forty minutes till Shabbat at the Lev Yerushalayim Hotel

I lock eyes with the man hanging out of the hotel window.
His arm grasps the sill, the other waves in the breeze.
A cigarette hangs, precariously, on red lips.
a glance to the right reveals another man, cigarette clutched in teeth, farther to the right, another.
every window of the third, fourth and fifth floor, another man.
a hundred men, each to his own room, each to his own window.
the overwhelming cigarette smoke consumed us as we stood, looking up at them,
they peered down at us.
each man, in quarantine for a virus.

the New York Times said the virus has driven us apart.
here, these men gathered together. At a distance, between their windows
they joked, laughed, wisps of Hebrew drifting down from the third story.
one man sat on a fire escape, reading.
another man stood, adidas tracksuit, speaking Arabic on his phone.
took a virus to bring the Nusseibeh’s and Oz’s of Jerusalem together, perhaps.
but they were still divided.
in a window to the far right, a Haredi woman stood alone. It was closed, but she too looked out from behind a dirty windowpane, wig under black knit hat, white telephone to her ear.

all these descendants of Abraham, infected together, standing apart.
when it came time for evening prayers, the Lev Yerushalayim hotel became Isaiah’s house of prayer for all peoples, a diseased temple on the mount.

isaac’s akeidah

nettle and thistle scratched me underfoot, drawing blood
it dripped down my leg, leaving a trail, like red teardrops, they dried
in the evening sun, which hung low in the sky like an ember
as it dropped, very slowly, into the western hills
there were oceans there, father told me, wide expanses of water
wade far enough, and you would fall off into the open yadayim* of g-d
i had never been to the ocean, no, my life was bound
to these hills, to this very hike, this path ever-upwards
my father, far along in his years and aging with every appearance and
disappearance of the gray moon. his face was gray too, partially
concealed behind a beard, and very solemn
he helped me over a particularly large rock, and we came to a clearing
father seemed upset, “what is wrong father?”
he was silent, busy in his work, the sun dipping farther and the air increasingly
cold.
father had split wood, many pieces of it, until his hands were splintered and
they too, wept with blood. i offered to wrap them and he refused.
he cried among the trees, he was preoccupied.
i sat next to a pool of water, small insects crawled on its surface
they hummed near my ears, i took a deep breath and looked upwards
the servants, whom we had left with the ass,
made noise and gathered around a fire. i wished to join their merrymaking
i could see its smoke escaping, free like a bird
father approached me as i sat, the sun dipped farther and the mood (and sky)
became very dark. i was afraid, suddenly.
father would not speak to me, his eyes looked wild and i saw the endless
ocean in his pupils as we embraced. i was a snake, caught between rocks.
only still images remain, the motion has been blurred out by pain
father bound me, we both still bled, he from splinters and I from nettles,
our blood mixed in the ground, soaking the soil.
the air was metallic and fresh, a knife appeared, grasped by evil gray knuckles

(inspired by Genesis 22)

* ידיים – arms

Chasing the Sunshine of ’67

This short story is fictional.

Garcia 

Nan is always very dirty. Her old eyes, which she once told me had seen the whole wide world and better days which I would never know, are hidden behind many wrinkles which make her look like an old bird. Nan is very short, maybe five feet tall, with white hair in a messy bun held with twine. Nan does not wash, well, none of us wash. Mom says we do not need soap to clean our bodies, only the air of the forest and the purity of our faith in Leader. Still, when the days are warm and it is summer, we go to the creek to wade with the tadpoles and minnows and water-skipper bugs which make Nan yelp with disgust and shut her wrinkly, old eyes with fear. I also hate the water-skipper bugs but I stay very quiet because I do not want to upset Nan. I can’t upset Nan.

Mom says life on the commune is better than life outside the commune, and I know she is right. Mom is always right, and I believe Mom.

Indigo Johnson

My family lives in utter squalor. I remember my last visit to the commune as if it was yesterday, though it will be six years tomorrow. I stepped into the cabin, that same pathetic structure of my youth, with its sagging roof and dirty tie-dye curtains concealing even dirtier windows. Oh, the smell! It hits you from the outside: stale marijuana, unwashed clothes, the indescribable odor of twenty years of bodies and their tears and sex and sleep and filth. Sister and Ma and my poor ten-year-old nephew Garcia living in voluntary destitution. ​Oh, how thankful I am to have escaped the smell of the commune. I shed the organic drippings of the cabin and woods for my business suit and undergraduate degree. Oh, how New York City pulses in my heart at night and reminds me I made the right choice to leave. Do I miss the commune? No. Yes? Do I miss the Ma of my youth, the Ma of ‘69 when our commune was one of dozens in the Berkshire mountains*, well? Yes, I miss Ma, but I no longer miss the commune. Maybe I miss the Berkshires trees which surround the site and spread shade over the cabin and the well and the gardens. But, no, I do not miss Sister.

It is 1986, and the communes which we once counted as neighbors have since packed up and gone away, and the era of free love and peace is fading into memory for everyone except Ma and Sister and her poor son.

I called Sister last week, I talked to her on the commune’s landline phone and heard her voice which poured into my ear like the heroin she once poured into her pocked arms to soothe her troubled soul.

“Hi Sister,”
“Hi Indigo. Indigo, we are leaving the commune soon.” “What?” I asked, startled.

Jane Johnson

The shrill tone of the phone rouses me violently from my psychedelic stupor and stuns me into reality. Getting up off the bed, I lean across the sheets and put the receiver to my ear. The light on the ceiling pulses into my eye, the white beam dividing into dozens of colors, real and imaginary, which flood my psyche and touch my soul. I come back to consciousness and the phone, now pressed against my ear, and I manage to say hello.

“Is this the residence of Blue Johnson.” It is an unfamiliar voice.

“That’s my mother, she is outside, this is her daughter speaking,” I say.

“This is head Commune.”

My hand starts shaking violently, my head feels light and I sit down on my bed. “Ma,” I say. “MA,” I scream.

“What,” I hear her yell from the picnic table, where she spends every night sitting and smoking. Ma finally appears in the doorway, leaning on her wooden cane and looking at me with red, tired eyes.

“I think it’s Leader,” I say.

Blue Johnson

I hear Jane yelling from the inside. Usually it’s the withdrawal, her nightmares of days soaked with opium smoke and paranoia. She screams “MA” and I run to her bedside with water and a joint and she smokes and drinks and I say breathe and her frightened eyes quiet and she sleeps. But her scream now is not the scream of need but the scream of urgency so I yell back “What?” while I hoist my creaky body off the porch table which serves as my nighttime throne and I walk inside. Her eyes are filled with a new fear, her hand trembles slightly on the phone and her heavy breathing fills the cabin. “​It’s Leader,” she says. How could head Commune call now of all times? After nineteen years? We are one of the smallest offshoot communes in the country, just the three of us in my cabin. The marijuana in my brain floods my head with a wave of memories, I steady myself on my cane. Suddenly I leave the cabin and find myself in the sun-soaked summer of ‘67 when life was good and love was free for the taking and Leader was still publishing his ideas and peace was coming. Now I feel as though our goals have gone stagnant as society, even my own traitorous daughter, leaves us behind in pursuit of money and hatred and possessions.

Garcia

Nan says I must pack my things. Nan says it very fast, as though what she is telling me to do scares her and she needs to get it off her chest and expel it from her old brain. Mom stands quietly in the corner, looking at the picture of Leader and humming: “The forests sing out your praises, your gifts lead us to nirvana.” ​Mom cannot sing as well as Nan; Nan is a very good singer and she sings to the stars and animals and to Leader at night, I hear her outside, I see her with the smoke from her joint curling around her old head and her old fingers. ​Nan said we have been called to head Commune.

I have only heard them speak about head Commune in whispers, in quiet voices when they think I am asleep but the buzz of the crickets and the hot air and the nighttime din of the forest keep me awake. I only hear snippets: “Colorado,” “the dancing,” Mom says quietly. “In a plane?” Mom asks. “Never,” Nan whispers sharply, cutting through the quiet hum of the air. “The car then,” Mom whispers.

Nan leans on her cane as she hoists bag after bag into the trunk of the car. It had taken me all morning to scrub the car with the old towel Nan keeps in the cabin. Mom cries and cries and cries. Mom cries often, it is just her nature Nan says, but I think it is because she misses the needles. ​Even I can’t forget the needles. There were so many needles.

Blue Johnson

We receive word that night on the phone from head commune that Leader has fallen ill with cancer. It has been nineteen years and yet Leader’s smile and voice still infatuate me and fill my mind. I have lived for him since ‘67, when he accepted me and Indigo and Jane into the group and we lived in the sunlight. I miss Leader often, but I sing for him and I think about him so that I can’t forget him, his crooked smile with a cigarette sticking out​ ​and his bright, hopeful eyes​. ​I am an atheist, my God is peace my God is love and my God is freedom but I ​do believe in Leader. L​eader is ill and we must go to him despite the distance. I haven’t been out of the commune these whole nineteen years, besides maybe to the store and I don’t want to leave but I must, for Leader.

Indigo Johnson

My mother is in a cult, well I guess by proxy Blue and Garcia are in it too. Well, they call it a commune but once I arrived at college in the big city and learned how cults manipulate minds I realized Leader was just a man and his promises were also made of air and false sunlight, but mother thinks they are real. “He holds the keys,” she told me every night before bed in the

cabin. Oh, she’d spin elaborate stories out of thread and spread them over me like a delicate blanket as I fell asleep. Ma wove tales of free love and sex and drug-soaked days of her youth when music would play for hours and people would spin and spin and turn like tops until the stars studded the purple horizon over head commune and the sun went to sleep. ​Oh, I guess you could say I miss Ma’s stories and her faith but I now know that Leader isn’t really enlightened and head commune isn’t really paradise and I can’t bring myself to tell Ma.

Sister says on the phone they dusted off the old car with its yellow, chipped paint and left the commune to return to Leader. Oh, it is kind of a motley crew for a cross-country drive, given that head Commune is somewhere in Colorado now. In ‘67 it was in California where Ma and the hippies lived in the shadows of the redwoods and Leader and his dedicated followers sang and danced under the pacific rains and breezes. At least that’s how Ma described it but I have my doubts. I can’t remember it there, I was so young at the time.

Blue Johnson

I don’t know what it is that fills me with such an urge to pack up and visit Leader. Maybe it is his teaching that we “must be devoted to our kind” and “sow warmth and care upon those in need.” We three pack into the car and it shakes and shudders to life and we start off down the highway, my hands clutching the wheel. We fly down the interstate and cover more ground than I have traveled in years. We move like insects, crawling over concrete roads like worker bees traveling towards the Queen. ​Perhaps the Leader is like our monarch but I’m not religious I don’t believe in anything, except perhaps Leader and the power of a good joint.

Garcia’s young eyes look stunned out of the car window, as trucks scream past and the landscape changes from wood to fields to corn to woods yet again. The sun beats down overhead, lighting up his blue eyes and shaggy brown hair and illuminating his dreamlike face. Jane sleeps next to him, and Leader’s voice fills the space from the cassette player. “We are all here for but a short while, so we must spend it with those we love,” his voice crackles out of the dashboard. ​I love Leader, and I really do miss Indigo.

Jane Johnson

I often find myself dozing off onto Garcia’s shoulder as the minutes turn into hours and the hours turn into days and the landscapes we pass through blend into a forgettable canvas of greens and reds and yellows. ​I’d offer Ma to help drive but she wanted to go see Leader and I can’t even drive anyway from the heroin bust so I’ll just languish here in the backseat, stuffed between Garcia and Ma’s ancient trunks filled with our stuff and I can’t wait to get out of this fucking car.

Garcia

“Have you ever heard of Ohio?” Nan asks me a few miles after the car crosses into the state. “No, Nan.” Nan took her eyes off the road and looked at me with a smile. I look down, fiddling with my thumbs and then looking out at the corn fields which surround the highway. We left the house before sunrise after Nan got the call and we have been in the car all day. Well we stopped to pee at the side of the road and eat turkey sandwiches which Mom made but now we are back in the car and the sun is burning up the cornfields in front of us. “The sun sets in the West, Garcia,” Nan says, her visor shading her face as her old hands clutch the steering wheel. “Ok,” I respond. ​Nan talks about the sun a lot. She says once upon a time she danced in the sunlight.

Indigo Johnson

“Hi there” the voice rasps into a faraway telephone. The shrill scream of the phone had broken the silence which enveloped me as I studied in my apartment.

“Hello?” I respond, trying to make out the voice, though I guess it is Ma. “Indigo? Can you hear me?
“Yes, Ma,” I say.

“We are calling from a payphone ​and​,” I hear a truck ​whoosh​ by the phone booth. It drowns out Ma’s voice. Oh why are these people doing this, ​why couldn’t they just stay on the commune why did they have to do this, well I left, but they shouldn’t leave.

