisure and general comforts entirely (50). In fact, you note that you lived in “extreme poverty” as a result of your philosophizing. This comes as no surprise; the system at the hands of the oppressive upper classes is designed to reject those individuals who try to break the status quo. Later in your narrative, the able and wealthy citizens of Athens come together to attack your willingness to think outside of the box and act as an individual. 

In my own writings, I propose that landed proprietors, the “bourgeois,” control the common man’s individuality by exploiting his endless toil for their own benefit (1192-1193). Thus, the common man’s inherent ability to use the aforementioned faculties of reason to see through this system of exploitation and free himself from the cycle of oppression must be one of the most positive aspects of individuality. So, I propose an absolute abolition of bourgeois individuality, independence and freedom (1193). I see you gentlemen reproaching me with your body language, squirming in discomfort at my suggestion. Hear me out, please. 

In the system I propose, united working men will have no country, nationalism will disappear and the incredible freedom of commerce on the world market will make differences between nations “immaterial” (1194). National differences and antagonisms are decreasing hour-by-hour, and the proletariat’s unity will lead to the abolition of inheritance, the erection of mass “industrial armies,” especially for agriculture, the equal liability to labor and other equalizing conditions (1194-1196). 

STRIER: I appreciate your suggestions, Marx. It seems to me that we can all agree, in some way, on the importance of individuality, which I will also refer to as personal freedom in my ensuing comments. To you, personal freedom is the realization of the human capacity to surpass a life of selling one’s labor as a mere marketable commodity and establish a new system. But in your propositions, I fear a loss of the positive aspects of individuality. As Mills accurately notes in On Liberty, the vast majority of people live mildly, with moderate introspection and moderate inclinations (1044). He notes that it is “essential” that different people should be permitted to lead different kinds of lives, and this differentiation is directly correlated to the development of wider society (1041). He adds that human genius can only “breathe” in the atmosphere of freedom, and the select few who dare to think differently from the moderate masses lead “society” to be “better for their genius” (1042). Whether in philosophy, science, cuisine or industry, I can think of many examples in which the innovations of a few have led to easier or more pleasurable lives for the majority. In this way, increased individuality provides a net positive to society because it allows for ingenuity.

After all, Marx, it seems that you led a nomadic lifestyle — moving from Trier to Paris to Brussels to London in search of freedom to philosophize and act as an individual, without succumbing to the same fate at the hands of the frightened masses as Socrates did (1158). In your suggestions of vast industrial armies, people compelled to similar labor and long hours in the fields, and mass standardization of education, I cannot help but wonder whether the genius suggested by Mills (a category which, if you permit me to say, you fall into) will be fostered enough to truly drive society forwards (1195-1196). 

If possible, I would also like to comment briefly on culture and groups which surpass the individual level. Mills, I found your statement on the cessation of human differences in On Liberty compelling. You argued that over time, we humans have come to read the same things, listen to the same things, visit similar places, fear and love the same objects, have the same abilities and liberties, and more (1046). Call me sentimental, but the endless sprint towards homogeneity frightens me — and I will go out on a limb to say it frightens both you and Socrates as well. Most notably, your statement about the cessation of our differences being greater than those differences which remain, rings true (1046). After all, in the Socratic age, the differing perspectives among peoples were massive. While animists nurtured spiritual connections with nature and animals among the vast African and American landscapes, Greeks imposed their human experience on the gods around them. Meanwhile my own ancestors, the Jewish people, were drawing upon different Eastern narratives to form a new religion of austere monotheism. At that time, people on different corners of the globe saw the world in deeply different ways; the vestiges of their different views have imbued the canon of world literature, the individual geniuses among them recording their society’s perspective for future generations to ponder. After all, we have gathered in today’s Zoom to discuss and grow as individuals through the discussion of our individual stories and differences. This is another positive impact of individuality: the ability to live life differently and grow through sharing narratives of ever-expanding human experiences. 

Now, this is not to say that I believe in either anarchy or a life without association with others. Both laws and various types of group association give our life meaning, a nod to our deep tribalism. So, I conclude that we wrap up our Zoom today with a cursory discussion of the best ways to emphasize individualism as a positive force in society while ensuring order and legal stability. Mill, I can see you are eager to join the conversation with the “raise-hand” feature and several questions in the chat. Please jump in. 

MILL: Wonderful, thank you. My basic conclusion in On Liberty is that the worth of a state, over time, is the worth of those individuals within it (1068). I argue that a state which belittles men, turning them into “docile instruments” and suppressing their mental expansion and individuality will accomplish nothing (1068). That’s not to say we should do away with government, instead the government should aid and stimulate individuals’ efforts (1068). 

STRIER: And you argue that while governments are usually alike, individual and voluntary associations are varied experiments, leading to an “endless diversity of experience” (1065). This makes sense, as does your condemnation of attempts by the state to “bias” citizens’ conclusions on disputed subjects (1064). Marx, your economic assertions also ring true: individuals caught in the gears of the capitalist system certainly lose agency. But let us set them aside for arguments’ sake and focus on individuality and ideology. Does not your assertion of abolishing “eternal truths,” “religion,” and “all morality,” risk becoming dogma in itself (1195)? Sure, it may sound like abolishing such things would encourage individualism, as truths, religion and morality are all things which are held in common by groups of people. Yet, the ability to choose between different “half-truths” according to my own inclination, as Mills puts it, and to pursue various ideological or religious schools at my will is where individuality truly shines (1037).

MILL: I am glad that you agree. 

STRIER: I’ll wrap up this discussion now, as I see that our neglect to purchase a premium subscription means our Zoom chat will end shortly. Everyone, I appreciate hearing your opinions. Though I am still coming to my conclusions, you will have noticed that I have aired on Mills’ side several times. As I seek to express myself freely without fear of retribution from others online, and seek out information at my own pace, I find his argument in On Liberty particularly compelling. He notes that when men refrain from molesting others with their own concerns and act according to their own judgement, they should be allowed to do what they please at their own cost “(1037).

Socrates, in the narrative presented in Plato’s Crito, you were nurtured by the “Laws” which you implicitly chose to follow by never leaving your polis (69). When presented with the option to submit to the laws in the form of the death penalty or escape using your means, you stood by your convictions and were put to death. In this way, you had agency in your demise, and at least had the hope of an afterworld where you would associate with, examine, and talk to whomever you please, which seems to me the most precise expression of individuality (Apology, 69). And, since the prospect thereof made you happy, it is only evident that a society which maximizes those individualistic ideals, grounded in freedom, on earth would be the best. 

HOST HAS ENDED THE MEETING. 

Works Cited

Morgan, Michael L. ​Classics of Moral and Political Theory, ​Hackett Publishing Company, 2011.

