INTRODUCTION
The United Arab Emirates, or UAE, has unique demographics, with a population of mostly foreign nationals. A federation of seven constituent emirates run by tribal elite, two — Abu Dhabi and Dubai — have come to international notoriety since the UAE’s formation in 1971 due to exponential economic growth based on oil wealth and a strategy to attract foreign investment (UAE). This economic growth brought with it a massive number of expatriate and migrant workers. In line with other undemocratic states in the region, neither Emirati citizens — who constitute some ten percent of the population — nor foreign nationals challenge the ruling regime. In this paper, I will examine how the UAE regime both suppresses rights and civil society while capitalizing off of the expatriate-model to prevent democratization.
The diverse foreign presence in the UAE, focused on economic prospects, remains politically inactive. The lack of sufficient native Emiratis to work the expanding economy, coupled with large oil resources, has drawn increasing numbers of workers to the UAE since the 1970s (Khalifa 109-110). As far back as 1976, nearly 240,000 permits were issued to migrant workers (111). The foreign community is heterogeneous, which is one of the reasons they remain a politically inactive entity. The category of Arab foreigners alone represents workers from a variety of backgrounds, ranging from Yemenites to Palestinians, Salafists to Maronite Christians. In countries like Lebanon, domestic sectarian division prevents homegrown agreement. Thus, it is evident that groups of ethno-linguistically disparate foreigners living and working within the UAE are less likely to organize into any formidable political entity. Furthermore, expatriates and migrant workers have good reason to keep their heads down, regardless of political grievances like labor abuses (Sönmez 17). This is because the risk of deportation makes most immigrants politically acquiescent and passive (Khalifa 112). These foreign residents of the UAE, largely young males, are motivated to send money dependents abroad, not effect political change in their host country. If there is any political risk from the expatriates, it may more accurately lie in any grievances their presence provokes among the outnumbered Emirati population. In the long run, due to political deprivation and occasionally subpar living conditions, some experts believe Emiratis may become clandestinely organized and provide the seeds of internal subversion (113). Later, I will demonstrate how UAE leaders seek to quell Emirati grievances through financial subsidies and an emphasis on common identity, instead of through democratization efforts.
UAE: THE POLICE STATE
Heavy police surveillance is one of the first tools the UAE regime uses in maintaining power and preventing democratization, so I will examine it first. Since the death of the well-liked Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan in 2004, subsequent rulers have moved towards less accountable governance, relying on surveillance, instead of diplomacy, to ensure domestic order (Davidson). Accordingly, the urbanizing population is increasingly monitored and censored (Davidson). Despite allowing some sanitized proposals from permitted civil society organizations (see Civil Society), anything which moves towards a provocation of mass uprising is quickly silenced. An example of this monitoring and censorship is the arrest of Ahmed Mansoor, a Dubai-based telecommunications engineer (Davidson). After he founded an online discussion forum, it was blocked by the UAE’s proxy server (Davidson). Such online forums can provide a key space for grievances to be voiced. Soon thereafter, a group of police officers arrested Mansoor after he refused to leave the UAE. The state’s reliance on surveillance is evident in the blocking of certain websites and arrest of anyone deemed destabilizing.
The UAE closely surveils foreign nationals. Beginning in 2001, the regime implemented systematic immigration checks at 17 established entry points, soon using iris recognition to screen arriving foreigners (Guéraiche 95). The thousands of entering passengers are immediately matched against the profiles of some 400,000 persons blacklisted in the UAE (95). While these efforts are part of the fight against the threat of Islamist violence, it is also a clear effort to monitor foreign nationals. Much remains unknown about the UAE’s security efforts, but some experts believe there are attempts to track specific groups of foreign nationals: “It is rumoured that certain minorities, considered destabilising, such as Shi’a, Palestinians, and lately Egyptians, are monitored” (95). This mass-monitoring of those entering the UAE illustrates an important point: the regime recognizes the possible threat inherent in the constant importation of foreigners. The UAE has enjoyed undeterred growth, but leaders are clearly engaged in a constant undertaking to bolster surveillance apparatus in an effort to maintain power and domestic stability.