“We are in Illinois, Indigo. My gosh it feels like we’ve been driving forever, well more specifically it feels like ​I’ve​ been driving forever. Hah! My fingers are all stiff from clutching that darn wheel. What has it been now, Garcia? Two days?”

I hear Garcia chime in in the background, “Three, Nan, it’s been three days.” ​He sounds so grown-up. It’s been so many years since I have seen Garcia, with his dirty rattle and dirty toys and big crooked smile.

“It’s been three days,” Ma repeated confidently.
“I heard Garcia,” I said, looking out over the traffic which filled 117th street.

“We have been staying in motels, Indigo, and we’re heading out again tomorrow, should reach Colorado soon enough, Leader needs us, Indigo,” Ma says. I don’t respond, I hear Ma breathing in the other end and the crackle of the wind and distance.

Why is Ma so convinced? I take a deep breath, fill my lungs with air — sweet city air filled with freedom and opportunity and the breath of others stacked above and below me who don’t obsess over Leader and I come back to the call.

“Ok, Ma. Tell me how it goes.”
“I will, Indigo,” her voice sounds distant, I know she is looking off into the distance. “Bye, Ma.” The receiver clicks and the phone’s hollow dial tone fills my ear.

Halfway to Colorado in three days what is that ​I try and do the math, never been a math person maybe 9 hours a day? Oh, Ma. Ma, who is willing to do anything for Leader she will go so far for leader she will leave Pa for leader she will drive halfway across the country for Leader. ​Why does she do it all for Leader?

Garcia

The big purple mountains fill up the sky and seem to crack the earth in front of us and they have snow on them despite the fact that it is nearly summer. It is very cold at night here. Nan says we are almost at head commune and her voice is very excited and her eyes are very alive. ​Well maybe it is because Nan has not had her joint in a few days and she usually loves to have her joint like Mom once loved her needles, but the joint is not as bad as the needles since the joint makes Nan smile and the needles would make Mom shake and sleep and scream and cry.

Never have I ever seen such big, big mountains. They are monsters which rip apart the land and they are shadows to the big, setting sun which also fills the sky. My back hurts from all the driving, and my ears ring from the voice of Leader which still crackles out of the car speakers. It has been very quiet except for Leader’s voice on the cassette and the roar of the tires underneath the car. Mom especially has been very quiet during the rides, but I hear her voice at night when I pick up snippets of her and Nan talking in quick voices outside the motel room window and I try to drown them out but their voices fill up my head and and the picture of Leader which Nan brings everywhere looks at me through the yellow half-light of the room which pours from the neon motel sign through the broken curtains.

Nan says that at head commune Leader lives with many other followers like us, but that they live a purer form of Leader’s vision, although Nan never tells me exactly what the vision is but I know it is good and Nan says it is good and pure like the sunshine of ‘67.

Jane Johnson

As we near head commune, the Rocky mountains which spotted the distance only a few hours before surround our small car and disappear into the nighttime, becoming one with the sky until the galaxies appear and hang like jewels above us. Ma has since turned off the track of Leader’s sermons, and the only sound now is Garcia’s breathing (who has dozed off) and the quiet putter of the tired engine.

The dozens of hours felt like a blur but only now, as the mountain nighttime air dips into the open window and bites my nose do I feel alive, like I have come out of a coma and entered reality. Ma took this trip for Leader since Leader has fallen ill and she says she needs to see him once more. ​“I just need to,” she says. Maybe she just wants to relive the glory of ‘67 but I have always thought there was something more to it. Garcia begins to snore as the clock turns from 11:59 to midnight and ​wow this is the first time I have even looked at the clock this whole long way and man are we far from home.

“We are quite close,” Ma breaks the silence and I look at her, the same hands clutching the steering wheel as they have this entire long way.

“Yeah?” I respond.
“Next exit. Loveland, Colorado,” she says.

The word Loveland has always existed in my mind as the place where head commune, and Leader reside, but never has it felt so real. As we turn off the exit the headlights illuminate an empty stretch of road banked by pine trees. For miles, we fly down the road — no trace of human existence besides our humming car and the road beneath our tires. I see Ma become more tense, her breathing becomes hurried, and she grips the steering wheel stronger than before. ​Suddenly I feel an overwhelming urge for my needles and for the dope which takes off that sharp edge of life and dulls out the pain until all sensations blend into one and the grays and the blues and the sweet and the melancholy saturate your thoughts and placate your mind.

“We’re here, Jane, wake Garcia.” My body tenses as we pull into head commune, hasn’t it all been leading up to this? This was the place Ma would speak to me and Indigo about as children. She’d tell us of Leader, and how he captured her heart and mind and his vision spoke to her and she needed ​just needed t​o live according to his word. Well, Ma has never been to head commune after it moved to Colorado and she moved back to the East Coast but now we are here and it is happening and we are to see Leader and…

“It is so dark, Jane,” Ma says. Her voice cut me off from my race of thoughts and I looked around. She is right — the streetlights are off, all the light is flooding from our car and from one cabin in the distance.

“Well, it is so late at night,” I respond, but I feel worried. Something feels wrong, maybe it is just the mountain altitude. ​It feels like that feeling when the dope was running low and there was only one more pinch for too many hours and it felt so uncertain and I knew that the shakes would start if I didn’t get more.

Our car pulls up to the cabin with the light and Ma turns off the engine and gets out and Garcia stretches and we three ascend the stairs like we are entering the the kingdom of paradise and knock ​tap tap tap ​on the door and it swings open and the face which I have seen in the pictures and the mailings and the posters and in my very brain greets us, but it doesn’t seem right.

Garcia

I wake up as we enter head commune and Nan and Mom and I go up to the door and it opens and the man behind it has a very bushy beard. It takes me a minute to realize that it is Leader and I feel very excited but also scared. That face (without the beard) watches over our house and, for the past week, over our motel room with big thoughtful eyes. But now those eyes in front of us look strained and red and his hair, which is combed in the poster and images, is unkept and he does not look the same, maybe it is because he is ill which is why we came here anyway but I don’t know.

Mom and Nan say “Hi there, hello” and Leader looks at them blankly like he has never seen them before. Maybe it is because he is ill but he says “who are ya” and the smell of his breath is wrong and smells like whatever is in the clear bottle on the table behind him I think Mom once said it is called “Lick or” but I don’t know what she means by that because I think it is alcohol.

We go inside and sit on the bed and the cabin is a little bit cleaner than ours but not much cleaner, but it has a similar smell to ours and for a second I feel at home. ​A cone of patchouli incense burns in the corner and fills the air with its sweet, smokey aura like burnt honey and herbs. And the year is 1986 but I feel like this incense is the smell on Nan’s mind when she talks about the sunshine of the summer of ‘67. While Ma and Nan talk I look at the incense, watch the smoke curl and turn over and over itself into the air like the smoke which drips off of Nan’s joint and I watch the air dissolve it till it is no more.

I keep watching the incense that whole time while I listen to Leader and Ma and Nan talk and then kept watching it from across the room on the cot they set me up on until I fell asleep and the next thing I see is the morning light flooding the room.

Blue Johnson

The scent of patchouli and sandalwood gushes into the crisp, mountain air as the door swings open and we stand before Leader. I feel my eyes well up with tears and the years between us seem to evaporate into what felt like a few, long minutes. His face looks older, more tired — with new lines on his forehead and a beard which now conceals the chiseled jawline which stands out in my photos of him.

He does not recognize me at first, but I remind him of who I am and of the summer of ‘67 and of how I have lived according to his principles and brought my child and grandchild with me here to see him and he smiles and remembers me and invites us in and my heart pounds with anticipation since it is really him and ​I don’t believe in anything except maybe this man and he is right here in front of me.

I sit and smile and clutch my cane but I can’t help noticing the empty bottles strewn about and bottles of medication which are scattered around the cabin’s kitchenette. They reflect the light of one exposed bulb on the ceiling which pulses around the cabin and fills the space with an eerie yellow light like it is dawn though it is just past midnight.

Leader smells of alcohol and I am worried ​why is he drinking with the cancer? a​nd he says he missed me all these years and is glad I came and I respond that we had to come before the cancer gets worse. Leader always said to us alcohol detracted from the pure path which explains why I don’t drink and only smoke and use the herb which Leader believed in.

“What cancer,” he says, “it’s liver disease,” he says, and my head swims with worry and confusion and I just don’t understand. Was I too high on my call that night.? Did I not hear right? After all, I had stumbled into the room, heard the voice on the phone say “cancer” but they must have said “cirrhosis.”​ I think of the Wizard of Oz which my mother had shown me once as a little girl when we lived in Brooklyn and how the quadruplet approach the Emerald City and stand before the wizard and he is just a man behind the curtain and now Leader appears to be that man but I wonder who was the wizard and where was the curtain and I feel so tired and must go to sleep so we arrange blankets on the floor and a cot for Garcia and sleep and sleep until the sun rouses us in the morning.

Garcia

Mom and Nan and I wake up and then sit together outside Leader’s cabin and watch head commune’s morning ritual. The many people, who were hidden last night in the woods and dark cabins, come out in their tie-dye clothes. Some of the men and women are almost naked, and I can tell that none of them wash just as we do not wash. Nan joins them, and they stand in a circle with Leader and begin to sing the same songs which Nan sings at night on the commune. Now though, the songs come to life and their voices mix and rise together toward the sky. They beat drums and chant, and move in circles, spinning around and around for many minutes so even watching them is dizzying. ​The men and women spin and spin and spin like colorful tops and it becomes an optical illusion, a pulsing rhythm of bodies.

I hold Mom’s hand in mine, her fingers are so soft and warm — unlike when they were cold and dead and I am so happy that there are no needles anymore. We are at head commune and since Mom is happy I think I am happy and at least Nan is happy because if Nan is happy I am happy and isn’t that the goal anyway?

Jane Johnson

I remember when they took Garcia away from me. They had found me high, my eyes rolling like white marbles back into my brain and the needle sticking out from my dead, gray arm. They had found me in the apartment, Garcia was alone in his crib and his crying had woken the neighbors. They had found me with so much heroin coursing through my veins that I had nearly died and gone to the paradise.

Sometimes, I dream of poppies, bursting with rich opium saps and dancing gracefully to the tune of the wind in high, lush mountain prairies. Then I dream of the refined, crystalline powders which I would get from the man on the street to smoke and snort and shoot and I wonder how one led to the other. Garcia was taken away from me for a long time, and when I got him back I threw out my needles and dope and I moved back to the commune with Ma.

So now, as I sit with Garcia watching head commune’s morning dance, I grab his small hand and hold it very tight because I can’t let Garcia get taken away from me again even if it means no more needles. His hand is very small in mine, and I put my other arm around his shoulder and hold him so tight against me so that we are one. I watch as Ma dances around and around, spinning in circles, her lips moving along to the melody of the group and her old feet stomping to their beat.

Blue Johnson

The morning dance that first day at head commune fills me with hope. I step out into the field with the others, leaving my cane and Garcia and Jane behind on Leader’s porch. I felt a new energy fill me up as we gathered into a circle and took each other’s hands. I recognize some faces, each imbued with the same optimism and sense of purpose which had always captivated me.

We begin to spin, faster and faster until the pines around head commune blur and become a green river and my head is filled with the sound of the voices and instruments. My legs, creaky as they are, become agile and numb, my torso rotates and gyrates with intensity. I throw my hands up in the air and look to the sky, which is filled with light gray clouds. I feel dizzy, spinning and spinning but I cannot stop — the beat consumes me as it did in ‘67 and I lose sight of Garcia and Jane on the porch, they blend too into the green and it all becomes one.

So Leader is an alcoholic now, dying of liver disease and so ill he must sit down to watch the morning ritual. Well maybe if I spin hard enough he too will melt away into the backdrop and the past nineteen years of my life will have been worth something Garcia and Jane enter my view again as I spin in their direction, and who am I joking? It has been worth it for them.

The gray clouds continue to become lighter as the ritual proceeds, and while we stand and chant the various hymns I look up again and see a break in the clouds. The break becomes whiter and whiter until finally the final clouds dissipate and the sun gushes in like a golden waterfall, drenching my face and body and soul in its majesty. I know I have found it again, even though I didn’t know I was looking for it, and I feel weak and mighty all at once, standing there enlightened in the same sunlight which had poured over me in ‘67.

Garcia

I see Nan smiling at the sky, the sunlight in her face and her wrinkles hard to see in the bright light. She stands without her cane, holding onto nothing but the air around her and I can see her breathing in and out. I lean into Mom, who is holding my hand so tight that it feels tingly. She is also watching Nan, who seems alone even though she is surrounded by a busy group of people. Tears rush down Mom’s face and I don’t know why, but I know it is not about needles or about Auntie Indigo or about anything else. I know Mom’s tears are just because she is watching Nan and she thinks Nan looks just as young and beautiful in the sunlight as I do.