 

Utopia on a Tightrope: The Delicate Political Economy of the Early Moshav

For millennia, humans have longed for the dream polity. As one commentator puts it aptly in an introduction to Thomas More’s renowned 16th century work, Utopia: “Utopianism isn’t hope, still less optimism: it is need, and it is desire” (More 6). More’s discourse on the island of Utopia envisions a city of men who shun land ownership in favor of permanent tenancy and communal governance, pooling resources and tilling the land for sustenance (More 73-80). Five centuries later, with an added dose of socialist idealism, many Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe set out for Palestine in hope of a new life grounded in egalitarian economic principles. Much economic and sociological literature focuses on kibbutz villages, the secular communes governed by “absolute economic equality” which have garnered international interest for their communal child-rearing and emphasis on direct democracy (Leach 8-9). But the lesser known moshav (Hebrew: dwelling) proves of considerable interest for the student of political economy. Less communal than the kibbutz, the moshav combined private house and farm property with collective marketing and other forms of mutual aid. Formed in the same years as early kibbutzim (Hebrew plural of kibbutz), moshavim’s unique economic setup allowed for sustained agricultural growth in difficult economic conditions but required a strict set of internal regulations to prevent the encroachment of parasitic moshavnik (moshav resident) behavior.

In this research paper, I will open with a history of the moshav, focusing on the years before Israeli independence (statehood) in 1948. Then, I will discuss the political economy and organization of the early moshav in some detail. Throughout this second section, I will uncover several issues inherent in the moshav economy, which damage its founders’ utopian ideals, weaving in several early warning signs with modern examples and attempting to make connections throughout. Throughout, I will argue that the early moshav moralized its pursuit of success through mutually beneficial collective programs and aid; but under the surface, early moshavim would have likely faltered without economic assistance from pre-State institutions like the Jewish National Fund, and the strict — almost dystopian — rules governing moshavnik (moshav member) behavior.

History of the pre-State moshav

The roots of the moshav are in the ideological commitments of thousands of early Jewish immigrants to Palestine, and culminate in the establishment of the first moshav, Nahalal, in the Jezreel Valley. The second and third waves of European immigrants, known in Hebrew as “Aliyot” (Hebrew plural of aliyah, ascent), proved most important to the early moshav. The Second Aliyah came predominantly from the Russian Empire and involved some 40,000 new immigrants between 1904 and 1914 (Klayman 13). This group of largely young adults were affiliated with the World Zionist Organization and various European socialist movements, mostly offspring of middle-class Jewish families who had new dreams of working the land (13-14). Though many of these immigrants descended from agricultural or trade laborers in the Old World, which they were trying to leave behind them, this agricultural work in Palestine was infused with a new Jewish nationalism, bubbling with idealism. The goal: a base for a new Jewish society free of “social and racial [i.e., anti-Semitic, in modern parlance] injustice” and grounded in what Klayman describes as a “cult” of manual labor (13-14). Different from their religious forefathers, the vast majority of early moshavniks were secular and dedicated to Judaism only so far as it served them through ancestral ties to the Land of Israel and a group of co-ethnics with whom to establish their experiments in social organization.

These early ideologues quickly began to disseminate information supporting the communal cause and organized the first settlements. The first step toward the moshav-esque settlement was in experiments made by Zionist agencies between 1907 and 1914 to settle workers near private Jewish farms in need of labor (Klayman 18). These moshv’ei po’alim (literally: worker settlements) failed quickly, as the laborers could not support the small plots of land allotted to them alongside their hired-out labor on the private farms (19). Such started the beginning of several questions key to the moshav movement, most notably, the equal allotment of land and the role of hired labor in the wider collective. Eliezer Yoffe, a founding father of the moshav movement, began to proselytize about the promise of the moshav during this period (Klayman 19). He outlined a utopian collective which would furnish the farmer’s many needs, capture “his heart and bind … him to his farm with unbreakable ties” (Weintraub 127). For this early advocate, the collective lifestyle would mitigate the farmer’s fear of the market. Private farmers who sell their goods on the public market, Yoffe argued, become “merchants,” whose “mind and heart tremble like the prices in the market” (127). In addition, the constant catering to the market leaves the soil “abused and impoverished” and condemns the actor to economic subserviency and cultural mediocrity (127). Another early proponent of the moshav­­­ collective, Yitzhak Wilkansky of Hebrew University, explained that each family should be given a plot of land which fit their maximum “working capacity” — without hired help — and that the villages should be established on federal land rented from the Jewish National Fund, which purchased wide swaths of land in Palestine through the support of diasporic Jewry and business enterprises like these later arrangements with moshavim (Klayman 19). In Yoffe’s 1919 pamphlet about moshavim, he echoed this land plan, noting that the “settler has the right to use the land but not the right of ownership” (20). Such plans became the object of widespread discussion by members of the second and third aliyot, which I will explain next.

The theories of early moshav thinkers like Yoffe or Wilkansky became popular among the secular, socialist Russian immigrants. After a brief interlude due to WWI, the first settlers pitched their tents in the Jezreel Valley in 1921, forming the roots of Nahalal (Weintraub 131). Each person was allotted some 25 acres of land, and though the settlers still supported themselves through outside employment, they planned to progressively switch to solely agricultural work by diversifying their crops (132). Along with the formation of Nahalal, which was contemporaneous with the formation of several important kibbutzim, which lie outside the scope of this essay, the moshav movement began to pick up steam. A first volunteer-based conference in 1930, called the Committee of the Moshavim, convened to sort out moshav affairs (235). The committee, which met several more times before Israeli independence in 1948, passed a series of UN-style resolutions on moshav conduct, which aimed to insert rules into the pioneers’ idealism and structure the political economy of the moshav into an operable entity. In the next section of this paper, I will focus exclusively on moshv’ei ovdim, workers’ moshavim like Nahalal, instead of the moshv’ei olim, which were established by the State post-independence to settle Arab Jewish refugees (and whose deep dependence on national guidance made them less relevant to this exploration of the voluntarist moshv’ei ovdim).

The early moshav was both supported and formed by the various political forces in pre-State Palestine, a topic I will explain briefly here. In the early days of the State, the moshav was viewed in different ways by different political parties, with whom many were affiliated. The party Ha’poel Ha’tzair (Hebrew, the young worker) viewed the moshavlifestyle as a “supreme manifestation” of their ideology of individualism and social justice (Weintraub 229). Meanwhile, Achdut Ha’avoda (Hebrew, labor unity) viewed moshavim as “bastard” offshoots of their collectivist, kibbutznik ideology (229). For that party, the dual private and public co-operative structure of the moshav was a gesture to, and regression towards, a “materialistic and capitalistic” way of life, shunned by many secular European settlers in favor of socialism (229).