WEAK CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE UAE
A large heterogenous foreign population weakens prospects for unified civil society in the UAE, helping the regime stay in power, and consequently preventing democratization. Civil society serves as a buffer between government and individuals, providing spaces which contribute to discussion and democratization (Davidson 267). Yet, in the UAE what civil society organizations do exist serve within, and do not transcend, expatriate communities. While there are countries like India where large cultural subgroups do exist and civil society does thrive, the subgroups in the UAE are often temporary workers unwilling to involve themselves in what is perceived to be an alien society (Davidson 269). Given the dependence of UAE foreign workers on their host country, the civil society groups which exist remain explicitly apolitical. For example, one group designed to support Kenyan expatriates stresses that their mission involves “strictly social, educational and humanitarian activities,” and remains “absolutely non-political” (282). The Goan Cultural Society, founded for Catholic Indians in the UAE, also stresses its lack of “political affiliations” (282).
Besides stating their apoliticism, foreigners in the UAE also quietly self-censor to avoid provoking regime suspicion. For example, since the majority of the UAE’s journalists are Arab and South Asian expatriates, they are reluctant to criticize their wealthy host nation for fear of losing their job (Davidson 277). They are also hesitant to move towards public criticism in fear of attacks on their person or deportation, as I will soon demonstrate. So too are UAE academics careful of what they say about the regime, an especially notable feature of self-censorship given the presence of western university outposts like New York University Abu Dhabi.
In addition to the culture of self-regulation along government lines, UAE leaders are not opposed to presiding heavily over civil society and punishing those who step out of line. Regime leaders regularly co-opt civil society organizations to serve their own benefit, and UAE laws restrict freedom of assembly. Civil society groups’ inability to gain autonomy is because of strong links to the regime. This influence is due to the Federal Social Welfare Societies Law of 1974, which requires official approval for community groups, and a further de facto moratorium on new licenses in 1981 (Davidson 270). In Abu Dhabi, an “umbrella-system” of influence stretches over existing community organizations (271). Groups like the Amateur Astronomers Group, the Marine Races, and the Emirates Sailing Academy all tie back to the Emirates Heritage Club — chaired, at least in 1997, by a member of the ruling family (271). In the emirate of Sharjah, leaders pour funds into arts, theater and public interest associations (272). Both of these examples show the culture of cooptation and patronage which dampens civil society by tying organizations directly to the ruling elite. In addition, community organizations which do exist focus on sanitized goals, rather than address social or political change.
When unspoken rules fail to maintain a standard of silence about public grievances, the UAE regime swiftly steps in to silence dissent. A 1988 law stipulates that all publications are to be approved by the Ministry of Information and Culture (Davidson 277). Since before 1988 some limited press freedom existed, this legislative shift legally rendered press in the UAE as politically ineffective as civil society. When a member of the ruling elite in Dubai announced freedom of the press in 2001, it lasted only a precarious few months before the arrest, purported torture and expulsion of a Qatari satire writer (278). Such actions, alongside bans on prominent university professors and writers from newspapers, demonstrate the UAE regime’s willingness to crack down on dissent, including that of expatriates, in an effort to maintain power.