Biblical Trade Stigma in Medieval Times

A Jewish maxim teaches that the Bible, and its many values and moral constructs, were realized by those who lived before us as modeled in the Divine image, recorded, and passed down. So too did Medieval clergy look to Scripture, and other sources from antiquity, to strongly guide their moralization of labor. Certain stigmas about licit and illicit trade practices, recorded in the Pentateuch and which likely even pre-dated the Israelites, have continued to hold sway over thinkers even into today. In this essay, using Jacques LeGoff’s essay “Licit and Illicit Trades in the Medieval West” as a guide, I will show how Medieval ways of moralizing labor were largely based on similar ancient stigmas and taboos. Looking to the Pentateuch and touching on Greek thought, I will try to show that Biblical stigmas about mercantile trade and currency, among other taboos about purity and societal division, made their way into Medieval thought.

To start, the ethno-centric rules surrounding usury and other commercial activities presented in Deuteronomy tinge mercantile trade from the outset as something to be shunned, especially when dealing with clients in one’s own society. This tinge made its way to Medieval society in widespread bans on usury, money-handling and other forms of commercialism. This ethno- centric ancient Israelite view is represented in Deuteronomy 15:3, where different rules are drawn for exacting foreigners of their debt, and special care in the next verse paid to making sure there are no poor among “you.” “You,” in this sense, being the ancient Israelites. The merchant, reaching across societies to make money, is hardly working to help those among their own, and are instead contributing to their own coffers and the bank account of foreigners. The Book of Deuteronomy understands that poverty is inherent in groups of societies, noting that poor will“never cease” in the land, and that the Israelite needy require charity, help and brotherhood to overcome their woes. Clearly, a merchant who straddles the divide between one’s mother society and foreign societies, and merely to make money at that, will be looked down upon in this construct. In Medieval times, when Christian ideals of charity, salvation and brotherhood were at the forefront (at least for theologians), mercantile trade from a philanthropic perspective is filledwith issues. For example, LeGoff notes that Medieval commercial trade was “proscribed when conducted with an eye to profit,” but permitted in more charitable circumstances (58). Though the passages in Deuteronomy which we read did not outright ban mercantile activity, it was clearly looked down upon as less righteous than activities which either helped fellow men within Israelite society or at least involved infusing one’s own labor into their earnings. This view passed down to Medieval thinkers, who were grounded in ancient Israelite Scripture.

An ancient distinction made between work which is the result of human passion and work which results from the trade of others’ goods also continued through Medieval times. This emphasis on labor, and thus stigmatization of merchants, is highlighted in the Book of Proverbs. In the Proverbs, it is written that wealth accumulated in the name of vanity will vanish, while true labor leads to increased wealth. In pre-modern societies, long before refrigerators and other luxuries graced households, much trade between societies was likely based in luxury goods, food additives and other items not essential to survival. It is unlikely that premodern societies such as the ancient Israelites imported vast quantities of their foodstuffs and other goods as we do today, instead growing it themselves in fields governed by strict religious law. Thus, the merchant would likely trade in vain means, whether it be jewelry, art, or other luxurious items. And merchants trade the products of other’s labor. The same animosity which the left in the United States directs towards the insulated office-bound CEO, CFO and other businesspeople parallels this ancient dislike of merchants, in that people looked to others who traded the products of their own labor with disdain and frustration. Also notable is LeGoff’s critical realization that since man’s work in Medieval times was supposed to be like that of the Divine, which is recorded in Genesis and is remarkably productive and clearly labor-intensive, mercantile trade which simply benefits off of others’ labor is inherently inferior and un-G-dly.

The popular Medieval conception of wrongdoing in mercantile commerce lies not only in Deuteronomy and Proverbs, but in the Book of Sirach, which was key to Christian thinkers (it is not in the Jewish canon). It says in the Book of Sirach that merchants cannot keep themselves from doing wrong, as sin inserts itself into buying and selling. This conception, especially coming from early sources, makes sense. In a time before regulations could crack down on unstructured trades, and without the Internet or newspapers to communicate common prices, merchants could likely inflate prices to unreasonable measures, among other kinds of lies. The Book of Sirach is included in the canon of several Christian sects for several reasons, including that it reinforces Christian ideals of honesty and charity. The Book of Sirach’s dislike of currency and metal-based wealth, as opposed to what it views as the more honest labor of agriculture, sheds indirect disdain on merchants too. That is, the book notes that gold ruins people, destroying the fools who engage with it and corrupting those who follow it (31:5 – 31:7). This suggests again that merchants, whose trades of others’ material goods can leave them only with gold or other currency, are caught up in gold’s enticing vices. The final excerpts we read in class from the Book of Sirach further suggest that trades which allow humans to apply their passions and labor to objects are most desirable, leading to diligent careers and honorable. Merchants, excluded from such activities, are clearly also excluded from such honor.

The next similarity between medieval and ancient conceptions of moralizing labor is the distinction between which groups are permitted to engage in which kind of labor. LeGoff notes in his essay that certain activities were forbidden to Medieval clerics and religious authorities (58). This mirrors conceptions of class purity found in ancient Israelite societies, when priests and high priests were banned from engaging in impure activities, lest their holiness be muddied. Of course, as LeGoff rightfully notes, this thus lends a certain stigma to those laymen who do participate in the activities unfit for their holier brethren (59). This idea of purity serves as a clear link to the argument that medieval conceptions of moralizing labor mirrored the that of the ancients. LeGoff notes the blood taboo, which affects primarily those practitioners of death: executioners, butchers, even soldiers. So too, in ancient Israelite times, did an entire corpus of law emerge on how to properly cleanse those Priests who had to touch the unclean dead or work with dying animals. The link between ancient and Medieval, in taboos and ensuring purity of their clergy, is clear.

The component which worried me about arguing the ancient and medieval conceptions of moralizing labor were similar is their different view of asceticism, at least on paper. While the ancient Israelites and other ancient writers recognized a natural progression into social classes, with renowned works such as Plato’s The Republic developing schemes which divided society into different classes, this outlook clashes ideologically with Christian belief. In Christianity, “avarice,” “greed,” “gluttony” and innumerable other keywords associated with luxury were roundly condemned by church elders and the clergy. This condemnation is based on fundamental Christian tenets, including the inherent purity of man in his natural state, and thus the soil of trade and other activities, according to LeGoff. And, the idea that all people, rich or poor, are children of Christ and worthy of his salvation. In such a worldview, any desires to self- aggrandize or otherwise improve one’s net worth or belongings, on paper, was sinful. Now, regardless of this theological position, it is well-known, and supported by a quick glance at the bloody history, ruined châteaux and crumbling castles of medieval Europe, that despite theological inclinations to the contrary, Europeans in Medieval times still sought out money, worked to build defensible (and thus economically viable) estates and engaged in other forms of feudal commercialism.

In a way, though, ancient ways of moralizing economic activity continued in medieval times even after the transition to a widely accepted view that various types of trade were compatible, not exclusive from, Christian salvation. LeGoff notes that ancient views of various trades making up different parts of the society’s “body,” and thus each a key component, became popular (67). This “anthropomorphic image,” taken from the ancients and propagated by medieval theologians, is key. Clearly, ancient ideals can be twisted or renegotiated to fit a variety of needs. Lastly, ancient Greek and Roman techniques of associating certain trades and occupations with Divinity certainly resonate with the Medieval Christian tradition of patron sainthood for different trades and guilds (68).

In this short essay I sought to show a link between ancient modes of thought about licit and illicit practices in commercial activity. I drew a connection between various stigmas associated with trade which made their way from the Bible into (especially early) Medieval conceptions of moral labor, the ancient emphasis on purity, and a variety of brief ideas and images taken from the ancients and employed in Medieval thought, each of which can provide a book’s worth of exploration and elaboration.

* Page numbers refer to class reader from GOVT 20.03, Political Economy and Morality. References are to Jacques LeGoff’s essay “Licit and Illicit Trades in the Medieval West,” and the Bible.

Terrorism and Water: Strategies to Mitigate Biosecurity Threats to Municipal Water Systems

Introduction

Every day, the New York City water system delivers millions of residents over one billion gallons of water through a network of three lakes, 19 reservoirs and miles of aqueducts and tunnels (Hu). This water, some sourced over 100 miles north of Manhattan, almost entirely avoids filtration plants, instead it is rigorously tested and delivered (unfiltered) to city taps (Hu). Should this massive system face pathogenic disruptions, especially if combined with another crisis like the current outbreak of COVID-19, it could cause mass societal breakdown. For years, water systems in New York City and elsewhere have faced biosecurity threats in both digital and physical forms. From tampering with chemical additives dispersed by increasingly digital systems, to attempts to deposit chemicals in the water supply, there is a clear need for better protections of large water systems. In order to address this key capability gap in biosecurity, I propose a three-pronged policy approach that would take the form of a new executive order to advance national water protections, similar to existing Homeland Security Presidential Directives seven and nine (EPA). Homeland Security Presidential Directives are issued by the president on matters pertaining to homeland security (EPA). To better protect water resources from bioterrorism, this executive order would expand Early Warning Systems and public health knowledge, and promote digital and physical defenses of water supply systems, all of which can help protect the general population from waterborne terrorist attacks.

Context, definitions and history

In order to conceptualize the urgency for increased protections against waterborne attacks, let me first turn to historical incidents of attempted attacks on various water supply systems, as well as an example of the danger of waterborne disease in such systems.

Before diving into these examples, it is critical to clarify that it is unlikely that any large water supply system (like New York City’s) could be contaminated through the addition of a single pathogenic super-agent (Gleick 483). In fact, such attacks would likely be identified by existing water quality control checks at various points outside of the city limits (Worth). However, even terrorist attacks which fail to kill or injure large numbers of people can have important political ramifications, including sowing widespread fear and anxiety and eroding popular trust in public infrastructure (Gleick 483). Inherent in any “terrorist” attack is a desire to stir up widespread fear, regardless of real physical impact. Designing strategies to prevent such attacks, then, is a meaningful and worthy public investment — helping to mitigate fear and panic in addition to the low, but existing, risk of actual harm on the population. In addition, in studying this topic, it has become clear to me that any national actions on preventing biosecurity threats in water supplies could garner enough media attention to inspire such attacks. However, I think the government would be remiss to abandon important preparation and defense strategies, even in light of the risk of publicity.

Attacks on water systems go back over 4,500 years, and take on military, geopolitical or social motivations (Gleick 485). In keeping with New York as an example of a large water system at risk, there have been a variety of discovered plots to attack its system. For example, in 1985, law enforcement authorities discovered that a small survivalist group in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas known as The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord had acquired a drum containing 30 gallons of potassium cyanide, with the apparent intent to poison water supplies in New York and other major cities (487). A decade earlier, in 1972, two members of the right-wing “Order of the Rising Sun” were arrested in Chicago with 30-40 kg. of typhoid cultures that were allegedly to be used to poison the water supply in Chicago, St. Louis and other cities (486). Though both of these thwarted plots were unlikely to cause major harm given dilution and chlorination efforts (respectively) in major municipal water systems, they hint at both historical precedent for attacks on water systems and serve to inform today’s ever-tech savvier attackers of the do’s and don’t’s of waterborne terrorism.

In the vein of cyberterrorism, as water systems and technology find themselves increasingly intertwined, there have been attempts to maliciously overwhelm such technologies. In 2000 in Australia, police arrested a man for using electronics (including a computer and radio) to take control of the Maroochy Shire wastewater system and release sewage into parks, rivers and property (Gleick 488). Just two years ago, the special agent in charge of the F.B.I.’s New York Special Operations and Cyber Division released an op-ed subtitled “America’s water supply is increasingly digitized, and increasingly vulnerable” (Mahairas). In the piece, he and a co-author explain that until recently, water systems were physically separated from the internet and from computer systems (Mahairas). However, in recent years, water systems working on modernizing their purification, distribution and maintenance, and their industrial control systems have started to lose this gap between operation and digitization (Mahairas). In 2013, Iranian hackers gained unauthorized access to a dam in Rye Brook, N.Y., just twenty miles north of New York City (Connor). Though they did not cause any damage, the risk was present (Connor). According to another article, if a successful assault occurs at New York’s Hillview Reservoir it could be a catastrophic event for the city (Worth). In the article, one expert said: “One could argue it [Hillview Reservoir] should be protected like Fort Knox, but at present it does not even have the security of a 7-Eleven” (Worth). In 2016, Syrian hackers attacked an American water district’s industrial control systems, and managed to manipulate the system to alter the amount of chemicals that went into the water supply (Mahairas). Later in this paper, I will present possible preventative measures to such attacks as part of the three-pronged approach to water defense.