The early moshav’s political economy occupied the unique position of employing collective models for its residents while navigating a competitive, capitalist market. In some ways, then, the forgoing of market woes mentioned earlier by Yoffe is somewhat of a fallacy. While the moshav residents pool their ties to the market into the collective, easing personal risk and contributing to the common good for their own benefit, they are still affected by the market’s desires as a wider unit. As William Safran notes in his essay on “Collectivization, Modernization, and Embourgeoisement: The Contemporary Kibbutz,” unlike collectives in communist countries, Israeli agricultural collectives’ produce was not “requisitioned” by the state but sold for the commune’s profit (Francisco 193-194). However, both the moshav and the kibbutz began “without any capital” and were financed by the Jewish Agency and additional “public bodies” (Kanovsky 141). This calls to mind the setting of More’s utopia, which a commentator illustrated is only separated by the “thinnest stretch of ocean,” dug out by manual laborers, from the main body politic (More 4). So too were early moshavim separated by a thin line from the demands of the natural market only by the willingness and dedication of early inhabitants to moshav ideals. And they were able to moralize (and make feasible) their collectivist economic activity only with the backbone of support from national agencies and cheap land.

Land in early moshavim was not privately owned. Instead, it was leased by the Jewish National fund to moshavim for a 49-year period, with an “automatic option” for renewal or transfer to heirs (Galor 85). Weintraub explained that the tenure agreement between the National Fund and each moshavnik formalized the idea that there would be a ban on individual transfers of land in the moshav and an indivisibility of each lot’s inheritance to prevent fragmentation (Weintraub 133). Beyond these stipulations, the National Fund had little control over the actions of the early moshav, despite their renting relationship. In fact, the 49-year leases were “completely secure,” easily renewable and cost only “token” prices (133). In the moshav, problems of organization and economic stagnancy came not from issues with the federal lessor, but from the moshav lessees. There were few controls on the National Fund’s part, due to the lax lease rules, to prevent “unproductive, mismanaged or abused units” from proliferating (133). Additionally, in many established moshavim, two-family farm units arose, binding as a unit when operated by family members (Klayman 99). This allowed for more intensive cultivation on some farms than others (99). Lastly, national land could not be used as a credit security by the individual moshavnik, and the bank could not repossess the farms in the case of failure to repay, thus adding to the village function as a risk pool but insulating faulty moshavniks from the consequences of bad local behavior (Haruvi 56). An incredible amount responsibility lay in moshav hands, which explains the variety of institutions erected early-on for self-governance.

Aside from the wider conferences mentioned above, moshavim organized on a local level to enforce rules. “Cooperative theory” suggests that moshavniks’ desire to uphold the moshav’s financial obligations led them to attempt “prudent management,” enforcing social controls to counter deviant behavior and backing officials’ attempts to “impose” formal discipline (Sherman 163). The job of local moshav council entailed enforcing three critical principles, as outlined by Baldwin (2). These were: [1] that there should be no private ownership of land (it is all leased from the Jewish National Fund); [2] that there should be self-work without hired labor; [3] and that there should be mutual aid between members of the settlement (2). The local governance of the moshav included the general assembly which convened monthly, an elected council of 18-25 members and a ruling secretariat of five to nine members (Klayman 91). The secretariat typically included an accountant, treasurer, as well as internal and external secretaries, both of whom were paid for their administrative work and permitted to use hired labor (often from fellow moshavniks) during their period of service (91). To enforce rules, the early moshavim maintained municipal autonomy over their own education, physical infrastructure, and local justice system (95-96). The latter, a local, “justice of the peace,” adjudicated conflicts among moshavniks and between the individual and village authorities, with the opportunity for complainants to appeal into higher courts with unresolved issues (96). This unspoken legal arm of the moshav allowed disputes about by-laws to quickly enter the existing legal system (first British, then Israeli) for actual dispute and settlement. In a way, this shows the blending of the moshav and national methods of enforcement. It also weakens the pure social commitment argument found widely in early, pro-moshav literature on this subject. That is, the utopian nature and general cooperation among moshav members was quietly enforced by elected secretariats, local forms of justice and even forms of judicial appeal.

The national committee on moshav affairs sought to assist the local moshav secretariats in their struggle to promote economic cooperation, which I will expand on shortly. The committee dealt with these issues through rhetorical and non-binding means, as they had no direct “enforcing” authority over their constituent moshavim or individuals (Weintraub 241). Not to mention that the committee, this critical “organ” for the early moshavim, was staffed by volunteers (242). Few wanted to take on this “additional burden,” except in name or as a façade of cooperation, like modern-day virtue signaling (242). A major step in moshav organization took place in 1935, at the third Committee conference, with the proposal (but not wholehearted adoption) of several resolutions aimed at curbing issues resulting from private sector-moshav interactions. These included the call for moshavim to become legal collectives, with all holdings registered as the property of the moshav and giving the village a better legal basis for enforcing its rules (242). Another resolution compelled every settler to join the moshav’s institutions, allowing the village to condemn or punish those who refused (242-243). Though not fully adopted, the amount of local control (public condemnation, punishment) advocated for by the Committee in this one instance stands out as notably dystopic, despite their well-meaning pursuits. Yet another Committee resolution “forbade” members from working outside of the farm without explicit central permission and asked that they liquidate property and assets held outside of the collective (243). Klayman explains that from the outset, moshavim had to restrain “individualistic tendencies” which could harm the village’s cooperative framework (22). Klayman noted that it became established that the village should guarantee a minimum level of subsistence for every member and that it could exercise controls in the economic activities and plans of its members (22). Nahalal, for example, did not allow members to raise private loans (22). Despite the lack of full adoption of these 1930’s Committee measures, they represented a first attempt to legislate rules designed to keep moshavim from veering off their founders’ ideological goals of the previous two decades. Other entities suggested by inter-moshav organizations, which were better realized, included an “Inter-Moshav Fund for Mutual Aid,” which was established in the early 1940s to take care of moshav households in need of assistance (Weintraub 244).

