Since 1990, new Senegalese leaders have replaced the old guard of Léopold Sédar Senghor and his chosen successor Abdou Diouf in a series of peaceful elections, alongside political reforms which have allowed for wider participation in government. The crumbling of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990’s led to a widespread disenfranchisement of Marxism, which had defined pre-1990’s political opposition in Senegal. Paired with this move away from far-left ideology has been an increased political tolerance and even interest in catering to Senegal’s deeply influential Maraboutic Islamic authorities. A deeply pious country, religious messaging is increasingly impactful as a means of both connecting with voters, and possibly contributing to Senegal’s democratic strengths. In this piece, I will first seek to provide a brief historical overview of Senegal’s elections since 1990. Then, I will move on to discuss major political reforms over the last three decades. Finally, I will examine the influence of religion on post- 1990’s politics, before concluding with a brief sketch of remaining sociopolitical trends and challenges.

History and Elections

Before moving into post-1990’s elections, it is critical to incorporate some key historical premises. In 1963, a new constitution established a strong presidential regime in the former French colony, and an election shortly thereafter gave Senegal’s first president, Senghor, an overwhelming majority (Clark and Phillips, p. 14-15). Throughout the 1970’s, Senegal was a one-party state, with the Socialist Party in control as the only “viable” political entity (p. 15). Senghor’s successor and fellow socialist party member, Abdou Diouf, took control of the country in 1981 and maintained power until 2000, when he was defeated in democratic elections (Encyclopaedia Britannica). According to the Encyclopaedia, Senegal’s elections in both 1993 and 1998 were generally peaceful. Despite economic issues and tense youth uprisings engendered by the 1994 French decision to devalue the African franc by some 50 percent, the Diouf “regime” maintained a positive relationship with Senegal’s Islamic leaders and thus maintained power (Encyclopaedia Britannica). In 1998, however, opposition parties made gains — particularly in the urban sphere surrounding Dakar, the capital; by 2000, Abdoulaye Wade had won the election and unseated the Senghor-Diouf dynasty (Encyclopaedia Britannica). This victory of Abdoulaye Wade and the opposition in the March 19, 2000 presidential elections was met with “euphoria” by opposition parties who previously had little faith in the ruling regime to hold fair elections (Gellar 2005, p. 11-12). Beck noted in her 1997 piece on incremental reform in Senegal that the socialist party under Diouf used “patronage networks to manipulate the code” in elections (p. 27). Thus, it appears that though opposition parties made gains in 1998, and electoral reforms (which I will discuss in the following paragraphs) were passed, challenges to meaningful, free and fair democratic elections posed by the incumbent Diouf regime remained potent until 2000. Gellar noted years later that, despite the 2000 electoral defeat, the losers took consolation in their improved democratic image on the international stage (p. 12).

Wade continued to lead until he was unseated in the 2012 elections by Macky Sall, which Resnick described as an affirmation of the country’s “long-standing democratic reputation” (2005, p. 623). Proof of the resilience of Senegal’s multi-party democracy in the wake of the Senghor-Diouf regime, a notable amount of civil unrest had preceded the 2012 elections due to Wade’s argument that he was exempt from a 2001 term limit since it had been enacted after he took office (p. 623). Despite such unrest, and other “legalistic manoeuvres” by Wade, a variety of international observers roundly confirmed the absence of voter fraud or intimidation, allowing Sall — a representative of the incoming era of post-colonial leaders — to take office peacefully.

Reforms

Despite Diouf’s entrenched power until 2000, political liberalization started before his tenure ran out. In the 1980’s, he was the force behind the legalization of the very multi-party participation which would unseat him 20 years later. The idea of democratic liberalization has also made its way from the French-educated élite of Dakar to the general populace over time. According to Gellar, for many years, the French term démocratie as used by Senegal’s French- speaking intelligentsia referred to equality before the law, freedom of association, a free press, and the holding of fair and open elections (p. 11). In the 1980’s and 1990’s, Senegalese opposition politicians emphasized alternance (the ousting of the regime in power through the ballot box) as the most significant component of démocratie in Senegal (p. 11). Gellar further noted that because one party had held power “since independence” and allegedly used its control over the state apparatus to ensure victory in the elections, opposition leaders argued that Senegal was not a true démocratie – an idea which has faded in the years since 2000 (p. 11). A quick glance at Senegalese language trends illustrates the increasing general awareness of democracy. In Wolof, the local language used to some extent by 80 percent of the Senegalese population, the idea of demokaraasi has come to mean consensus in decision-making, solidarity, mutual reciprocity in resource distribution, and evenhandedness in treating everyone fairly (p. 12).