Lastly, it is key to turn to an example of what an infected water supply can look like in terms of human suffering and financial damage (examining natural outbreaks, given a waterborne terrorist attack of the same scale has not occurred in the United States). The large outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1993 is an example of how contaminated water distributed through a municipal water system can result in significant medical, public health, and economic consequences in a community (Meinhardt 214). In this case, an estimated 403,000 Milwaukee residents developed diarrhea, which reflected an attack rate of 52% of the population served by the affected municipal water system (214). In addition, more than 4,000 Milwaukee residents were hospitalized during the waterborne outbreak, andcryptosporidiosis was listed as the underlying or contributory cause of death in 54 residents following the outbreak (214). Investigators estimate that 725,000 productive days were lost as a result of the water contamination event, at a cost in excess of $54 million in lost work time or additional expenses to residents and local authorities in Milwaukee (214). In 2000, the municipal water supply of Walkerton, Ontario, was contaminated with E. coli, resulting in 2,300 symptomatic residents and 7 deaths attributed to the waterborne disease outbreak (214). Current estimates of the total cost of the Walkerton Ontario, waterborne disease outbreak and municipal water contamination event have reached $155 million (215). Both of these examples from Meinhardt’s in-depth study highlight, under an academic microscope, the health and financial effects possible during disruptions to a water system. If such events were to be caused maliciously, especially to a large system like New York City, it would clearly harm the health and financial resources of the municipality.

Three-pronged approach, approach one and two: EWS and public health measures

A wide body of scholarship shows that improved Early Warning Systems, or EWS, can improve municipalities’ response to biosecurity issues in their water (or food) systems. So, part of any Homeland Security Presidential Directive would include strategies for improved EWS across domestic municipalities. As Foran notes in his study of EWS and the implementation thereof, the resources necessary for the development, installation, operation, and maintenance of an EWS will be substantial; therefore, virtually all of the decisions regarding the EWS must be made at the local or community level (Foran 995). Such EWS would include technology-based and other pre-event (or pre-exposure) management strategies which can be effective deterrents to widespread human exposure to bioweapons, as well as other low-probability/high-impact contaminant events in drinking water supplies, such as the intentional introduction ofCryptosporidium (see “Milwaukee,” above, for a natural example of Cryptosporidium dangers) (993). Of particular note are existing and developing technologies to rapidly detect pathogens in real time, both in source water and water distribution systems (993). Included among these technologies are DNA microchip arrays, immunologic techniques, microrobots, and a variety of optical technologies, flow cytometry, molecular probes, and other techniques (993). Also of consideration would be the type of EWS to install (and its included costs), interpretation of information from the EWS, responses that should occur as a result of a signal from the EWS, and the nature of communications to the affected public (995). The emergency preparedness plan will play a crucial role in many of these decisions, and (see above) there should be significant local involvement in the development of the plan (995). However, funding assistance for EWS development, installation, and operation may be available from both the state and the federal government (995). Foran also notes, regarding the price of implementing such systems, that if the price of false negatives and other issues is less than the benefit of averting true positives, spending on such measures will garner public support (993). Given the importance of local and state action on designing and implementing such systems, an executive order (coupled with federal funding) would provide the key spark in designing such systems.

If the feedback testing associated with EWS does not work sufficiently, or just to complement such measures, it is critical that healthcare providers are well-informed and able to identify patient patterns which may indicate emerging or novel waterborne threats. According to Meinhardt, this can prove difficult since many weaponized biological agents display a significantly different clinical picture when the route of exposure is ingestion (Meinhardt 217). The researcher notes that food and water as a mode of dispersion for weaponized biological agents may confound diagnosis, delay treatment, and impede protective public health measures if epidemiologic investigations and clinical assessments are restricted to evaluation of inhalation and cutaneous routes of exposure alone (217). Meinhardt notes that the first indication of a terrorist attack may be an increased number of patients presenting to their health care provider or hospital emergency department with unusual or unexplained illness or injury (230). She notes that one method to monitor epidemiological trends and search for biosecurity threats is to employ syndromic surveillance, which utilizes the recognition of characteristic signs and symptoms of large groups of presenting patients usually at hospital emergency departments (231). Meinhardt also argues that providing access to constantly updated and credible clinical information could help most health care providers and public health practitioners to rapidly evaluate, manage, and prevent disease resulting from exposure to biowarfare agents (233). Both syndromic surveillance and increased internet resources for healthcare providers would be part of the proposed Homeland Security Presidential Directive.

Three-pronged approach, approach three: digital and physical policy and preparation

To address the digital biosecurity risks such as those highlighted in the preceding section, there exist a variety of strategies. In New York City and other large water utilities, that could look like the adoption of a “defense in depth” approach that creates multiple layers of security, instead of relying on passive defenses like antivirus software and digital filters (Mahairas). Utilities can also employ more practical cybersecurity guidance from federal agencies, such as hardware measures like single-direction gateways that prevent the inward flow of information (Mahairas). Last, utilities need to trust the government channels available to them to report attacks, using resources like the Department of Homeland Security’s national Risk Management Center to organize private and public sector defense of key infrastructure (Mahairas). All of these digital protection strategies (including those designed to build trust) would be included in the proposed Homeland Security Presidential Directive. On the physical side, water resources such as New York City’s upstate reservoirs and web of interconnected water mains and pipes have a variety of weak points. In his analysis of Polish water systems, Chudzicki identifies both critical points in a water system, measures taken to physically protect them, and a three-level plan which can be implemented in the event of a major disruption (Chudzicki). As a precursor to the three-level preparations plan he proposes, Chudzicki highlights the importance of physical fencing and surveillance of junctures in the water system (5). Though municipalities like New York do perform security checks on their resources, including fly-overs of upstate reservoirs and constant chemical monitoring, the proposed Homeland Security Presidential Directive would emphasize the need for similar security measures across the nation (Worth). Chudzicki also highlights that geodetic data showing individual underground utility components (technical infrastructure), including the information about water supply network elements, is widely available on geodetic websites and in public and private sources (Chudzicki 9). The proposed Homeland Security Presidential Directive would call to strike such data from public sources, making it harder for the general populace and malicious actors therein to access geodetic information about water systems. In order to placate criticism from champions of information freedom, such data could be accessible through petition and review to local or state governing bodies. In limiting public access to data such as entry points, junctions and pipe networks, the government would help thwart physical attacks on water systems. One 2001 article, written in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks in New York City, highlighted the physical inadequacies of the New York system (which can be reasonably inferred to be mirrored in municipal systems elsewhere) (Worth). In the article, city officials disclosed that staffing was lacking for patrol of the New York municipal water system (Worth). In addition, New York City police have limited jurisdiction over the watersheds which feed New York, because they lie outside of city limits (Worth). The Homeland Security Presidential Directive would address these concerns, outlining regulations to increase hiring of staff to patrol water systems, and ensuring extended jurisdiction for a municipality’s police and environmental forces over the watersheds which supply their respective constituents.

Lastly, on the physical protections side, Chudzicki highlights a three step preparations plan in the event of water system disruptions; this plan would be incorporated into the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (Chudzicki 10-11). In Variant (scenario) I, a disruption which would last up to 48 hours, water would be supplied to municipality inhabitants by means of tank trucks with non-potable water for domestic use and distribution of drinking water (11). In Variant II, a water supply failure between 2 days and 4 weeks, temporary water tanks supplied with clean water from non-disrupted sources would provide residents with essential water (11). In Variant III, a water supply failure between 1 month and 1 year, strategies included in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive would include preparations to distribute bottled packaged water, use fragments of water supply networks as underground reservoirs, or drill new wells to create alternative water intakes (12). These policy changes and preparation strategies would better prepare domestic municipalities for attacks on their water supply.

Conclusion

The new Homeland Security Presidential Directive which I propose would take three different approaches to improving domestic preparation for bioterrorism in municipal water supply systems. These three prongs are improved Early Warning Systems, better public health measures, and increased physical and digital defense mechanisms. The approaches I suggest can also be applied to other countries’ municipal water systems, through whichever legislative processes are best aligned with the United States executive order process. In this paper, I examine the strategic value of implementing these recommendations (which include preparedness to minimize harm to the general population in a terrorism event), but in further research detailed financial calculations would need to be made to better highlight the cost, benefits and risks of such an executive order. I also identify biosecurity threats to water as the most serious problem in biosecurity because water systems sustain every member of society, and especially when coupled with another attack or threat, can cause widespread disruption. Further research on this subject would also look into the toxins, like those Meinhardt identifies, which can cause such disruptions — and explore cures and treatments (Meinhardt 224-228). Executive orders are highly feasible pieces of legislation: they require no public deliberation and can inspire national action immediately. Circling back to the introduction, given that millions of New Yorkers wake up each morning and reach for their unfiltered taps, it is imperative to address the real risk of biosecurity in this (and other) water systems in order to keep citizens safe.

Works Cited

Chudzicki, J. “Current threats to water supply systems.” WIT Transactions on the Built Environment, Urban Water (2016): 3-14.

Connor, Tracy, et al. “Iranian Hackers Claim Cyber Attack on New York Dam.” NBCNews.com, NBCUniversal News Group, 23 Dec. 2015, www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/iranian-hackers-claim-cyber-attack-new-york-dam-n4 84611.

Foran, Jeffery A., and Thomas M. Brosnan. “Early warning systems for hazardous biological agents in potable water.” Environmental Health Perspectives 108.10 (2000): 993-995.

Gleick, Peter H. “Water and terrorism.” Water policy 8.6 (2006): 481-503.
“Homeland Security Presidential Directives.” EPA, Environmental Protection Agency, 4 Apr. 2018, www.epa.gov/emergency-response/homeland-security-presidential-directives.*

Hu, Winnie. “A Billion-Dollar Investment in New York’s Water.” The New York Times, 18 Jan. 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/nyregion/new-york-city-water-filtration.html

Mahairas, Ari and Peter J. Beshar. “A Perfect Target for Cybercriminals.” The New York Times, 19 Nov. 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/19/opinion/water-security-vulnerability-hacking.html

Meinhardt, Patricia L. “Water and bioterrorism: preparing for the potential threat to US water supplies and public health.” Annu. Rev. Public Health 26 (2005): 213-237.

Worth, Robert. “New Concern About Security Of the Water Supply.” The New York Times, 14 Oct. 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/14/nyregion/new-concern-about-security-of-the-water -supply.html

The UAE: A Demographic Experiment in Modern Authoritarianism

INTRODUCTION

The United Arab Emirates, or UAE, has unique demographics, with a population of mostly foreign nationals. A federation of seven constituent emirates run by tribal elite, two — Abu Dhabi and Dubai — have come to international notoriety since the UAE’s formation in 1971 due to exponential economic growth based on oil wealth and a strategy to attract foreign investment (UAE). This economic growth brought with it a massive number of expatriate and migrant workers. In line with other undemocratic states in the region, neither Emirati citizens — who constitute some ten percent of the population — nor foreign nationals challenge the ruling regime. In this paper, I will examine how the UAE regime both suppresses rights and civil society while capitalizing off of the expatriate-model to prevent democratization.

The diverse foreign presence in the UAE, focused on economic prospects, remains politically inactive. The lack of sufficient native Emiratis to work the expanding economy, coupled with large oil resources, has drawn increasing numbers of workers to the UAE since the 1970s (Khalifa 109-110). As far back as 1976, nearly 240,000 permits were issued to migrant workers (111). The foreign community is heterogeneous, which is one of the reasons they remain a politically inactive entity. The category of Arab foreigners alone represents workers from a variety of backgrounds, ranging from Yemenites to Palestinians, Salafists to Maronite Christians. In countries like Lebanon, domestic sectarian division prevents homegrown agreement. Thus, it is evident that groups of ethno-linguistically disparate foreigners living and working within the UAE are less likely to organize into any formidable political entity. Furthermore, expatriates and migrant workers have good reason to keep their heads down, regardless of political grievances like labor abuses (Sönmez 17). This is because the risk of deportation makes most immigrants politically acquiescent and passive (Khalifa 112). These foreign residents of the UAE, largely young males, are motivated to send money dependents abroad, not effect political change in their host country. If there is any political risk from the expatriates, it may more accurately lie in any grievances their presence provokes among the outnumbered Emirati population. In the long run, due to political deprivation and occasionally subpar living conditions, some experts believe Emiratis may become clandestinely organized and provide the seeds of internal subversion (113). Later, I will demonstrate how UAE leaders seek to quell Emirati grievances through financial subsidies and an emphasis on common identity, instead of through democratization efforts.