Delicate Political Economy of the Moshav

Thus far, I have tangentially mentioned the collective economic infrastructure of the moshav, now let us examine it in further detail. The moshav was a smallholders’ cooperative village (Sherman 163). It acted as the main channel through which its constituents could obtain credit from financial institutions (Guttman 77). The individual moshav farm, usually under 20 acres, was too small to be a “feasible risk” for most financial institutions, who preferred safer bets in the unstable pre-State economy (77). Instead, the moshav guarantees members’ loans through the institution of “mutual co-signing,” in which members take responsibility for each other’s debts (77). If all went well, through the legal and by-legal enforcement mentioned before, the moshav was then able to serve as a risk pool for financial growth. The guaranteeing of loans was based in a “capital pool” which was grown through collective marketing of produce (77). The value of each moshavnik’s produce was then entered as a form of credit in the moshav accounts, which they then used like a local “bank account” to purchase farm equipment and consumer goods (77-78). This financial cooperation enhanced “capital intensity,” which in-turn raised income and the value of the members’ time and strengthened cooperation (Haruvi 55). For those moshav members not involved in agriculture, some hired labor was present for their land. The moshav’s “ancillary” services were provided by a small number of settlers who engaged in manufacturing or crafts (Kanovsky 9). However, the level of hired labor had to remain low, as it posed severe problems for the principle of self-labor key to the moshavmentality.

This deviation from self-labor and general “buying in” to the moshav principles caused moshavim issues from the outset. Weintraub noted that during the 1930’s, early moshavim dealt with several specific deviations from important principles. First, some settlers worked outside of the village to accumulate capital, hiring out their farm labor to a non-moshavnik (Weintraub 241). Second, difficult economic conditions before independence in 1948 made it hard to finance moshavim, though financing based in the groups strengthened by the “unifying bond of Zionist ideology,” in which private interests were often subjugated to “national needs,” often aided struggling moshavim (Klayman 239). Notably, that very aid “severely” weakened some moshavniks’ motivation to legislate controls on cooperative officials and other members’ conduct, which I will show in the next paragraph.

This outside aid led some moshavim to carry-out unnatural economic proceedings since it provided a foolproof back-up plan for bad behavior. Many 1970’s moshavim were similar in structure to the pre-State collectives which I have focused on, so I will use one as an example to show how some moshavim moralized unusual economic behavior due to their backing by the State. In Sherman’s focus on Kfar Zimri, which was widely viewed as a “bad” moshav, the author notes issues of co-operation stemming from clashing ideologies and flush financial support from the Israeli Settlement Division, a government aid agency (Sherman 168-169). At first, Kfar Zimri, functioned as a “moshbutz,” which carried out joint farm operations and provided its 35-40 families a uniform living allowance (168). This “arrangement” was designed to help the settlers fit in as a community and give them practical experience with managing a moshav and living the cooperative lifestyle (168). After the introduction of more traditional moshav structures, though, the entire experiment entered a period of disaster. Three years after its founding in 1975, Kfar Zimri began to allot member families their individual farms, keeping with the aforementioned “smallholders” setup (163, 168). It proved to be a “social disaster,” leading to factional conflict, especially after the expectation that each family would consume supplies at predetermined level did not pan out (168). According to Sherman, the moshavnik families were so embittered by the lack of cooperation that they exited the public arena, and no longer felt compelled to cooperate (168-169). It became clear before that whether at the local level or in national organizations, volunteer action in moshav organizations was key in maintaining healthy villages. In Kfar Zimri, “receipt of financial aid” led to distortions in the handling of both cooperative debts and private consumption,” and members’ use of the aforementioned credit system spiraled out of control without common trust or cooperation (168-169). Even in the roots of early moshavim, four decades before Kfar Zimri, the critical need for working together became evident.

The next layer of the economic layout of the moshav involved high levels of mutual aid, as proposed by Yoffe in his early writings. The operation of the moshav cooperative as a financial intermediary simplified mutual aid among moshav members, at least in those villages which escaped issues of cooperation like those present later in Kfar Zimri (Haruvi 57). According to Haruvi, assistance to a moshav member in distress, which may have been based in the past on physical work on the hurting neighbor’s farm, took the form of sharing “financial burden” in the moshav (57). Moshavniks in need could draw on their village credit when they were making less money, or even receive assistance from the village’s private coffers to erect a new “enterprise” or farm infrastructure and improve future earnings (57). In a study of Kfar Hefer, the author noted that in the late 1960’s, the Israeli government imposed acute control measures on collective settlements to scale back their overproduction of dairy, such as strict quotas on output for each settlement (Baldwin xviii). This led to a unique situation, in which elderly moshav dairy farmers gave their quota rights to younger, more able members of the moshav, allowing them to continue their high levels of dairy production (xviii). Such was an example of another kind of mutual aid: in which moshav members keen on working together bent regulations to fit a variety of needs and support each other. However, even in the Kfar Hefer example, disagreement erupted when mutual aid between some led to anger among others. Much of the ensuing disagreement from the quota restrictions involved different takes on moshav by-laws and “principles,” especially as some members had reduced farming due to the quotas and could not recompense their loss from another type of farming as some neighbors could (xix). Clearly, mutual aid could become strained as moshavim sought to adapt to changing policies as the decades wore on.

Now, we must turn our attention to cooperative production and marketing, peeling through another layer of the moshav’s economic onion. Ideally, the cooperative marketing gives the moshav farmer more time to focus on his work. Galor notes that farmers “everywhere” are known to be very individualistic producers (86). In the moshav, member-farmers devoted themselves solely to their farm work and production (86). Galor notes that farmers found credit at the lowest possible cost, purchased inputs at the lowest possible loss and marketed produce at the highest possible net revenue (86). While this author notes that the collective marketing “does the job” for moshavniks, Guttman notes that the issue of the free rider comes into play in the moshav marketing scheme, as farmers take advantage of mutual aid and cooperative credit but find private ways to market their goods for better prices. This is a major issue, as the collective marketing is a main source of income and support for the moshav institutions dedicated to such social provisions. Apparently, by marketing individually instead of cooperatively, the moshavnik avoids the risk of financing neighbors’ debt (Guttman 78). And, in addition to the higher prices, private marketing can lead to beneficial tax avoidance (78). Thus, Guttman outlines the potential for the “free-rider problem in the moshav,” defining village success in terms of its members’ ability to obtain loans and to adapt to technological change (78). While moshav theorists argued collective marketing is beneficial, I will show in the next paragraph through Guttman’s study how that line of thinking can be faulty.

It was widely argued as moshavim came into existence that certain tasks, like marketing, were deeply time-consuming. Moshavniks had “relatively high values of time,” and thus would want to market through collective means (Guttman 78). Already, farmers had to spend most of their time tilling the land, and had trouble doing other things. Even at the first inter-moshav Committees, it was widely discussed how difficult it was to socialize under the “heavy burden” of agricultural work, which left little time for true leisure (Weintraub 236). Moshav life also left little time for volunteering in such national Committees or local secretariats, leading to a lack of volunteer labor for internal administration, as I explained before. But, in terms of marketing, Guttman noted the hypothesis that moshavniks would automatically gravitate towards collective marketing is “open to criticism,” namely because private marketing was not necessarily more time consuming that collective marketing (78). In a detailed case study of one moshav, in which private wholesalers were willing to drive in small trucks to the moshav to collect farmers’ crops, and collective marketing required each farmer to bring their goods to a central pick-up point, it would prove more time consuming for farmers to work together (79). Another ground for criticizing the “hypothesized positive interaction” between moshavniks and collective marketing had to do with evolving transportation and market distance. Apparently, the ease of access to nearby markets affects the relative profitability of collective marketing (80). When collective marketing reduces the number of “individual” journeys to the market, it is more profitable (80). But increasingly good transportation as the years go on would lead to a natural inversion as individual marketing eases (or private buyers drive their trucks to the farms, see above).