A key example of liberalizing reforms in Senegal is the transition towards decentralized power, allowing deeper local participation — a reflection of the spreading importance of demokaraasi even in the countryside. In Senegal’s earlier years, the urban intellectual élite adhered to different ideologies (mainly, different schools of leftist thought), but many agreed that the postcolonial state should be secular, highly centralized, and the main agent for economic development, modernization, and nation-building (Gellar 2005 p. 54-55). Moreover, like many intellectuals, they showed little interest in local affairs and preferred to focus their attention on national and international issues (p. 55). Because of this view, the central government determined how many villages would belong to each rural region, as well as the number, size, and boundaries of the regions (p. 56). According to Gellar, local communities had little power to organize their own units of local government (p. 56). This changed after 1990, as government leaders took several “important initiatives” to reduce the oversight of the central government and administration over Senegalese society and local government institutions (p. 56). In April 1990, several months before the November local elections, the Diouf government legislated new rights for urban mayors and presidents of Rural Councils, allowing them to elaborate and manage local government budgets and expenditures, which heretofore had been managed by federal representatives (p. 56). This “Second Administration Reform” empowered local chief executives with new financial power (p. 56). Additionally, during the 1990’s, the Diouf regime slowly acquiesced to public demands for an increasingly honest electoral system and relaxations of the state-controlled media (p. 81). Gellar noted that the 1991 electoral code, which had the support of fourteen out of Senegal’s seventeen political parties, created conditions for “minimizing fraud” and making elections more transparent (p. 81). These improved electoral conditions promised, among other reforms, foreign election monitors and a secret ballot (Resnick 2013, p. 625). In the years since 2000, despite the aforementioned unrest in 2012, these improved electoral conditions have proven resilient and allowed for the transition of power.

Religion and challenges

Senegal is both a stable democracy and a deeply religious nation. Nearly the entire population is Muslim and divided into four religious brotherhoods which hold powerful sway over the nation’s political and socioeconomic structures (Volk 2017, p. 33). According to Volk, their influence has increased over time. Senghor started the precedent of religious tolerance, as a Catholic leading a predominantly Muslim country. According to Volk, his election was “linked directly to the goodwill of the Senegalese brotherhoods” (p. 35). Diouf kept his distance from the brotherhoods, but following the democratic transition to Wade’s leadership, a new religious influence entered the federal offices of Dakar. Volk points out, interestingly, that Wade put effort into the religious aspects of his leadership. He wore traditional garments, including a “boubou,” and he made clear his affinity to the Mouride brotherhood evident in his public discourse (p. 35). Additionally, Islamic authorities received special benefits under his leadership, including tax exemption, land discounts and diplomatic passports (p. 35-36). In some ways, religious authorities reached a climax in power under Wade’s leadership. Babou argues that the existence of religious authorities at a “critical” distance from government legitimizes religious leaders and allows them act as “safety valves and brokers in times of crisis” (Babou 2016, p. 166). According to Babou, religion was the “beginning and end of power” for Wade, and he used it to garner and preserve control, sway the population, and legitimize government action (p. 182). Since then, and despite pressure to take sides in the 2012 election, the Islamic brotherhoods are shifting back toward neutrality, a notable example being the refusal of one paramount religious leader of the Murids to take sides in the presidential elections of March 2012 (p. 183).

Sall, the incumbent president today, has suggested that Islamic authorities would no longer receive such special treatment and immunity. A testament to their continued influence, however, is that Sall’s original promises have faltered. Volk notes that Sall continues to seek “proximity” to the influential brotherhoods, using projects like the state-sponsored modernization of religious buildings to demonstrate his connection to the Islamic authorities (p. 36). Despite this clear propensity of Senegalese leaders to cater to the Islamic authorities, Volk makes no claim that it is hindering democracy. In fact, he describes Senegal as a “stable, democratic country” with “impressive harmony” between ethnic and religious groups (p. 42).

Conclusion

Since 1990, Senegal has held several elections and seen the transition of power from the entrenched socialist party to new leaders, under the auspices of international observance. Despite some stumbling blocks, ranging from some moves by the Diouf regime in the late 1990’s to hinder voter participation, to Wade’s eager blending of religion and secular politics, Senegal has remained largely stable and its elections democratic and fair. Even before its 2012 contests, the protests sparked by questions of candidate legitimacy were handled by the Western African country’s governing bodies and a peaceful transition of power ensued. In 2019, Sall won his second five-year term with 58 percent of the vote, and despite some questions regarding corruption charges of opposition candidates, a British article about the election described thevoting atmosphere as “calm,” while international observer missions signaled no major issues (BBC 2019).

Works Cited