UAE: THE POLICE STATE

Heavy police surveillance is one of the first tools the UAE regime uses in maintaining power and preventing democratization, so I will examine it first. Since the death of the well-liked Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan in 2004, subsequent rulers have moved towards less accountable governance, relying on surveillance, instead of diplomacy, to ensure domestic order (Davidson). Accordingly, the urbanizing population is increasingly monitored and censored (Davidson). Despite allowing some sanitized proposals from permitted civil society organizations (see Civil Society), anything which moves towards a provocation of mass uprising is quickly silenced. An example of this monitoring and censorship is the arrest of Ahmed Mansoor, a Dubai-based telecommunications engineer (Davidson). After he founded an online discussion forum, it was blocked by the UAE’s proxy server (Davidson). Such online forums can provide a key space for grievances to be voiced. Soon thereafter, a group of police officers arrested Mansoor after he refused to leave the UAE. The state’s reliance on surveillance is evident in the blocking of certain websites and arrest of anyone deemed destabilizing.

The UAE closely surveils foreign nationals. Beginning in 2001, the regime implemented systematic immigration checks at 17 established entry points, soon using iris recognition to screen arriving foreigners (Guéraiche 95). The thousands of entering passengers are immediately matched against the profiles of some 400,000 persons blacklisted in the UAE (95). While these efforts are part of the fight against the threat of Islamist violence, it is also a clear effort to monitor foreign nationals. Much remains unknown about the UAE’s security efforts, but some experts believe there are attempts to track specific groups of foreign nationals: “It is rumoured that certain minorities, considered destabilising, such as Shi’a, Palestinians, and lately Egyptians, are monitored” (95). This mass-monitoring of those entering the UAE illustrates an important point: the regime recognizes the possible threat inherent in the constant importation of foreigners. The UAE has enjoyed undeterred growth, but leaders are clearly engaged in a constant undertaking to bolster surveillance apparatus in an effort to maintain power and domestic stability.

WEAK CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE UAE

A large heterogenous foreign population weakens prospects for unified civil society in the UAE, helping the regime stay in power, and consequently preventing democratization. Civil society serves as a buffer between government and individuals, providing spaces which contribute to discussion and democratization (Davidson 267). Yet, in the UAE what civil society organizations do exist serve within, and do not transcend, expatriate communities. While there are countries like India where large cultural subgroups do exist and civil society does thrive, the subgroups in the UAE are often temporary workers unwilling to involve themselves in what is perceived to be an alien society (Davidson 269). Given the dependence of UAE foreign workers on their host country, the civil society groups which exist remain explicitly apolitical. For example, one group designed to support Kenyan expatriates stresses that their mission involves “strictly social, educational and humanitarian activities,” and remains “absolutely non-political” (282). The Goan Cultural Society, founded for Catholic Indians in the UAE, also stresses its lack of “political affiliations” (282).

Besides stating their apoliticism, foreigners in the UAE also quietly self-censor to avoid provoking regime suspicion. For example, since the majority of the UAE’s journalists are Arab and South Asian expatriates, they are reluctant to criticize their wealthy host nation for fear of losing their job (Davidson 277). They are also hesitant to move towards public criticism in fear of attacks on their person or deportation, as I will soon demonstrate. So too are UAE academics careful of what they say about the regime, an especially notable feature of self-censorship given the presence of western university outposts like New York University Abu Dhabi.

In addition to the culture of self-regulation along government lines, UAE leaders are not opposed to presiding heavily over civil society and punishing those who step out of line. Regime leaders regularly co-opt civil society organizations to serve their own benefit, and UAE laws restrict freedom of assembly. Civil society groups’ inability to gain autonomy is because of strong links to the regime. This influence is due to the Federal Social Welfare Societies Law of 1974, which requires official approval for community groups, and a further de facto moratorium on new licenses in 1981 (Davidson 270). In Abu Dhabi, an “umbrella-system” of influence stretches over existing community organizations (271). Groups like the Amateur Astronomers Group, the Marine Races, and the Emirates Sailing Academy all tie back to the Emirates Heritage Club — chaired, at least in 1997, by a member of the ruling family (271). In the emirate of Sharjah, leaders pour funds into arts, theater and public interest associations (272). Both of these examples show the culture of cooptation and patronage which dampens civil society by tying organizations directly to the ruling elite. In addition, community organizations which do exist focus on sanitized goals, rather than address social or political change.

When unspoken rules fail to maintain a standard of silence about public grievances, the UAE regime swiftly steps in to silence dissent. A 1988 law stipulates that all publications are to be approved by the Ministry of Information and Culture (Davidson 277). Since before 1988 some limited press freedom existed, this legislative shift legally rendered press in the UAE as politically ineffective as civil society. When a member of the ruling elite in Dubai announced freedom of the press in 2001, it lasted only a precarious few months before the arrest, purported torture and expulsion of a Qatari satire writer (278). Such actions, alongside bans on prominent university professors and writers from newspapers, demonstrate the UAE regime’s willingness to crack down on dissent, including that of expatriates, in an effort to maintain power.

THE UAE GUEST-HOST DYNAMIC

In addition to quick suppression of dissent, the UAE regime deliberately controls foreign nationals under local laws while also emphasizing their status as domestic guests. The UAE is advertised abroad as a land of economic opportunity, complemented by glistening beaches and high-quality accommodations (Guéraiche 223). But many expatriates are quickly made aware of the state’s presence if they attempt to cross lines, either deliberately or in naïveté (223). This presence of the state is most evident in crackdowns on unsuspecting foreigners, such as the aforementioned Qatari writer. Another example is the 2006 arrest and imprisonment of a British couple for lewd outdoor behavior (1). Emiratis were outraged that the couple, who enjoyed the advantages of the Emirati economic largesse, would violate local modesty laws. As Guéraiche puts it, a deliberate system of guest-host relations has arisen in the country. Regardless of the quality of services performed by foreign nationals, they are required to have acquired property by age 65 or risk deportation (2). Rules like this serve as a continual reminder of the guest status of expatriates; no matter the contributions an expatriate makes, he/she should not stay past their welcome. The role of the foreign national is clearly centered around this mutually symbiotic, economic relationship. Freedom of assembly, speech and press are not prerequisites for economic success, which is a key understanding of the UAE’s ruling elite. Expatriates are also made explicitly aware of their foreign-ness; they will never be more than guests or enter the Emirati inner circle and have no reason to do so.

SPATIALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UAE

The UAE regime’s efforts to divide living spaces are intended to resist mass organization and democratization. To start, it is key to note the separate living spaces between foreign nationals and Emirati natives. For example, Dubai is described by one expert as “no more than a city-state of relatively gated communities marked by sharp communal and spatial boundaries” (Ledstrup 23). Given that the ruling elite constitutes the governing body of Dubai, such sharp borders are clearly intentional. These communities include the segregated milieu of foreign jetsetters, the labor camps of South Asian migrant workers, and the “cosmopolitan” ghettos of Western expatriates (23). Unlike the assimilation which often marks the experience of expatriate workers in countries like the United States or France, many expatriates (save for migrant laborers) live and operate in completely separate spaces from Emiratis. These spaces, replete with features like parks and children’s play areas, keep foreign residents satisfied during their stay in the UAE. Domestic relations are organized around the divide between Emirati and non-Emirati: “Land open to settlement which integrates or assimilates outsider populations is an impossible model” (Guéraiche 3). History demonstrates that large, communal spaces like Egypt’s Tahrir Square in the 2011 Arab Spring provide breeding grounds for mass mobilization. In its efforts for self-preservation, the UAE regime thus actively ensures spatial division.

On the citizen side of the spatial equation, the same housing provisions awarded to citizens also divide formerly communal space. For example, in Abu Dhabi all male Emirati citizens born in the Western region of the emirate are entitled to generous housing aid (Guéraiche 189). Citizens are offered either a small house, or a housing loan (189). Oil-rich governments throughout the Arab world offer citizens similar housing subsidies and other financial benefits to stave off discontent. But, according to Guéraiche, the same villa walls which are built in such regime-sponsored housing programs divide friends and neighbors (189). Given that sociability is a key element of Emirati cultures, and that in many countries informal social gatherings spark political discussion (like Yemeni qat circles or Tunisian soccer clubs), it appears these material benefits from the UAE regime may also serve as agents of strategic, spatial division.

The UAE regime emphasizes citizen identity and kinship, while actively denying the majority of citizens democratic political participation. Since political power is in the hands of the few tribes to which most Emirati natives belong, leaders emphasize a common sense of belonging. The Arabs of the Emirates think of themselves as a subset of the great Arab nation, a status no foreigner (nor their descendants) can achieve (Guéraiche 3). This idea is continually bolstered by the regime, which has emphasized Emirati identity through museums and other cultural investments. Even with this sense of belonging, some Emiratis quietly express grievances about the side-effects of economic growth: “Older Emiratis will still hanker after the past … Apart from the patrimony of sheikhs, they had no need for welfare in the past and being relocated from their old dwellings to modern houses only uprooted and disconnected them from each other” (Morton 212). Despite these grievances with the side effects of state benefits, however, Morton describes the same Emiratis as “immensely patriotic,” with their words imbued with a sense of awe or astonishment at the (economic) “Big Bang” which has turned their world upside down (212). This contradiction between awe and disdain for national economic advancement is notable and complex. It appears, though, that the patriotism associated with the economic benefits of UAE modernization trumps concerns. Few common Emiratis, save for a suppressed intelligentsia and some disgruntled workers, truly take much issue with the UAE ruling elites’ style of governance (Guéraiche 48). Under the visual veneers of modernization, Emiratis have maintained a conservative society, and are often satisfied with the actions of rulers who they view as their own kin (9). This kinship is institutionally cemented through the very means by which people can become citizens. Today, it is not enough to hold a UAE passport in order to establish full citizenship: one must also have a document known as khulasat al-qaid, a family book, to qualify (Morton 212). Clearly, the resonance between Emirati citizens and leaders is concretized through an emphasis on kinship and Arab identity. This leads to patriotism, which coupled with (widespread, though not complete) satisfaction at economic growth, means widespread citizen support for the ruling elite.

CONSEQUENCES FOR DEMOCRATIZATION: A COMPARISON

The UAE regime’s model of building an economic powerhouse on foreign labor and efficient, authoritarian governance would be weakened by democratization efforts. This helps to explain the regime’s use of police force to stifle discussion and prevention or cooptation of civil society. This is most evident in comparison with Kuwait. In Kuwait, there is a parliament which holds generally free and fair elections with near universal adult suffrage for citizens (Herb 379). Both Kuwait and the UAE are gulf monarchies strengthened by oil resources, but Kuwait badly lags behind the UAE in foreign direct investment (377). As one Kuwaiti businessman put it, “What takes one year to accomplish in Dubai takes ten years in Kuwait” (381). Without having to contend with bureaucracy or accountability to parliament, UAE regime leaders are able to govern efficiently (if unfairly). It is wholly possible that the UAE would view a strong, citizen- led parliament as a liability to a strong, diversified economy. Kuwait’s parliament represents citizens, most of whom rely on government jobs and oil-rents (384). Thus, Kuwaiti legislators limit the economic diversification of the economy and focus on citizen needs. In the UAE, in the absence of a parliament, political power resides in the hands of those who have personal stakes in private-sector growth (384). This private sector growth is a key reason why the UAE ruling elite would be interested in both suppressing democratization efforts and ensuring mass foreign investment and expatriate labor in the UAE. In addition, for the investments of the various UAE ruling families to profit, expatriates must move to Dubai and the other emirates of the UAE, buy residences, rent office space, and start businesses (384). This can be accomplished only if the UAE remains attractive to foreign shoppers, tourists, investors, and businesspeople and does not focus more on citizen needs, as Kuwait does (384). Unfettered by a parliament, regime leaders have pursued this goal. Thus, the UAE regime’s economic model (and thus means of staying in power) both relies on expatriates and would be weakened by enabling UAE citizens to have more of a say in national affairs, where they could promote their own interests.

CONCLUSION

The regime of the UAE maintains a strong grip on power through controlling all residents and relying on the contributions of apolitical expatriates. The consequence: a lack of democratization in the UAE. Through both imposing and inspiring a culture of censorship, save for some permitted, sanitized criticism of specific policies, the regime preserves its integrity. Foreigners largely keep their heads down, focused more on economic prospects than political agency. Meanwhile, Emirati citizens largely acquiesce to the presence of the state, despite minor grievances which come with modernization and the mass importation of labor. The lack of democratic institutions or rights in the UAE means grievances cannot surface, and regime leaders continue to focus on economic growth. Upon further reflection, it appears that maintaining a population where 90 percent of people are not citizens could be exactly what the ruling elite wants. After all, in the UAE model, there is little de facto difference in political rights between citizens or foreign residents. So, as the UAE regime strengthens citizen identity through an ever- increasing emphasis on kinship and shared Arab identity, they still afford them as few rights as possible and attempt to placate them with financial benefits. Even “elections” staged in the mid- 2000s for citizens only allowed voters hand-picked by the ruling elite, and results were consistently changed based on the agenda of those in power (Guéraiche 45-48). Only as the UAE enters a new decade, and prepares to host the landmark 2020 World Expo, will it remain to be seen how the regime positions itself under international scrutiny as a model of modern authoritarianism.