A last aspect of the political economy of the moshav worth our attention is the effect of changing generations and kinship, which requires a brief peek at history and then a modern example. Early on, and only in the second decade of moshav settlement, new settlers started to drift from the founding fathers’ principles. These new settlers were less connected to the workers’ movement, some even shunning membership in the Histadrut, the root party of today’s Israeli labor union (Weintraub 237). These new settlers also wanted to become independent farmers and live off the land, even doing so cooperatively, but had less of the utopian idealism of their predecessors (237). Lastly, the new settlers sought to settle in the middle of the country — widely known as the mercaz — in which settlement was “not accompanied by special difficulties,” that is, violence with neighboring Arabs (237). So, as in any society, as children shun the goals of their parents and live with new desires, so too may the parents’ original goals for something like economic cooperation falter. In the close study of Kfar Hefer (which was founded in 1929 by people familiar with Nahalal), Baldwin notes that older members told her of the “tremendous interest” which all members once took in village affairs in the 1930’s, a trend already dissolving by the 1960’s (1, 13). Though Baldwin noted in this 1972 study that no participants outwardly questioned the “viability” of the moshav as a way of life, the community was rife with issues related to demographic age changes, mechanization, and changing government policies (xviii-xix). Even in the roots of the moshav movement, like the new 1930’s moshavniks described by Weintraub, the eventual needs of different groups and their vested interests were sometimes left out of the economic equation by moshav founders.

Conclusion

In the paper so far, I have provided an overview of the moshav political economy and shown how certain safeguards like state aid and cheap land allowed for moshav survival, even when the cooperation of moshavniks was tenuous or non-existent. The difficulty in ensuring co-operation in early moshavim is in line with the questions which thinkers have asked for millennia about human cooperation. In Plato’s Republic, an ancient literary thought experiment in utopia governed by strict rules and division, Thrasymachus put it simply to Socrates in their discussion of economic justice, saying: “the just man everywhere has less than the unjust man” (Plato 21). Thrasymachus goes on to note that in contracts, upon the “dissolution” of the partnership, the just man has less than the unjust man (21). Then, in matters pertaining to the “city,” or in our case the moshav, when each man holds some ruling office, when the just man suffers “no other penalty,” it becomes his “lot to see his domestic affairs deteriorate from neglect,” even has he gets no real advantage from the public store (21). Meanwhile, the unjust man, engaging in unjust principles, would readily use immoral means to ensure private success during public service, and additionally use public service to his advantage (21). This speaks to the voluntarist nature of moshav organization, on a local and federal level, which were time-consuming for the busy agricultural worker yet so key to ensuring the moshav project. Moshavniks were clearly torn between dedicating themselves to the manual labor key to their endeavor and legislating an economic layout which would stand the test of time, and only strict regulations could keep the village in line (along with outside assistance) under such circumstances. While the moral philosophy of moshavniks is complex and multi-faceted, I think that some of the topics I have addressed in this paper so far fall in line with Thrasymachus’ timeless description.

The issue of voluntary labor in moshav committees, both local and national, as well as the choice to do business with the cooperative as opposed to privately, all rely somewhat on individuals’ sense of justice. In failed moshavim like Kfar Zimri, where community cooperation was at a low and people withdrew from the public sphere, it became ever-clearer how only the safeguards of the Zionist (and in the Kfar Zimri case, established-Israeli) institutions kept the early villages from crumbling. And, as I have tried to show, only strict rules would ensure some level of cooperation among people. As mentioned in the introduction regarding More’s utopia, ever-apart yet so close to shore, so too did moshavim moralize their economic behavior partly because they operated within and around non-moshav economic systems. Over time, the effort to reduce a person to a unit of production and consumption is evident in social utopia, or more accurately dystopias (Sedlacek 22). Moshavniks, with few leisure hours and dozens of regulations on their economic behavior, seemed to toe the line between the two extremes, crafting a new life in Palestine with oft-utopic economic cooperation (when it worked) at the dystopic expense of very low personal freedom.

For embattled refugees, tired of persecution and economic misery in Europe, and bursting with energy at the prospect of a new order in the Holy Land, the moshav’s many promises made sense. And, many were delivered upon, leading to a proliferation of moshavim due to the safeguards and the ideological commitments of many early moshavniks. The model even helped accommodate hundreds of thousands of Arab Jewish immigrants in the post-independence period, which lay outside of the scope of this paper but serves a historical purpose as proof of some of the merit of the moshav. But, from a purely economic and behavioral standpoint, I hope to have shown how the moshav way of life was filled with pain points which emerged even in the villages’ nascent stage and continued throughout the twentieth century into today.

Works Cited

Baldwin, Elaine. Differentiation and Co-Operation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav. Manchester:

Manchester University Press, 1972. Print.

Galor, Zvi. “The cooperative components of the Classic Moshav.” Journal of Co-operative

       Organization and Management. (2014): 85-86. Web.

Guttman, Joel M, and Nava Haruvi. “Cooperation and Part-Time Farming in the Israeli

Moshav.” American journal of agricultural economics 68.1 (1986): 77–87. Web.

Haruvi, Nava, and Yoav Kislev. “Cooperation in the Moshav.” Journal of Comparative

        Economics 8.1 (1984): 54–73. Web.

Kanovsky, Eliyahu. The Economy of the Israeli Kibbutz. Cambridge: Distributed for the Center

for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University by Harvard University Press, 1966. Print.

Klayman, Maxwell Irving. The Moshav in Israel; a Case Study of Institution-Building for

        Agricultural Development. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. Print.

Leach, David. Chasing Utopia: The Future of the Kibbutz in a Divided Israel. Toronto, ON:

ECW Press, 2016. Print.

More, Thomas, and Ursula K. Le Guin. Utopia. London. Verso, 2016. Print.

Plato., and Allan Bloom. The Republic of Plato. 2nd ed. New York: Basic Books, 1991. Print.

Sedlacek, Tomas. Economics of Good and Evil the Quest for Economic Meaning from Gilgamesh to    

        Wall Street. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print.

