The explosion which killed Lebanon’s former prime minister, Rafik Hariri on February 14th, 2005, sent shock waves through both the streets of Beirut and Lebanon’s precarious political situation. In the wake of the assassination, largely Shi’a protesters supported by Hezbollah took to the streets on March 8th to highlight the importance of Syria as a post-civil war peacekeeping influence in Lebanon. On March 14th, Sunni, Christian and Druze Lebanese counter-protested in huge numbers, demanding (eventually with success) the end of Syrian influence on their nation. The March 14th camp also placed blame on Damascus –– which had held military and political influence in Lebanon for decades –– for the assassination. This series of uprisings, though not a singular movement, has been widely termed the Cedar Revolution. In this essay, I argue that the Cedar Revolution represents an outburst of Lebanon’s resilient sectarianism, a partial result of Lebanon’s deep confessional divides and shaky historical solutions to the problem.
Sectarianism impacted the Cedar Revolution, both in division between the March 8th and March 14th camps, and even between factions of each camp. For example, the large March 14th camp was beset with internal division, despite apparent unity against Syria displayed during mass protests. Given, the March 14th protests demonstrated some early visual symbols of Lebanese confessional unity: “During the demonstrations, posters depicting a Muslim crescent together with a Christian cross and signed with a slogan ‘all Lebanese’ were distributed on the streets” (Kurtulus 199). Clearly, anti-Syrian sentiments in Beirut trumped sectarian concerns for a significant portion of the population (some one fourth of the population poured into the streets to protest Syria). Yet, as Kurtulus argues, the surface-level unity shown by citizens “brandishing their [Lebanese] flags,” among other symbols, often concealed the fact that different citizens were displaying the flag for different ideological goals. The development of the pro-Syrian March 8th and anti-Syrian March 14th blocs best exemplifies this wider division.
These different camps had disparate goals despite being historically branded as part of the same Cedar Revolution. Even the call for a withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which was somewhat supported even by the pro-Syrian camp, saw different March 8th and March 14th leaders tracing their reasoning for the pro-withdrawal stance to different official documents (Kurtulus). During an effort to set up a tribunal to try those associated with Hariri’s death, Shi’a government officials boycotted the efforts by the newly elected, anti-Syrian (March 14th) government, showing the resilience of sectarian divides (Kurtulus). The victories of anti-Syrian political groups also provoked the ire of pro-Syrian groups like Hezbollah –– showing how the very goals of the March 14th camp fed sectarian division in the country (Kurtulus). The 2005 Cedar Revolution and its aftermath consisted more of the flares of resilient sectarianism than deep political change.
The 1989 Taif Agreement –– which ended the Lebanese Civil War –– institutionalized sectarian divides by outlining a government with sectarian restrictions, which impacted Lebanon in the wake of the 2005 unrest. To start, the original agreement notes that “Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of sectarian restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided…Equally between Christians and Muslims” (Taif). Given that demographic groups in Lebanon do not actually align with Taif’s provisions, the document’s provisions almost predicted sectarian tensions as groups vie for power. Shi’a groups in Lebanon alleged that the agreement did not provide sufficient representation for their confessional community in the government (Hamdan). Their grievances included that the Taif Agreement undermined Shi’a executive power while enhancing the Sunni position through the newly empowered Prime Minister position (Hamdan). The Shi’a (e.g., Hezbollah and Amal) position regarding the Taif agreement is that it “has not distributed executive authority to the council of ministers and … that executive power was monopolized by the prime minister, beginning with the late Hariri,” though the bloc apparently offered little advice about how to reform the system. (Hamdan). The outlines of the Taif-based government evidently fanned sectarian flames as the March 8th and March 14thcamps debated which confessional community deserved the privileges to which position. The post-2005 government of Lebanon still finds itself caught in the resilient confessional divisions outlined in the Taif Agreement, wherein sectarianism better battled through open political competition is entrenched in law.
Resilient sectarianism also impacted Lebanese politics when the March 14th camp achieved electoral victories in the wake of the Cedar Revolution. The departure of the Syrian military and the break with Damascus which defined the Cedar Revolution’s outcome led many Sunnis in the March 14th camp to favor a new strengthening of the Lebanese state through the bolstered domestic rule of law, a national defense strategy and justice for Hariri’s killing: “The aim of this strategy was to strengthen the state at [Shi’a] Hezbollah’s expense … and blame it for exacerbating sectarian tensions” (Knudsen). The expulsion of Syria from Lebanese affairs was advocated by March 14th constituents not just out of concern regarding Syria’s impact on their brethren, but also out of spite for pro-Syrian March 8th sectarian groups like Hezbollah. According to one scholar, despite its electoral and policy victories, the March 14th government proved incapable of basic governance, let alone reform, and Lebanese politics again broke down along sectarian lines (Makhzoumi). This domestic division was also witnessed in the years following 2005, including when Israel attacked Hezbollah in 2006 –– which strengthened both Hezbollah and consequently, sectarian tension (Makhzoumi). Eventually, the March 14th government even blocked March 8th’s (i.e, Hezbollah’s) power by “banning its private telecommunications network” (Makhzoumi). This division eventually militarized, leading to the rise of Hezbollah’s militia, which countered the main Lebanese Army run by the March 14th government and eventually occupied much of Beirut at the expense of local stability (Makhzoumi). The fact that Hezbollah grew strong enough to pose a true threat to Lebanon’s central coercive apparatus is also indicative of the division in the country and the inability of the then-ruling March 14th camp to centralize power in the wake of the revolution.
The 2005 Cedar Revolution was less a revolution than a series of uprisings provoked by a powder-keg style assassination and resilient domestic sectarianism. When the successful ousting of Syria as an oppressive peacekeeper opened a power vacuum between the March 8th and March 14th camps, old sectarian tensions re-appeared. In a country with an uneasy balance of Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shi’a Muslims, even occasional successes such as the expulsion of unwelcome Syrians can quickly devolve into civil tensions. The two major ideological camps still compete for power and military influence. They also debate how to address justice for Hariri, a point of heated contention. These issues affect Lebanese politics to this day –– between 2014 and 2016 parliamentary gridlock between March 8th and March 14th groups made it difficult to elect a new leader. As recently as late 2019 mass protests erupted in Beirut concerning the latest political and socio-economic grievances (Chehayeb).
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