Works Cited

An Exploration of Senegal

Senegal, located in coastal West Africa, emerged from French colonial control in 1960 and charted a unique path in independent politics. In this paper, I will delve into the history of Senegal through 1991, starting with a brief overview of French control in Senegal, where residents enjoyed unique rights of participation and education among French West Africans. Then, I will examine the transition to independence in 1960, the rise of independent (and socialist) politics in the country, domestic and border crises, before finally exploring the saliency of ethnicity and caste in Senegalese politics.

Senegal occupied a special role in France’s colonial empire: the federal capital of French West Africa was established in Dakar, and Senegal was the only colony in black Africa where France applied assimilationist ideals (Clark and Phillips 1994, p. 9). That is, the ruling French viewed their culture as superior and believed that through education and integration colonial subjects could amount to full French citizens. The residents of the quatre communes (Dakar, Saint-Louis, Gorée and Rufisque) were awarded full citizenship rights and had far greater access to French resources than brethren in the countryside (p. 9). By 1914, urban African voters had elected a black deputy to the French Assembly, where he championed African rights with a French-oriented vision (p. 10). In the 1930s, socialism had found popular support – seen by the African élite of the communes as the antithesis of capitalism and colonial hardships – despite the ideology itself being a European import (p. 10). Léopold Sédar Senghor, a Francophone intellectual first nominated to represent rural Senegalese in a deputy’s seat, quickly mastered local “realpolitik” (p. 12). He capitalized on rural residents’ animosity toward the seats of power, forming his own political party: the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (p. 12). Senegal first entered independence in the late 1950s, as part of the Mali Federation with the former French Sudan – before divisions arose and Senegal declared its “unilateral” sovereignty in 1960 (p. 12).

The four-year development plan (1961-1964) propagated by Senegal’s first independent leaders – Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia – embodied African socialist idealism. Rejecting the compulsory labor element of Maoism and Leninism practiced elsewhere, Senghor’s socialism involved asking villagers what they wanted to work on and providinggovernment support to those ends (Crowder 1967, p. 123). Despite Senghor’s goal of distancing Senegal from the European “bourgeois” conception of land as personal property and illustrating socialism as akin to the “traditional” nature of black Africa, his plans faced several issues (p.123- 125). In 1963, the nascent country still relied on imported foodstuffs, depended on foreign aid and French involvement, and suffered under a bloated bureaucracy (p. 124-125). Clark and Phillips, writing thirty years later, add to this understanding of Senegal’s early troubles: they note the drought of 1966-1973, France’s 1967 abandonment of colonial price supports, the 1970s rise in oil prices, and worldwide inflation (p. 15).

In addition to economic issues, Senegal’s early independence politics were stagnant (though stable) after Senghor’s rise to power. The first two years were marked by an animated struggle between Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, which resulted in Dia’s arrest and imprisonment (Clark and Phillips 1994, p. 12). In 1963 a new constitution established a strong presidential regime, and an election shortly thereafter gave Senghor an overwhelming majority (p. 14-15). In the ensuing decade and a half, Senegal was effectively a one-party state, with the Socialist Party in control as the only “viable” political entity (p. 15). During this time, however, a handful of student and far-left protests dotted the political landscape and laid the groundwork for the eventual opening of the country’s politics in the 1980s. In addition to the aforementioned economic discontent, in 1968 the Senghor administration announced a 50 percent reduction in academic grants, leading to a student strike and new revolutionary sentiments (Bianchini 2019, p. 188). State police stormed a university, carnage ensued, and trade unions held strikes in solidarity (p. 189). The incident left a mark on the young nation’s political psyche. By 1976, the National Democratic Rally was formed, largely to gather “all shades of the left,” and aimed towards cultural decolonization and activism directed at the rural masses (p. 194-195). Bianchini argues that the leftist struggles of 1968 weakened the “Senghorian regime,” leading to a decade of political redefinition by leftist groups and the decisive move in December 1980 by Senghor’s successor towards an unrestricted multi-party system (p. 195).

The 1980s saw domestic political liberalization, with new inclusion of political parties, but also hosted international challenges on the Senegal-Mauritania border. Senghor’s successor, Abdou Diouf, eventually allowed fourteen political parties to participate in elections (Meredith 2011, p. 271). In fact, Meredith notes that by 1989, elections throughout the African continent served almost exclusively to prop up authoritarian regimes and bolster the power of the (permanently) incumbent leader, save for Senegal, the Gambia and Botswana (p. 385-386). In 1988, Diouf received almost three quarters of the national vote, but mass rioting was sparked in the Senegalese capital due to public allegations of rigged ballots and electoral irregularities, including mass voter absenteeism (Clark and Phillips 1994, p. 15). Nevertheless, Meredith points out that Diouf continued to win elections throughout the nineties until his defeat in 2000 (p. 271).

Meanwhile, on the border of Senegal and Mauritania, desertification had been pushing nomadic Mauritanian Arab herders towards Senegalese black African farmers, leading to a clash in 1989 (Parker 1991, p. 155). A Mauritanian camel herd, grazing over the border in violation of law, sparked tensions (p. 159). The rapid escalation of violence between black Africans and nomadic Arabs led to international trade embargoes and climaxed in late April 1989, after the Mauritanian embassy in Dakar was attacked and, in turn, Senegalese were killed in Mauritania. The crisis ended with the transportation and repatriation of 245,000 people who had been living in the opposing country back to their place of origin (p. 160). The open press in Senegal contributed to the public opinion against Mauritanians, promoting the “rivalry” (p.164). Meanwhile, the internal forces which caused the initial clash forced each country’s régime to take a hard stance on the conflict to maintain public support (p. 163-164). The issue can be attributed to racial politics, with the largely Arab Mauritania’s goal of reducing black power and thus capitalizing on the crisis, while domestic Senegalese opposition leaders (many of whom hailed from the river region) criticized Diouf’s government for failing to protect indigenous Senegalese on the border and forced Dakar to toe the hard line against its neighbor (p. 161-162).

Notably, ethnicity has proven to be less salient within Senegal than along its borders. Writing within a decade of Senegalese sovereignty, Crowder notes that Senegalese society enjoyed an indigenous ethnic homogeneity unrelated to the French policy of assimilation, encouraged by a common adherence to Islam, wherein local religious leaders of one tribe had considerable influence over Muslims of other ethnic origins (Crowder 1967, 97-98). In addition to this indigenous unity, the erasure of local divisions through French influence further blended – though certainly did not do away with – ethnic division. Crowder chalked this blurring of ethnic groups up to the widescale education of Senegalese in mainland France: “…in France they found themselves automatically dubbed as Senegalese, for few Frenchmen had time for the niceties of tribal distinctions” (99). A common cuisine bridging ethnic groups from the Wolof, Serer, Toucouleur and Lebou further blended ethnic boundaries: for example, a national dish known as riz sénégalais appeared in heterogenous parts of the country, showing the infusion of national identity into traditionally ethnic customs such as food (p. 100-101). Meredith also suggests indirectly a precedent of ethnic and religious tolerance in politics started by Senghor. The first President, who was a Catholic in the predominantly Muslim country, became “adept” at building coalitions and forged links with Senegal’s rural Muslim religious leaders (p. 60). It appears that the leaders of Muslim rival sects in Senegal preferred a Catholic “indifferent” to Islamic divisions than a Muslim who would naturally be a partisan in such affairs (Crowder 1967, 107).

Meanwhile, tribal caste systems proved a more relevant facet of Senegalese society. Crowder notes a system of superior and inferior castes in his 1967 book, designating it as the “main problem of Senegal” (p. 110). By 1994, Clark and Phillips describe a changing reality in which caste poses influence but has been subdued by punitive laws. Most Senegambian ethnic groups had a caste system based primarily on specialization or occupation – families of griots, blacksmiths and other artisans were attached to individual noble families, as were slaves (85-86). After independence, it became illegal to refer to or discriminate against a person’s caste or slave origin (86). Though endogamy remains, people of all caste origins are generally accepted as Muslims, rarely give the “deferential kneeling salutation” and live and are interred alongsideother Senegalese regardless of caste (86-87). Caste, for the most part, was absent in the discussions of independence politics which I encountered, suggesting its diminishing importance.

This brief glance into the emergence of Senegalese independence, its politics and early leaders, notable historical conflicts and the relative importance of ethnicity and caste have shown a unique national history. Heavily associated with France before independence, Senegal became a stronghold of the European-educated African intelligentsia, a home for a new attempt of African socialism, and one of the few African nations which had instituted successful multi-party elections by the late 1980s.

Also check out my paper on Senegalese democracy since 1990! 

Works Cited

Bianchini, Pascal. “The 1968 years: revolutionary politics in Senegal.” Review of African Political Economy, vol. 46, no. 160, pp. 184-203. Accessed 1 Feb. 2021.

Clark, Andrew F. and Lucie Colvin Phillips. Historical dictionary of Senegal. Metuchen, N.J.and London, The Scarecrow Press, 1994.

Crowder, Michael. Senegal: A Study of French Assimilation Policy. Bungay, Suffolk, Oxford University Press, 1967.

Meredith, Martin. The Fate of Africa. New York, PublicAffairs, 2011.

Parker, Ron. “The Senegal-Mauritania Conflict of 1989: A Fragile Equilibrium.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 29, no. 1, 1991, pp. 155–171. JSTOR, Accessed 2 Feb. 2021.

Senegal: Democracy Report since 1990

Since 1990, new Senegalese leaders have replaced the old guard of Léopold Sédar Senghor and his chosen successor Abdou Diouf in a series of peaceful elections, alongside political reforms which have allowed for wider participation in government. The crumbling of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990’s led to a widespread disenfranchisement of Marxism, which had defined pre-1990’s political opposition in Senegal. Paired with this move away from far-left ideology has been an increased political tolerance and even interest in catering to Senegal’s deeply influential Maraboutic Islamic authorities. A deeply pious country, religious messaging is increasingly impactful as a means of both connecting with voters, and possibly contributing to Senegal’s democratic strengths. In this piece, I will first seek to provide a brief historical overview of Senegal’s elections since 1990. Then, I will move on to discuss major political reforms over the last three decades. Finally, I will examine the influence of religion on post- 1990’s politics, before concluding with a brief sketch of remaining sociopolitical trends and challenges.

History and Elections

Before moving into post-1990’s elections, it is critical to incorporate some key historical premises. In 1963, a new constitution established a strong presidential regime in the former French colony, and an election shortly thereafter gave Senegal’s first president, Senghor, an overwhelming majority (Clark and Phillips, p. 14-15). Throughout the 1970’s, Senegal was a one-party state, with the Socialist Party in control as the only “viable” political entity (p. 15). Senghor’s successor and fellow socialist party member, Abdou Diouf, took control of the country in 1981 and maintained power until 2000, when he was defeated in democratic elections (Encyclopaedia Britannica). According to the Encyclopaedia, Senegal’s elections in both 1993 and 1998 were generally peaceful. Despite economic issues and tense youth uprisings engendered by the 1994 French decision to devalue the African franc by some 50 percent, the Diouf “regime” maintained a positive relationship with Senegal’s Islamic leaders and thus maintained power (Encyclopaedia Britannica). In 1998, however, opposition parties made gains — particularly in the urban sphere surrounding Dakar, the capital; by 2000, Abdoulaye Wade had won the election and unseated the Senghor-Diouf dynasty (Encyclopaedia Britannica). This victory of Abdoulaye Wade and the opposition in the March 19, 2000 presidential elections was met with “euphoria” by opposition parties who previously had little faith in the ruling regime to hold fair elections (Gellar 2005, p. 11-12). Beck noted in her 1997 piece on incremental reform in Senegal that the socialist party under Diouf used “patronage networks to manipulate the code” in elections (p. 27). Thus, it appears that though opposition parties made gains in 1998, and electoral reforms (which I will discuss in the following paragraphs) were passed, challenges to meaningful, free and fair democratic elections posed by the incumbent Diouf regime remained potent until 2000. Gellar noted years later that, despite the 2000 electoral defeat, the losers took consolation in their improved democratic image on the international stage (p. 12).