Sherman, N, and M Schwartz. “The Effect of Public Financial Assistance on the Management of

Moshav Economic Affairs.” Human organization (1991): 163–172. Web.

Weintraub, Dov., Moshe Lissak, and Y. Azmon. Moshava, Kibbutz, and Moshav; Patterns of

      Jewish Rural Settlement and Development in Palestine. Ithaca [N.Y: Cornell University

John Locke’s Superior View of Law

In a single morning on the way to the library, I am subject to the many laws enacted by my fellow citizens to keep Hanover, NH, quiet and orderly. I must not attack my neighbors, nor stray off the sidewalk. I must not throw my empty coffee cup in the street, nor drive the wrong way down the road. Following the law — which English philosopher John Locke defines in his 1689 Second Treatise of Government​ as “​the direction of a free and intelligent agent ​to his proper interest” — is in ​my ​best interest, since choosing to abide by it keeps me safe from others and from fear of punishment at the community’s hands (726). In Locke’s world view, too, should these laws become unfair, a government “may be dissolved” at the will of men, reducing the common state to anarchy and leaving men at liberty to provide for themselves, erecting a new legislature until they “shall find it most for their safety and good” (769). Also, in Locke’s view, I maintain at least some say in the laws which I must obey, given that I am part of the community as a rational being and can contribute my thoughts on how best to pair naturally apparent ideals of justice with tangible rules and punishments. In Thomas Hobbes’ 1651 work ​Leviathan, ​a different, more pessimistic order is proposed. To save their miserable existence from an endless state of war, men must, he argues, enter into an arrangement with an all-powerful sovereign to whom they surrender their rights in return for order and stability. In this essay, I will focus on two key differences which prove Locke’s theory of liberty and law as far superior to that of Hobbes’. First, Locke’s view of the individual and community executing the law is more fair than Hobbes’ almighty sovereign. Second, Locke’s focus on the protection of property as a key aim of government is more grounded in reality than Hobbes’ view of an untouchable ruler.

First, it is key to explicate Locke’s statement on page 726 about the “​end of law.” ​In Locke’s view, the goal (“​end”​ ) of law is to maintain a body politic in which someone can deal with their physical person, actions, and property without fear of violence from others (726). The opening of the Treatise establishes that laws, and government, are a product of Divine providence, and are a system which exempts men from submitting to the “unjust will” of other equal men (715). Locke believes that even in a natural state (i.e, without an established government or sovereign), there exist certain laws of nature (715). These laws of nature can be deduced through reason, and are strengthened by human laws which assign tangible “penalties” to “enforce their observation” (747). Freedom on earth can be neither preserved nor enlarged for the dead, which helps explain Locke’s focus on the sanctity of life at the outset of his discussion of the “State of Nature” (713). Locke notes that humans are bound to preserve themselves, and not “quit” their stations willfully (713). This suggests that he bases his perspective on some inherent ​value i​n human existence, mainly that all mankind is the “workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker” (713). In addition, in keeping with Locke’s assumption of some inherent human goodness, men “ought” to preserve the ​rest o​ f mankind as well, and cannot take away or impair other lives, nor impede on others’ health, “limbs” or “goods” (714). Clearly, the end of law in Locke’s eyes is a state in which the obligations of the law of nature as listed in Genesis’ Ten Commandments and through rational deduction are “drawn closer” to human reality and assigned more digestible and widely promulgated definitions (human law) to ensure widespread obedience (747). Directly preceding the quote mentioned in this essay’s prompt, Locke notes that law is the “​direction of a free and intelligent agent ​to his proper interest” (726). This brings to mind Locke’s idea that humans, born in a state of “​perfect freedom” ​and “​equality,” ​need law to continue this state of being.

To start, Locke’s view of the impartial judge is more fair than Hobbes’ view of a hypothetical Leviathan, an all-powerful sovereign who settles disputes. Both agree, certainly, that men enter a social contract in order to avoid violence and suffering. Hobbes argues that this is due to men’s “equality of ability, … [and] equality of hope in the attaining of our ends” (618). This warlike state, which men are subject to when they exist without a “common power to keep them all in awe,” leads to a state of being in which the “fruit” of industry is suffocated under infighting, and men live a “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” life in continual fear (619). Hobbes suggests the only path out of this condition in Chapter 17, explaining that the only way to defend themselves from the “invasion of foreigners” and the “injuries of one another” is to reduce their common and divergent wills “unto one will,” a ruling sovereign (634). Meanwhile, in the seventh chapter of Locke’s Treatise, the philosopher argues that men give their natural power to a community, with a known set of judges who both decide controversies and hand down penalties. According to Locke, the “private judgement of every particular member being excluded,” the ​community comes to be “umpire” by agreed-upon rules, and the men who execute such rules and ensure their obedience are “from the community” (734). This idea is much more fair — and better reflects the societies which are known today as the most free (western democracies) — since it involves the community settling upon its own judges. The law practiced in Locke’s theory is backed up by the “force of all the members” (734), a more fair treatment than in a Hobbesian world, wherein the “right of judicature” is annexed to the singular sovereign (637). While Locke and Hobbes agree that men need systems in place in order to ensure adherence to law, Hobbes’ idea that the sovereign power is the judge of all “opinions and doctrines” and “hearing and deciding all controversies” is hard to pair with his negative view of human nature (637). After all, who is to say that the sovereign elected in Hobbes’ view would truly act justly? Locke’s idea that a community, serving as an “umpire” in the game of politics, establishes rules by which to live, is both more modern and more just.

Since, for Locke, the end goal of the law “is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom,” this merits a discussion of what he proposes to do should the government enforcing the laws no longer serve such aims (726). Unlike Hobbes, who brushes off concerns of a problematic sovereign by arguing that factions and division lead to the breakdown of society (639), Locke builds such a possibility into his writings. Hobbes says that all authoritarian rule will lead to some “incommodity or other,” but maintains that a sovereign power is more orderly than the “confusion” and “civil war” associated with factions (639). Instead of brushing off “incommodity” (i.e., inconveniences, disadvantages), Locke addresses them. In his section on the “Dissolution of Government,” Locke provides a systematic description of what people are to do should the “arbitrary power of the prince, the electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and contrary to the common interest of the people” (768). In this quote, Locke is stating that the importance of the common interest of the people can overpower the sovereign ​even a​ fter the social contract has begun. For Hobbes, his view of the people and sovereign’s relationship as a covenant which can never be broken allows no room to breathe should the “supreme executive power,” as Locke puts it, abandon “his charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution” (769). What is key here is that Locke recognizes that an ineffective sovereign has no power to enforce the law, which, again, is supposed to “preserve and enlarge freedom” (726). Such a state with an ineffective sovereign might as well be in “anarchy,” and requires the building of a new government and more effective laws. Hobbes, on this topic, writes that besides protecting one’s physical person, the citizen in the person/sovereign covenant has absolutely no power, having submitted his entire being to the sovereign in exchange for order (635). He notes that including the sovereign under the jurisdiction of civil law, alongside the citizenry, is incorrect because it leads to a cycle of “confusion” and “dissolution” of the commonwealth (688). It might surprise Hobbes to know that many countries exist today which submit their ruling entities to the common rule of law without devolving into such chaos. Both in accordance with the historical record, which shows many societies continually replacing systems of governance in the name of efficiency and equity, and through basic reasoning, Locke’s suggestion of a sovereign without infinite immunity from the law is a better suggestion than Hobbes’ Leviathan.