THE UAE GUEST-HOST DYNAMIC
In addition to quick suppression of dissent, the UAE regime deliberately controls foreign nationals under local laws while also emphasizing their status as domestic guests. The UAE is advertised abroad as a land of economic opportunity, complemented by glistening beaches and high-quality accommodations (Guéraiche 223). But many expatriates are quickly made aware of the state’s presence if they attempt to cross lines, either deliberately or in naïveté (223). This presence of the state is most evident in crackdowns on unsuspecting foreigners, such as the aforementioned Qatari writer. Another example is the 2006 arrest and imprisonment of a British couple for lewd outdoor behavior (1). Emiratis were outraged that the couple, who enjoyed the advantages of the Emirati economic largesse, would violate local modesty laws. As Guéraiche puts it, a deliberate system of guest-host relations has arisen in the country. Regardless of the quality of services performed by foreign nationals, they are required to have acquired property by age 65 or risk deportation (2). Rules like this serve as a continual reminder of the guest status of expatriates; no matter the contributions an expatriate makes, he/she should not stay past their welcome. The role of the foreign national is clearly centered around this mutually symbiotic, economic relationship. Freedom of assembly, speech and press are not prerequisites for economic success, which is a key understanding of the UAE’s ruling elite. Expatriates are also made explicitly aware of their foreign-ness; they will never be more than guests or enter the Emirati inner circle and have no reason to do so.
SPATIALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UAE
The UAE regime’s efforts to divide living spaces are intended to resist mass organization and democratization. To start, it is key to note the separate living spaces between foreign nationals and Emirati natives. For example, Dubai is described by one expert as “no more than a city-state of relatively gated communities marked by sharp communal and spatial boundaries” (Ledstrup 23). Given that the ruling elite constitutes the governing body of Dubai, such sharp borders are clearly intentional. These communities include the segregated milieu of foreign jetsetters, the labor camps of South Asian migrant workers, and the “cosmopolitan” ghettos of Western expatriates (23). Unlike the assimilation which often marks the experience of expatriate workers in countries like the United States or France, many expatriates (save for migrant laborers) live and operate in completely separate spaces from Emiratis. These spaces, replete with features like parks and children’s play areas, keep foreign residents satisfied during their stay in the UAE. Domestic relations are organized around the divide between Emirati and non-Emirati: “Land open to settlement which integrates or assimilates outsider populations is an impossible model” (Guéraiche 3). History demonstrates that large, communal spaces like Egypt’s Tahrir Square in the 2011 Arab Spring provide breeding grounds for mass mobilization. In its efforts for self-preservation, the UAE regime thus actively ensures spatial division.
On the citizen side of the spatial equation, the same housing provisions awarded to citizens also divide formerly communal space. For example, in Abu Dhabi all male Emirati citizens born in the Western region of the emirate are entitled to generous housing aid (Guéraiche 189). Citizens are offered either a small house, or a housing loan (189). Oil-rich governments throughout the Arab world offer citizens similar housing subsidies and other financial benefits to stave off discontent. But, according to Guéraiche, the same villa walls which are built in such regime-sponsored housing programs divide friends and neighbors (189). Given that sociability is a key element of Emirati cultures, and that in many countries informal social gatherings spark political discussion (like Yemeni qat circles or Tunisian soccer clubs), it appears these material benefits from the UAE regime may also serve as agents of strategic, spatial division.
The UAE regime emphasizes citizen identity and kinship, while actively denying the majority of citizens democratic political participation. Since political power is in the hands of the few tribes to which most Emirati natives belong, leaders emphasize a common sense of belonging. The Arabs of the Emirates think of themselves as a subset of the great Arab nation, a status no foreigner (nor their descendants) can achieve (Guéraiche 3). This idea is continually bolstered by the regime, which has emphasized Emirati identity through museums and other cultural investments. Even with this sense of belonging, some Emiratis quietly express grievances about the side-effects of economic growth: “Older Emiratis will still hanker after the past … Apart from the patrimony of sheikhs, they had no need for welfare in the past and being relocated from their old dwellings to modern houses only uprooted and disconnected them from each other” (Morton 212). Despite these grievances with the side effects of state benefits, however, Morton describes the same Emiratis as “immensely patriotic,” with their words imbued with a sense of awe or astonishment at the (economic) “Big Bang” which has turned their world upside down (212). This contradiction between awe and disdain for national economic advancement is notable and complex. It appears, though, that the patriotism associated with the economic benefits of UAE modernization trumps concerns. Few common Emiratis, save for a suppressed intelligentsia and some disgruntled workers, truly take much issue with the UAE ruling elites’ style of governance (Guéraiche 48). Under the visual veneers of modernization, Emiratis have maintained a conservative society, and are often satisfied with the actions of rulers who they view as their own kin (9). This kinship is institutionally cemented through the very means by which people can become citizens. Today, it is not enough to hold a UAE passport in order to establish full citizenship: one must also have a document known as khulasat al-qaid, a family book, to qualify (Morton 212). Clearly, the resonance between Emirati citizens and leaders is concretized through an emphasis on kinship and Arab identity. This leads to patriotism, which coupled with (widespread, though not complete) satisfaction at economic growth, means widespread citizen support for the ruling elite.