Wade continued to lead until he was unseated in the 2012 elections by Macky Sall, which Resnick described as an affirmation of the country’s “long-standing democratic reputation” (2005, p. 623). Proof of the resilience of Senegal’s multi-party democracy in the wake of the Senghor-Diouf regime, a notable amount of civil unrest had preceded the 2012 elections due to Wade’s argument that he was exempt from a 2001 term limit since it had been enacted after he took office (p. 623). Despite such unrest, and other “legalistic manoeuvres” by Wade, a variety of international observers roundly confirmed the absence of voter fraud or intimidation, allowing Sall — a representative of the incoming era of post-colonial leaders — to take office peacefully.

Reforms

Despite Diouf’s entrenched power until 2000, political liberalization started before his tenure ran out. In the 1980’s, he was the force behind the legalization of the very multi-party participation which would unseat him 20 years later. The idea of democratic liberalization has also made its way from the French-educated élite of Dakar to the general populace over time. According to Gellar, for many years, the French term démocratie as used by Senegal’s French- speaking intelligentsia referred to equality before the law, freedom of association, a free press, and the holding of fair and open elections (p. 11). In the 1980’s and 1990’s, Senegalese opposition politicians emphasized alternance (the ousting of the regime in power through the ballot box) as the most significant component of démocratie in Senegal (p. 11). Gellar further noted that because one party had held power “since independence” and allegedly used its control over the state apparatus to ensure victory in the elections, opposition leaders argued that Senegal was not a true démocratie – an idea which has faded in the years since 2000 (p. 11). A quick glance at Senegalese language trends illustrates the increasing general awareness of democracy. In Wolof, the local language used to some extent by 80 percent of the Senegalese population, the idea of demokaraasi has come to mean consensus in decision-making, solidarity, mutual reciprocity in resource distribution, and evenhandedness in treating everyone fairly (p. 12).

A key example of liberalizing reforms in Senegal is the transition towards decentralized power, allowing deeper local participation — a reflection of the spreading importance of demokaraasi even in the countryside. In Senegal’s earlier years, the urban intellectual élite adhered to different ideologies (mainly, different schools of leftist thought), but many agreed that the postcolonial state should be secular, highly centralized, and the main agent for economic development, modernization, and nation-building (Gellar 2005 p. 54-55). Moreover, like many intellectuals, they showed little interest in local affairs and preferred to focus their attention on national and international issues (p. 55). Because of this view, the central government determined how many villages would belong to each rural region, as well as the number, size, and boundaries of the regions (p. 56). According to Gellar, local communities had little power to organize their own units of local government (p. 56). This changed after 1990, as government leaders took several “important initiatives” to reduce the oversight of the central government and administration over Senegalese society and local government institutions (p. 56). In April 1990, several months before the November local elections, the Diouf government legislated new rights for urban mayors and presidents of Rural Councils, allowing them to elaborate and manage local government budgets and expenditures, which heretofore had been managed by federal representatives (p. 56). This “Second Administration Reform” empowered local chief executives with new financial power (p. 56). Additionally, during the 1990’s, the Diouf regime slowly acquiesced to public demands for an increasingly honest electoral system and relaxations of the state-controlled media (p. 81). Gellar noted that the 1991 electoral code, which had the support of fourteen out of Senegal’s seventeen political parties, created conditions for “minimizing fraud” and making elections more transparent (p. 81). These improved electoral conditions promised, among other reforms, foreign election monitors and a secret ballot (Resnick 2013, p. 625). In the years since 2000, despite the aforementioned unrest in 2012, these improved electoral conditions have proven resilient and allowed for the transition of power.

Religion and challenges

Senegal is both a stable democracy and a deeply religious nation. Nearly the entire population is Muslim and divided into four religious brotherhoods which hold powerful sway over the nation’s political and socioeconomic structures (Volk 2017, p. 33). According to Volk, their influence has increased over time. Senghor started the precedent of religious tolerance, as a Catholic leading a predominantly Muslim country. According to Volk, his election was “linked directly to the goodwill of the Senegalese brotherhoods” (p. 35). Diouf kept his distance from the brotherhoods, but following the democratic transition to Wade’s leadership, a new religious influence entered the federal offices of Dakar. Volk points out, interestingly, that Wade put effort into the religious aspects of his leadership. He wore traditional garments, including a “boubou,” and he made clear his affinity to the Mouride brotherhood evident in his public discourse (p. 35). Additionally, Islamic authorities received special benefits under his leadership, including tax exemption, land discounts and diplomatic passports (p. 35-36). In some ways, religious authorities reached a climax in power under Wade’s leadership. Babou argues that the existence of religious authorities at a “critical” distance from government legitimizes religious leaders and allows them act as “safety valves and brokers in times of crisis” (Babou 2016, p. 166). According to Babou, religion was the “beginning and end of power” for Wade, and he used it to garner and preserve control, sway the population, and legitimize government action (p. 182). Since then, and despite pressure to take sides in the 2012 election, the Islamic brotherhoods are shifting back toward neutrality, a notable example being the refusal of one paramount religious leader of the Murids to take sides in the presidential elections of March 2012 (p. 183).

Sall, the incumbent president today, has suggested that Islamic authorities would no longer receive such special treatment and immunity. A testament to their continued influence, however, is that Sall’s original promises have faltered. Volk notes that Sall continues to seek “proximity” to the influential brotherhoods, using projects like the state-sponsored modernization of religious buildings to demonstrate his connection to the Islamic authorities (p. 36). Despite this clear propensity of Senegalese leaders to cater to the Islamic authorities, Volk makes no claim that it is hindering democracy. In fact, he describes Senegal as a “stable, democratic country” with “impressive harmony” between ethnic and religious groups (p. 42).

Conclusion

Since 1990, Senegal has held several elections and seen the transition of power from the entrenched socialist party to new leaders, under the auspices of international observance. Despite some stumbling blocks, ranging from some moves by the Diouf regime in the late 1990’s to hinder voter participation, to Wade’s eager blending of religion and secular politics, Senegal has remained largely stable and its elections democratic and fair. Even before its 2012 contests, the protests sparked by questions of candidate legitimacy were handled by the Western African country’s governing bodies and a peaceful transition of power ensued. In 2019, Sall won his second five-year term with 58 percent of the vote, and despite some questions regarding corruption charges of opposition candidates, a British article about the election described thevoting atmosphere as “calm,” while international observer missions signaled no major issues (BBC 2019).

Works Cited

Babou, Cheikh Anta. “Negotiating the Boundaries of Power: Abdoulaye Wade, the Muridiyya, and State Politics in Senegal, 2000–2012.” Journal of West African History, vol. 2, no. 1,2016, Accessed 17 Feb. 2021.

Clark, Andrew, Camara, Camille and Hargreaves, John D.. “Senegal”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 5 Aug. 2020, Accessed 16 February 2021.

Clark, Andrew F. and Lucie Colvin Phillips. Historical dictionary of Senegal. Metuchen, N.J. and London, The Scarecrow Press, 1994.

Gellar, Sheldon. Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian analytics in Africa. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Resnick, Danielle. “Continuity and Change in Senegalese Party Politics: Lessons from the 2012 Elections.” African Affairs, vol. 112, no. 449, 2013, Accessed 17 Feb. 2021.

“Senegal election: President Macky Sall wins second term.” BBC. 28 Feb. 2019.*

Volk, Thomas. “Heading towards Maraboutcracy? Muslim Brotherhoods and Their Influence in Senegal.” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2017, Accessed 17 Feb. 2021.

*No author provided on webpage

Non-culturalist Factors of Civil War in Diverse Countries

Resorting to a culturalist interpretation of civil war is convenient. It provides a reductive narrative, explaining away modern conflict as the inevitable result of ancient cultural feuds. In his seminal work on the “clash of civilizations,” Huntington (1993) argues that the roots of modern conflict lie in irreconcilable divisions between different peoples (p. 25). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, among other countries, such culturalist perspectives became a dominant frame for interpreting conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003, p. 78). Yet, a wide body of scholarship exposes flaws in Huntington’s thesis. In this paper, I will argue that Huntington’s culturalist explanation of why civil war occurs in diverse countries is weakened by an exclusion of the importance of leadership, financial incentives, and certain key contextual factors.

In the first section, I will demonstrate how leaders can catalyze mild ethnic tensions into violence, often for their own benefit. In the second section, I will show how in several civil conflicts, violence can be better explained by individual financial needs than by ancient ethnic hatreds. In the third section, I will explain how factors more tangible than Huntingtonian ethnic division — such as the economy, geography and political systems — can better explain civil conflict.

THE ROLE OF LEADERS

Since Huntington proposes a bottom-up, sociological reading of civil conflict, he neglects the strong role that the top plays in inflaming civil wars (Lecture, February 26). While Huntington (1993) does assert that leaders arouse mass support, he argues they practice “civilization rallying” to do so, neglecting to mention their use of key tactics like supporter intimidation (p. 38). In the post-2011 Syrian Civil War, the ruling Assad regime has relied on a deliberate strategy of inducing fear and intimidating supporters to rally the country’s main minorities against domestic opposition (Berti and Paris 2014, p. 24). This strategy includes suppressing mass mobilizations, retaliating against anti-regime activism, and arresting, torturing and killing protest leaders (Berti and Paris 2014, p. 24). Many Syrian protesters have resorted to violence after inflammatory attacks by regime forces. This actually benefits the Syrian regime, since authoritarian rulers are better equipped to confront violent opposition than to withstand prolonged, peaceful (and ideological) struggles (Berti and Paris 2014, p. 24).

Leaders also capitalize on citizen needs in civil conflicts, quietly providing them material benefits under the public façade of ethnic rallying. In Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, a rising reformist movement in Serbia threatened to destroy conservatives’ power (Gagnon 1994, p. 120). To shift the public focus away from reform efforts, conservative Serbian leaders like Slobodan Milošević alleged imminent danger to Serb interests by groups like Albanians and Bosniaks (Gagnon 1994, p. 120). While this ethnic inflammation keeps with Huntington’s world view, a closer look shows the top-down sway of the public through material means. Leaders like Milošević often paid sympathetic mobs with free food, transportation and liquor (Mueller 2000, p. 46). In addition, much ethnic violence in Yugoslavia was generated by small groups of opportunistic Serbian thugs, newly empowered by leaders and even freed from prisons to join the effort (Mueller 2000, p. 46-47, 49). Meanwhile, ordinary people of varying ethnicities displayed a general sense of “bewilderment” at the new (leader-generated) hostility between neighbors with whom they had long coexisted, worked alongside and married (Mueller 2000, p. 56; Gagnon 1994, p. 119). The key point from both Syria and Yugoslavia is the demonstration of a top-down incitement of ethnic violence within a largely docile population through intimidation or the promise of rewards. The bottom-up explanation offered by Huntington fails to account for this.

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

Civil war in diverse countries can often be better explained by looking at micro-level, financial choices than by studying fluid ethnic divisions. Ethnicity serves largely as an ordering device rather than as the impelling force which drives conflict (Mueller 2000, p. 62). What does serve as an impelling force are the aforementioned rewards which individuals can gain from participating in warfare. For example in Rwanda in the 1990’s, the Hutu army organized (by leaders) to partake in mass violence against the Tutsi minority largely consisted of foreign drifters, vagrants and other apolitical actors. These fighters, some of whom were destitute, were enticed more by free beer and the chance to loot and rape than by anti-Tutsi sentiments (Mueller 2000, p. 59). When talk of a peace settlement with opposition forces became widespread, increased Hutu mutinies and looting further demonstrated that the desperate fighters were in it not out of ethnic conviction, but for the financial compensation (Reed 1996, p. 491). In Yugoslavia, individuals even took advantage of business opportunities across enemy lines, such as when a Serbian commander sold artillery to a group of enemy Bosnians (Mueller 2000, p. 58). The rebuttal to Huntington’s view as too singular to account for individuals’ varied identities can be easily extended to the power of individual financial opportunism over ethnic division (Sen 2006, p. 45-46). Clearly, individual opportunism trumped Huntingtonian ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Yugoslavia when the right economic incentives arose.

FACTORS BESIDE ETHNIC DIVISION

Huntington largely omits socioeconomic status and geography in his study of civil conflict, instead focusing on civilization clash (Huntington 1993, p. 25). Most directly, data have shown that after controlling for socioeconomic diversity, more ethnically or religiously diverse countries are no more prone to civil violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003, p. 75). Instead, according to Fearon and Laitin (2003), the countries most vulnerable to civil war have conditions favorable to insurgency such as poverty, rough terrain and insurgent-supportive diasporas (p. 80-81). In Yugoslavia and especially Rwanda, citizens’ willingness to commit violence for meager rewards is a clear result of poverty. Secondly, rough terrain like mountains can shelter insurgent groups. This was evident in Rwanda, where the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) re-assembled in the Vumba mountains near Uganda, which provided natural protection for guerrilla fighters (Reed 1996, p. 490). The case of Rwanda also supports Fearon and Laiton’s (2003) hypothesis that civil war is more likely when insurgents have diaspora support. With no tax base, the only revenue the RPF initially had at its disposal was provided by its supporters in the diaspora (Reed 1996, p. 498). While this example shows clear Tutsi co-ethnic support of insurgents, it is only one of many contributing factors to civil war in Rwanda and may also be strongly correlated to a Tutsi desire for government power, as opposed to a mere ethnic hatred of Hutus.