Next, Locke’s view of property is clearer than Hobbes’ and provides a good launching point for why Locke’s view of law and liberty is superior. In the Hobbesian fashion of ensuring proper definitions of words and avoiding the pitfall of metaphor, I will first define Locke’s view of property (587-589). Locke defines property as the “lives, liberties, and estates” of men (745). Law, to this end, is necessary and both “received and allowed” by common consent to decide controversies (745). Locke uses property to ground his discussion of law, arguing that a man seeks the preservation of his property, and will surrender his “power of punishing” to the community body authorized to take on that role. This view is made even more fair by Locke, who makes clear by the end of the ninth chapter (“Of the Ends of Political Society and Government) that the legislative and executive power of the commonwealth so enumerated is “​bound ​to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people … by indifferent and upright judges” (emphasis added, 746). Hobbes’ view of a coercive state in which “nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice,” is inherently less fair (649). Locke makes room for what ought to happen (i.e. revolution) should the government’s end of protecting property go astray, while Hobbes simply notes that once the sovereign is elected, they can do no wrong, since they decide what is wrong (763-764).

Locke proposes that the world is given to men “in common,” and property is generated through the personal infusion of labor into common resources (719). He provides food gathering as a good example, noting that acorns or apples “gathered” become the property of a man so long as he does not take more than he can use, because his “​labour”​ removes these fruits of the earth from the common state (719). Such gathering of property, according to Locke, clearly pre-exists governments, though in a state of nature the status of property is uncertain. Thus, ​agreed-upon laws are necessary to preserve property. Using this kind of example, Locke grounds the reader in his discussion of law by appealing to our common economic interests. After all, the free and intelligent agent described by Locke would naturally understand that entering into a voluntary contract with others and giving up some rights to the community (I think of giving up my technical ​ability​ to steal food from the supermarket) can preserve both personal and general safety (no one will steal food from me). It is for this reason that Locke’s discussion of property truly helps strengthen his argument that absolute sovereignty is incorrect. This is because he argues that “so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others” (720). A moment of rational meditation on this suggestion proves its accuracy: though in modern times humans have invented money in order to extend our property past the shelf life of foodstuffs, the only property any person can technically enjoy is what one can use during their life to benefit their general wellbeing. Laws should protect that aim. In Hobbes’ writings, he actually describes private property as a factor in the ​dissolution ​of the commonwealth (688). Hobbes believes that the all-powerful sovereign must be privy to goods in the commonwealth in order to provide for the general defense and prevent internal strife. We know this is not true, as well-functioning democracies across the globe today are able to enforce law though sovereign governments ​alongside ​a widespread acceptance of private property (with taxation). For Locke, the “great and ​chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, ​is the preservation of their property”​ (745). Locke understands that rational men will not choose to worsen their general condition, and instead will establish laws which ensure the “​peace, safety ​and ​public good” ​of the general population. They will not, as Hobbes seems to argue they will, submit to a life imbued with incommodity at the hands of an almighty sovereign.

In this paper, I sought to demonstrate through a cursory examination of the role of the arbiter and the use of property in Locke and Hobbes’ writing that Locke’s view of liberty and law is superior. I argued that Locke’s suggestion of laws chosen by the community and enforced by impartial judges, under which even the sovereign must rule, is a more fair system than Hobbes’ almighty leader. Then, I looked at revolution and property, showing that since the aim of commonwealth construction is preservation of property, Locke’s is correct in his view that governments which do not preserve citizens’ property can be rightfully replaced. Hobbes argues that once established, the covenant between subject and sovereign is not able to change. Given his negative view of human nature, and the idea that without such a ruler humans descend into war and chaos (While Locke’s view of the state of nature is softer) it is difficult to understand how he expects the singular sovereign to protect common wellbeing and property if not subject to any form of restraint. However, the idea of the binding covenant lies outside of the purview of this paper and must be explored later.

Works Cited

Morgan, Michael L. ​Classics of Moral and Political Theory, ​Hackett Publishing Company, 2011.

Sacred Spaces: Differing Displays of Monotheism in Jerusalem

The spread of monotheism engendered new and difficult questions for rulers and architects in the Near East. No longer could religious justification for local political power be demonstrated in, say, a ziggurat to the city patron-deity (Taylor 48-49). With the growth of Abrahamic faith, which condemned idolatry and emphasized the universality and unknowable nature of the Divine, rulers needed to envision other ways of capturing man’s natural impulse to divide the sacred from the mundane. Few spots display the strategies used to obtain this effect better than the Temple Mount, the Jerusalem location holy to Jews, Muslims and Christians. In this paper, I will use examples from Jewish and Islamic religious structures on the Temple Mount to demonstrate how rulers and architects emphasize monotheism and religious justification through differing visual means. In Herod’s grand Second Temple, the mystery of the Divine was simulated through abstract, symbolic architectural elements, while the fashioners of the later Muslim Dome of the Rock did not shy away from heavier use of text and images in their design.

Historical and liturgical texts are all that remain of the destroyed Second Temple, but they paint an image in the modern reader’s mind of a space filled with abstract symbols of monotheism. In the Temple, visitors first entered the Court of the Gentiles, which was open to everybody (Armstrong 9). As the faithful proceeded inwards, “notices warned foreigners not to proceed further, on pain of death” (9). For the pious ancient Israelite, to pass through such a purity checkpoint undoubtedly provided a major boost in religious fervor — like permission to move into a higher level of spiritual awareness. This mood was conveyed through architectural means: sanctity represented by spatial division. Josephus Flavious wrote of these notices in ​Wars of the Jews,​ noting that upon one of the Temple’s inner partitions stood pillars, at equal distances from one another, declaring the law of purity, some in Greek, and some in Roman letters, that “no foreigner should go within that sanctuary” (5.194). Yet, besides these brief purity guidelines, a visitor to the Temple would not have encountered heavy text or imagery on the walls to guide their thoughts. Notably, earlier in his description, Josephus notes that the “magnificence” and “prospect” of the Temple was conveyed without paintings or engravings (5.191). One religious scholar highlights this distinction, explaining that through using beautiful metals and embroidery instead, the fashioners of the Temple avoided “threatening three-dimensional decorations such as carvings and statuary” (Elledge 46). According to Elledge, the positive impression that Herod’s Temple left on Josephus Flavius suggests that the veils and other ornaments of the Jewish structure offered an inoffensive and aesthetically pleasing architectural experience even to the most austere, aniconic monotheist (46). Armstrong sums up this architectural holiness created with minimal human expression: “Sacred space could still yield a powerful experience of a presence which transcended all anthropomorphic expression” (10). As we will see, the later Islamic Dome of the Rock embraces monothesism with more allowance of anthropomorphic artistic expression, including politicized text and visual art.

