Less Is More: an Era Without the United States
When I first read David Kang’s article Getting Asia Wrong, I automatically assumed that Kang was biased in favor of the Chinese and thus, automatically crippling his argument. One can only imagine my disappointment when I learned he is Korean like me, but somehow advocating for the rise of China as the sole superpower in the Asia-Pacific region. As I read through his arguments, I began to understand his personal beliefs but unlike him, I do not believe a strong and stable China will result in a more peaceful and stable region. To put it bluntly, the presence of the United States in Asia not only hinders political relationships between Asian countries, but also stunts the growth and development of all nations in its sphere of influence.
It is ironic that Kang assertively states that “scholars must not dismiss evidence that does not fit their theories”[1] but conveniently leaves out information that undercuts his own claims. Perhaps he doesn’t consider himself a scholar but the fact remains that his exclusion of the regions of India and South Asia and his simplified factors that only count military and territorial security undermine his stance on this topic.
Kang’s claim that East Asian would be more stable with a hierarchy with China at the top is absolutely false. If anything, “the evidence so far suggests that…China has…neither revisionist nor imperial aims.”[2] These Asian countries are not children, waiting to be force-fed propaganda. These are nations with the same “stability-enhancing mechanisms that sustain peace in Europe.”[3] Unlike common belief, Asia has a high level of regional economic integration through the post-2013 TPP and the RCEP and multiple regional institutions to mitigate and manage conflict, such as ASEAN and APEC.
Another misleading statement by Kang is his argument that Asian countries are beginning to bandwagon with China. However, Kang does nothing but repeat his catchy phrase without delving into what it truly means. A possible indicator of potential “bandwagoning” could be through “a state’s decision to align itself militarily with China”[4] but no state has done so publicly in recent times except perhaps Burma. As Acharya states, Kang seems to have confused economic self-interest with bandwagoning, a fatal mistake. For example, the United States pursues economic ties with Russia but this does in no way amount to deference on behalf of the United States to Russia. Finally, Kang shoots himself in the foot by later stating that “South Korean and Vietnam are known for their stubborn nationalism, gritty determination, and proud history as countries independent of China.”[5] If this is true, why should they bandwagon with China, a rival nation with a history of conflict?
The United States claim that they must provide the military force to protect allied nations but once again, the greatest threat to peace in the region is the United States, not China. It’s no secret that China’s military spending has increased five-fold since 2000,[6] but how much of this was in response to the United States’ unchecked actions in foreign territory? Recently, the United States accused China of “militarization” of the Xisha Islands, a Chinese territory, due to the installation of a surface-to-air missile defense system. What the United States failed to mention was the encroachment of United State Navy warships and fighter jets into Chinese territory under the flimsy excuse of the so-called “freedom of navigation” rights.[7]
As shown in the Bush Era and through the failure of President Obama’s Pivot to Asia program, the Asia region functions best without United States’ intervention. While the logistic of bringing nearly 100,000 personnel back home may seem daunting, there is no threat of a power vacuum or the exploitation of smaller nations, as a threat posed by another nation must contain “aggregate strength, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and [most importantly] offensive intentions.”[8] Simply, a nation will not “balance” against a rising nation that does NOT display offensive intentions, no matter how large the offensive capabilities.
Quite simply, in this era and region, military strength does not matter, which once again, makes the role of the United States obsolete. There have been no regional wars since the 1970s for a reason as the region is stable with “Tiger-State” nations focused on aggressively building up their economies, rather than their nuclear arsenal, except for North Korea, of course.
All in all, China does not necessarily have to be powerful for the region to be stable, but the United States must leave for the good of the Asian nations. Kang correctly recognizes “Asia’s growing interdependence as a force for stability,”[9] and while nations such as South Korea and Japan should be grateful for the United States’ protection in the era of the Cold War, Kang and other scholars must realize that these countries have grown significantly stronger, richer, and much more stable and no longer needs the guidance of a nation like the United States or China.
References
Kang, D. (2003). Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks. International Security, 27(4), pp.57-85.
Friedberg, Aaron L. 1993. Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia. International Security 18 (3): 5–33.
Acharya, Amitav. 2003. Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future? International Security 28 (3): 149–164.
Wilson, H. (2016). A Strategic Case for the Trans-Pacific Partnership - AAF. [online] AAF. Available at: https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/strategic-case-trans-pacific-partnership1/ [Accessed 9 Jan. 2018].
Tao, Z. (2016). U.S. has hard time justifying criticism of China's actions in South China Sea - China Military Online. [online] English.chinamil.com.cn. Available at: http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-02/19/content_6920135.htm [Accessed 9 Jan. 2018].
Walt, S. (1985). Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. International Security, 9(4), p.3.
[1] Kang 2003, pg 59
[2] Kang 2003, pg 68
[3] Friedberg 1993, pg 8
[4] Acharya 2003, pg 151
[5] Kang 2003, pg 79
[6] Wilson 2016
[7] Tao 2016
[8] Walt 1985, pg 4
[9] Acharya 2003, pg 157