The desire for a restoration of lost power by an excluded ethnic group in civil wars is often more closely related to a desire for power than ethnic hatred. For example, in colonial Rwanda the Tutsi minority was favored as a superior ethnic group by European powers and afforded a disproportionately large role in society (Lecture, March 4). When the tables turned in 1959, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis fled the newly-empowered Hutu government (Lecture, March 4). Huntington approaches cultural conflict sociologically, arguing that irreconcilable differences like contrasting moral values espouse violence. Yet, in Rwanda, the Tutsi fall from power, domestic discrimination, and violent return in the early 1990’s better exemplifies the theory that ethnic groups that are excluded from power are more likely to challenge the regime through violent means (Cedarman, Wimmer and Min 2010, p.114). Government power structures can also play into the likelihood of such civil violence. Graham, Miller and Strøm (2017) show that countries with dispersive power-sharing methods (decentralized structures) can undermine democratic consolidation by weakening national consensus and encourage ethnic appeals (p. 702). Although this is related to ethnic division, it is within the more important context of government structure — since a constraining power-sharing model modeled on mandatory ethnic inclusion could prevent a fall into civil warfare (Graham, Miller and Strøm 2017, p. 702).

CONCLUSION

Huntington’s culturalist view of the world and its conflicts is weakened by its exclusion of the effect of leaders, financial incentives to engage in conflict, and factors unrelated to ethnic division. In many places, conflicts which masquerade under the veneer of ethnic conflict are actually catalyzed by opportunistic leaders and citizens seeking money or power, regardless of ethnicity. Civil conflicts are also shaped by geopolitical factors and different kinds of government structures, some of which are better at maintaining democracy in fragmented countries. While it may be appealing to reduce global conflict to “civilization clash” and ethnic division, like Huntington (1993) does, it is critical to take other factors into consideration.

Works Cited

Berti, Benedetta, and Jonathan Paris. 2014. “Beyond Sectarianism: Geopolitics, Fragmentation,and the Syrian Civil War.” Strategic Assessment 16(4): 21-34

Cedarman, L.E., Wimmer, A. and Min, B. 2010. “Why do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis.” World Politics, (62)(1): 87-119

Fearon, James and David Laiton. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil Wars.” American Political Science Review. 97(1): 75-90

Gagnon, V.P. 1994. “Serbia’s Road to War.” Journal of Democracy 5(2): 117-131

Graham, B.A., Miller, M.K., and Strøm, K.W. 2017. “Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival.” American Political Science Review, 111(4): 686-704

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72(3): 22-49

Mueller, John. 2000. “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War.’” International Security 25(1): 42-70

Reed, Wm Cyrus. 1996. “Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 34(3): 479-501

Sen, Amartya. 2006. Identity and Violence. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Ch. 3.

Opposing Literary Recollections of Youth in Jerusalem

The emotions and experiences of youth are profound, and long-lasting. The politicians and leaders whose actions, conflict and writings affect the lives of millions were once children too, absorbing the conversations of their elders and catching details which adults often miss in their haste or preoccupation with other matters. As Sari Nusseibeh puts it, poignantly, in Once Upon a Country, “My brother Zaki, a precocious ten-year-old, watched the debates with large, round, curious eyes, absorbing every word as if his brain were a complex calculating machine” (73). Clearly, Nusseibeh himself — despite his occasional disclaimer that he oft preferred other distractions to the heated political salons of his Palestinian family — clearly gathered a vast amount of information as a child among the Arab intellectual élite of Jerusalem. So too, in Amos Oz’s Tale of Love and Darkness, the author recounts his childhood in Jerusalem on the Jewish side of the divided city, delicately weaving together political events with intimate personal moments. In this short essay, I will demonstrate how the childhood perspective of both young protagonists is a salient method which sheds light on the domestic underbelly of Jerusalem politics, and how the “othering” of the opposite side is rooted in separation since birth.

Nusseibeh’s childhood perspective shows the intimate side of his father’s involved Arab political life. His first political recollections were “of screams,” after the new war broke out in 1956 (73). These “screams” are left ambiguous, suggesting a child’s ignorant and innocent fear. As a child, Nusseibeh described politics as the “gravitational center” of his family life (73). Privy to conversations which historians and scholars can only dream about, his narrative of his father’s political activity evokes an image of the young author — more cognizant of his surroundings than the adults realize, with “curious eyes” like his brother — scurrying underfoot. He relates the “interminable discussions” in his living room about King Abdullah (Jordan), Ben-Gurion, Eisenhower, Nasser and others (73). These conversations were less than abstract, though, as these political leaders figured as personal characters in Nusseibeh’s childhood. Later in the text, Nusseibeh casually mentions King Hussein dropping by the house for lunch, and a later falling-out between his father and the Jordanian sovereign (89-91). The living room was filled with “dense smoke” and lengthy evening debates (73). His mother, a Palestinian refugee from the coastal plain, talked politics infused with a literary air, filling the young narrator’s brain with images of a “magical dreamland,” lush with oranges, the Mediterranean Sea, all imbued with “idyllic innocence” (73). Out of his own bedroom window — arguably the most intimate of spaces — the narrator could peer out into a “shoot-to-kill zone,” separating the Jews in “enemy territory” from Arabs like himself (74). With such views out of his childhood window, little exposition is required to emphasize how interwoven personal life and the perils of politics were for Nusseibeh and other Jerusalemites.

Nusseibeh addresses the simultaneous proximity and division with neighboring Jews in the text’s prologue, directly addressing Amos Oz’s narrative: “I was raised no more than a hundred feet away from where Oz lived out his childhood, just on the other side of the fortified ‘No Man’s Land,’” (16). Oz, as a child, sat in his parents’ “small, dark apartment,” coming up with military strategies to defend the Jewish people, knowing little of the “ancient cobbled lanes” of the Arab quarters of the Old City which had long been inhabited and preserved by Nusseibeh’s ancestors (16). Only a hundred feet away, the intimate spaces of Oz’s home provided sanctuary for entirely opposing beliefs; a boyhood with the opposite experience of Nusseibeh’s.

After the 1947 announcement of the partition plan for Israel and the plan for a Jewish state, Oz relates the domestic side of a profound political change. Far from the dry narratives related in historical textbooks, Oz’s childhood recollections of the late November merrymaking suggest the raw passion and emotion which remain a powerful part of Israeli national memory. A child of course, his elders instructed him to sleep until the vote ended near midnight, after which he awoke and — in what felt like a “frightening dream,” a neighbor or stranger picked up the young narrator, so he “wouldn’t be trampled underfoot,” after which he was passed from hand to hand until he landed on his father’s shoulders (Ch. 44). Oz feeds the reader a stream of consciousness of the festive night: his parents shout, his mother strokes his head and back (Ch. 44). Within the personal narrative, Oz interweaves the personal and political realms. His mother’s hand is a symbol, working “perhaps to soothe us or perhaps not, perhaps out of the depths she was also trying to share with him [father] and me in our shout and with the whole street, the whole neighborhood, the whole city, and the whole country” (Ch. 44). If the original Hebrew is a direct translation of “out of the depths,” this brief reference (ממעמקים) to Psalm 130 calls to mind the soulful song of ascents and Jewish hope for Israel’s Divine redemption. His mother’s hand, thus, calls to mind an entire narrative of national and religious memory. Amid this political redemption, the touch of his mother connects Oz’s personal life to religious politics.

Later that evening, back in the confines of his childhood bedroom, the political and personal continue to connect through Oz’s youthful eyes. His father had told him on the street, “… look, my boy, take a very good look, son, take it all in, because you won’t forget this night to your dying day and you’ll tell your children, your grandchildren, and your great-grandchildren about this night when we’re long gone” (Ch. 44). After the political rejoicing, Oz recounts crawling back into bed past his bedtime and dressed in his street clothing — his childhood innocence peeks through: his parents’ rules are just as important to include as the political narrative at hand. Oz’s father sat down beside him in bed and told him a painful story of anti-Semitic assaults he experienced in Eastern Europe. His father, caressing his son, told him that “from now on, from the moment we have our own state, you will never be bullied just because you are a Jew” (Ch. 44). The bedroom here becomes main stage for a powerful infusion of classical Zionist values. The moment becomes increasingly personal, as the narrator sleepily touches his father’s face, feeling the only tears his father would ever shed in front of him. For many children, seeing a parent reduced to tears is one of the most powerful marks of an emotional moment. In the Nusseibeh writing, too, the narrator’s sister was reduced to tears by Anne Frank’s Holocaust narrative, as is his Palestinian mother who “suffered at the hands of the Zionists: “Without a word, my mother gently wiped Saedah’s tears away, and furtively wiped away her own” (72-73). The reader, allowed into these private childhood moments in the narrators’ memories, sees family emotions on both sides of No Man’s Land.

Separated since birth, each child protagonist sees the other side as alien. The ultra-orthodox provide a good focal point for the divide. Nusseibeh, peering out from the few vantage points he has over the Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem, sees the highly observant Haredi Jerusalemites as otherworldly. Intrigued, he describes men with “long wizard’s beards,” black coats and “curly side locks” (75). The men are “bearded creatures,” appearing eerily in the distance before disappearing behind another corner, entering and exiting his reality silently and at a distance, like “in a dream” (75). Meanwhile, on Oz’s side of No Man’s Land, the ultra-Orthodox neighborhood has a Hebrew name — Mea She’arim — but is just a passing thought at the beginning of a paragraph which focuses mainly on the foreign side of Jerusalem, the stomping ground of Nusseibeh and his ancestors (Ch. 40). Oz describes an “opposite Jerusalem,” consisting of “menacing yet fascinating” Abyssinian, Arab, pilgrim, Ottoman, missionary, and other groups. Oz recalls an unknown world, filled with bells and “winged enchantments” (Ch. 40). To a childhood Oz, Nusseibeh’s side of Jerusalem is alien and hostile, “a veiled city, concealing dangerous secrets, heavy with crosses, turrets, mosques, and mysteries … through whose streets ministers of alien cults shrouded in black cloaks and priestly garb flitted like dark shadows, monks and nuns, kadis and muezzins …” (Ch. 40). As children, living before the Internet shed light on the going-ons in forbidden territories, neighboring communities provided as much intrigue and mystery to the protagonists as scripture or the content of their latest pleasure novel. It is only evident that such antagonism and alienation plays into adult politics, years later. After all, though in Chapter 44 Oz describes the melancholy, foreboding silence which must have filled Arab homes on the night of the partition announcement, such insight is the product of years of mature introspection and reflection. As a child, the Arab quarters and “veiled city” of non-Jewish Jerusalem remained a foreign world into which few, if any, entered.

In both works, the recollections of a childhood in a war-torn Jerusalem provide unique insight into the city’s history and its residents. The protagonists’ reflections on childhoods brimming with conflict and politics provided me a chance to sympathize with the intimate, hidden angles of Jerusalem history. Both child narrators, halfway through the twentieth century, also observe the stirrings of impending history outside of Jerusalem’s insulating mountains, albeit from opposite sides. Oz notes that “over the hills and far away, a new breed of heroic Jews was springing up, a tanned, tough, silent, practical breed of men, totally unlike the Jews of the Diaspora” (Ch. 1). He is referencing the suntanned, passionate new arrivals to the coastal plain, incidentally the birthplace of Nusseibeh’s refugee mother. The modern reader knows that the “tough” and “practical” men on the coastal plan, organizing collective farms and military organizations, would eventually continue to push Jewish infrastructure into the hills. Nusseibeh, a descendant of a 1,300-year-old Jerusalemite dynasty, may be alluding to this future, sensing it even as a child. In the years preceding the 1967 takeover of Jordanian Jerusalem by Israel, he describes faraway political “convulsions” as mere words in the newspaper or on BBC radio (79). Nusseibeh compares his childhood home’s nightly political salons to that of a Russian novel, where unassuming characters approach issues as the stuff of evening discussion — unaware that the “far-off cataclysm[s]” will eventually bring their entire world “crashing down” (79).

Works Cited

Nusseibeh, Sari. Once Upon a Country. Farrar, Giroux and Strauss, 2007.

Oz, Amos. A Tale of Love and Darkness. Translated by Nicholas de Lange, Harcourt Publishing

Company, 2004.*

*I used chapter references since the page numbers are not standardized due to the e-book format.