CONSEQUENCES FOR DEMOCRATIZATION: A COMPARISON
The UAE regime’s model of building an economic powerhouse on foreign labor and efficient, authoritarian governance would be weakened by democratization efforts. This helps to explain the regime’s use of police force to stifle discussion and prevention or cooptation of civil society. This is most evident in comparison with Kuwait. In Kuwait, there is a parliament which holds generally free and fair elections with near universal adult suffrage for citizens (Herb 379). Both Kuwait and the UAE are gulf monarchies strengthened by oil resources, but Kuwait badly lags behind the UAE in foreign direct investment (377). As one Kuwaiti businessman put it, “What takes one year to accomplish in Dubai takes ten years in Kuwait” (381). Without having to contend with bureaucracy or accountability to parliament, UAE regime leaders are able to govern efficiently (if unfairly). It is wholly possible that the UAE would view a strong, citizen- led parliament as a liability to a strong, diversified economy. Kuwait’s parliament represents citizens, most of whom rely on government jobs and oil-rents (384). Thus, Kuwaiti legislators limit the economic diversification of the economy and focus on citizen needs. In the UAE, in the absence of a parliament, political power resides in the hands of those who have personal stakes in private-sector growth (384). This private sector growth is a key reason why the UAE ruling elite would be interested in both suppressing democratization efforts and ensuring mass foreign investment and expatriate labor in the UAE. In addition, for the investments of the various UAE ruling families to profit, expatriates must move to Dubai and the other emirates of the UAE, buy residences, rent office space, and start businesses (384). This can be accomplished only if the UAE remains attractive to foreign shoppers, tourists, investors, and businesspeople and does not focus more on citizen needs, as Kuwait does (384). Unfettered by a parliament, regime leaders have pursued this goal. Thus, the UAE regime’s economic model (and thus means of staying in power) both relies on expatriates and would be weakened by enabling UAE citizens to have more of a say in national affairs, where they could promote their own interests.
CONCLUSION
The regime of the UAE maintains a strong grip on power through controlling all residents and relying on the contributions of apolitical expatriates. The consequence: a lack of democratization in the UAE. Through both imposing and inspiring a culture of censorship, save for some permitted, sanitized criticism of specific policies, the regime preserves its integrity. Foreigners largely keep their heads down, focused more on economic prospects than political agency. Meanwhile, Emirati citizens largely acquiesce to the presence of the state, despite minor grievances which come with modernization and the mass importation of labor. The lack of democratic institutions or rights in the UAE means grievances cannot surface, and regime leaders continue to focus on economic growth. Upon further reflection, it appears that maintaining a population where 90 percent of people are not citizens could be exactly what the ruling elite wants. After all, in the UAE model, there is little de facto difference in political rights between citizens or foreign residents. So, as the UAE regime strengthens citizen identity through an ever- increasing emphasis on kinship and shared Arab identity, they still afford them as few rights as possible and attempt to placate them with financial benefits. Even “elections” staged in the mid- 2000s for citizens only allowed voters hand-picked by the ruling elite, and results were consistently changed based on the agenda of those in power (Guéraiche 45-48). Only as the UAE enters a new decade, and prepares to host the landmark 2020 World Expo, will it remain to be seen how the regime positions itself under international scrutiny as a model of modern authoritarianism.