The currently standing Dome of the Rock represents monotheistic belief with different design elements than those described in the Second Temple. Inscriptions on its interior walls, like religious street signs, guide worshippers toward a proper state of mind, adding a flair of holiness and legitimacy. The inscriptions include powerful descriptions of Islamic monotheism, such as Verse III, “And say: praise be to God, Who has not taken unto Himself a son, and Who has no partner in Sovereignty, nor has He any protector on account of weakness” (Grabar 53). The implicit criticism of Jesus’ (“a son”) divinity is evident, a clear rebuke to Jerusalem’s Byzantine Christian character at the time of the Dome of the Rock’s construction. Inscriptions on the walls further guided believers towards the ​Islamic v​ iew of monotheism, outwardly criticizing Christianity’s three-pronged view of the Divine with quotes referring to Jesus as “only an apostle of God … God is only one God” (Grabar 53). It also warns Jews and Christians with a direct command, “O People of the Book! Do not exaggerate in your religion” (Islamic Awareness). So, while in the Second Temple, designers used abstract veils, empty spaces and other means to symbolize the untouchability of the Divine, in the Dome of the Rock designers looked to textual inscriptions to cement clear ideological views in the minds of visitors. Mosaics depicting vegetal motives, vases, cornucopias and wearable jewels also adorn the interior of the Dome of the Rock, to which Grabar assigns both political and socio-religious significance (47-48). He suggests that in using the aforementioned images, which are found in contemporaneous Byzantine and Persian artwork, the Umayyad decorators of this Islamic sanctuary intentionally employed “symbols belonging to the subdued or to the still active enemies of the Muslim state,” in a display of victory (48). It appears that the designers of the Dome of the Rock heavily considered their rejection of antecedent Abrahamic faiths and political victory while commissioning the building’s scriptural inscriptions. Though the quotes call for monotheistic thought (“God is only one God”), they are paired with earthly responses to Christianity and Judaism.

It is critical to remain aware of the different ideological aims​ o​ f the builders of the Jewish Second Temple and the Islamic Dome of the Rock. The fashioners of the Second Temple imbued the visiting faithful with symbolism in movement and vestment. Armstrong explains that visitors moved from the “ordinary mundane world” (outside) into the marginal realm of chaos, the so-called “primal sea,” to the ordered world inside the Temple that God had created (10). Instead of reading scriptural reminders of monotheism on the wall, visitors would physically “ascend” through ever-holier spaces of the Temple in preparation for their visit to the central sacrificial altar, surrounded by priests adorned with tunics symbolizing heaven, earth and the four natural elements (10). Given Judaism’s role in the Abrahamic story as the first major statement of monotheism, Second Temple architects may have felt less compelled to justify beliefs and usurp others’ views. Grabar notes the ​double​ task faced by the Islamic designers of the Dome of the Rock, of both encouraging monotheism and the universality of God and making clear that their faith has usurped previous attempts, like that of the Second Temple (55). Grabar describes the inscriptions as having a “missionary character,” accepting Christian and Hebrew forerunners but asserting the vitality of the “new faith” and the nascent state based on it (55).

Finally, it is rather difficult to pair Islam’s extreme monotheism with political pageantry and architecture in the Dome of the Rock, a dimension which Grabar examines. He argues that later pious Islamic accounts of churches and ornate Christian religious representations offered an air of ambivalence: impression without persuasian (55). But, the earliest Muslims and fashioners of the religion may have been more affected by Byzantine displays of grandeur than later documenters wanted to admit (55-56). The extent to which Islamic designers of the Dome were comfortable appropriating the ornate decorations of their Christian forerunners, especially given that its builder Abd al-Malik sought to “build for the Muslims a mosque that should be unique and a wonder to the world,” remains a topic for further inquiry (55). It is clear, though, that the designers of the Dome of the Rock were comfortable incorporating images and inscriptions into their structure — whatever their religious or political aims.

This brief glance at the Second Temple and the later Dome of the Rock show different ways in which architects fashioned their buildings in order to convey fundamental religious ideas. The Second Temple’s spatial planning moved pilgrims through ascending layers of holiness, largely free of textual inscription. Instead, visual stimulation was provided with elaborate curtains and vestments (Armstrong 8). The Dome of the Rock has fewer spaces; visitors do not experience a “move” towards the Divine presence through their footsteps. Instead, faithful are offered Quranic reminders of major tenets of their faith. Interestingly, thousands of years after the Temple period, Jewish synagogues regularly incorporate textual inscriptions on the walls. From prayers to scriptural quotes, these artistic inscriptions may be due to a lack of readily available prayerbooks during the Diaspora, or efforts to counter religious illiteracy among the general populace. The readiness with which diasporic Jewish institutions inscribe their walls and decorate their surfaces remain a topic for further study outside of this essay’s purview.

Works Cited

Armstrong, Karen.​Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths.​*

Elledge, Casey D., et al. “The Veils of the Second Temple: Architecture and Tradition in the Herodian Sanctuary.”Eretz-Israel: Archaeological, Historical and Geographical Studies. 2015, pp. 40*-50*. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24433090. Accessed 24 Jan. 2021.

Flavius, Josephus. ​The Wars of the Jews. ​Translated by William Whiston, 1737, 5.191-5.194, ​https://lexundria.com/j_bj/5.184-5.247/wst​. Accessed 24 Jan. 2021.

Grabar, Oleg. “The Umayyad Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.” Ars Orientalis, vol. 3, 1959, pp. 33–62. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4629098. Accessed 24 Jan. 2021.

Taylor, Michael. “The Ziggurat Endures.” Archaeology, vol. 64, no. 2, 2011, pp. 47–52. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41780672. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.

“The Arabic Islamic Inscriptions On The Dome Of The Rock In Jerusalem, 72 AH / 692 CE.” ​Islamic Awareness, 2​ 005. Accessed 24 Jan. 2021.