Alexandra Bramsen
Govt 42
Professor Jeremy Horowitz
May 19, 2020
Zimbabwe – Post-1990
Zimbabwe, formerly known as Rhodesia, has had a complex political history since the 1990s. Its independence in 1980 means that only a decade into government activity, there was still a whole host of troubles and issues to come, despite the general trend of democratization of Africa during this period. For starters, Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) President Robert Mugabe’s party established itself as the ruling party in a one-party state after the absorbance of Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) in 1987 (Onslow, 2011). This fell apart in 1999 with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) headed by Morgan Tsvangirai (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008 and Onslow, 2011). Mugabe sought out a referendum in 2000 that would solidify one-party power of ZANU-PF constitutionally, but was for the first time defeated in an election (Onslow, 2011). ZANU-PF came to be known for its unrelenting political oppression of its opposition, especially using police and military force (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008).
Their rhetoric of ‘patriotic history’ came to be the focus of their political expression, as they were the ties to the liberation war and the reason for independence (Ranger, 2004). Media and education became highly censored as this story that Mugabe and his compatriots would continually and hyperbolically spin was their hope to endear themselves to the people and keep power (Ranger, 2004). No opposing views were allowed to be expressed through radio, television, or press, and while academic books were allowed to be published, they were not as effective communication and were increasingly difficult to publish as printing costs soared (Ranger, 2004). The message was also a strategic ploy to empower and protect ‘war veterans’, not all of whom actually participated in the liberation war, but did carry out political violence on behalf of ZABU-PF and Mugabe (Ranger, 2004 and Hammar, 2008). ZANU-PF’s tightening grip on one-party power, was what brought about increasing opposition.
MDC came out the gates strong with their political win with the 2000 referendum, however, their strength was short lasted. The party eventually fell into disarray and internal fighting that eventually resulted in its division in 2005 (Raftopoulos, 2006). This stirring up of trouble came about because as the cabinet faced organizational issues and fell into two factions, one backing the President Tsvangirai and the other Secretary General Welshman Ncube (Raftopoulos, 2006). Tsvangirai’s opposition mostly heralded from Matabeleland, revealing more cracks in the party of attempting but failing to be inclusive (Raftopoulos, 2006). White officials in MDC also received this backlash as they get blamed for losing some of the vote because ZANU-PF depicts the party as settler sympathetic and thereby pro-colonialism (Raftopoulos, 2006). MDC lost the 2005 elections because of its internal confusion, division ideologically and lack of direction (Raftopoulos, 2006). In reality, MDC was never set up to be a powerful political activist as its main purpose initially was to present an opposition to ZANU-PF and its faults, but did not really have a basis of political logic otherwise (Raftopoulos, 2006). It was miraculous the party even survived, even split in two as MDC-Tsvangirai and MDC-Ncube, with all the persecution from ZANU-PF and the numerous internal weaknesses. Sadly, the weakening of MDC only meant the strength of ZANU-PF who with the help of rigging continued to win elections.
It is clear ZANU-PF went from liberators to the dictators with Mugabe at the head, and this was carried out using several fronts of reform for oppression. This oppression was only made possible by the backing of the military as it had strong tie to ZANU as ZANLA, the army faction of ZANU was integrated into and eventually dominated over the military (Jackson, 2011). The army was considered to act as if its own country were an “operational zone” allowing for its intrusion into political affairs (Jackson, 2011, p.390). Displacement of people was another tool used by Mugabe and ZANU-PF to wound the opposition and assert sovereignty over the state (Hammar, 2008). While in the 90s, this displacement started as an exertion of local authority over small migrant agrarian African communities, like in the Gokwe North District, where migrants were forcibly moved from Vumba only justified by the portrayal of the inhabitants as dangerous themselves (Hammar, 2008). Post-2000, this assertion of sovereignty moved from the local to the national with the creation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) which enabled the forced land invasion and redistribution of white commercial farms (Hammar, 2008). Many arguments were used to legitimize this radical action; anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist sentiments tied to the threat of MDC’s rise (Hammar, 2008). Following along those themes, the control of confiscated farms often fell to the war veterans as payment for their support, but often resulted in the farm’s ruin (Hammar, 2008). In 2005, after the parliamentary elections, there was then a shift in focus from the rural to the urban, as those became large centers of MDC support (Hammar, 2005). Operation Murambatsvina, a so-called urban renewal plan, was enacted to “clean up” the cities, but rather took a violent and destructive turn with evictions, demolition, and relocation (Hammar, 2005). The program worked to instill fear in and enable the monitoring of the opposition, affecting millions of people (Hammar, 2005). Furthermore, the government continued to abuse its power economically, and the political-military elite got to enjoy their spoils of war thanks to the national reserves (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008). There was no end to the exploitation and manipulation in Zimbabwe by Mugabe and his ZANU-PF government.
With so much greed and destruction it is not really a wonder that the country ended up in shambles. Under the tyrannical rule of ZANU-PF what was once the “breadbasket of Africa” became a “basket case” (Besada & Moyo, 2008, p.23). There was hyperinflation of the likes the world had never seen before, so of course industry, agriculture and economy were all utterly gutted and left for ruin, resulting in the switch to the US dollar (Wikipedia, 2020). Continued mismanagement of the economy meant that it has never recovered, with the government issuing bod notes to account for low cash circulation, leading to its further reduction and devaluation (Wikipedia, 2020). Unemployment soared to levels over 80%, food insecurity was and is a major issue with many people suffering from malnutrition, not to mention extremely extensive water and power cuts (Besada & Moyo, 2008). Services such as education and health had severely been cut and destroyed to function at the tiniest margin of what they could do before (Besada & Moyo, 2008). HIV/AIDS ravaged the country and left the population extremely vulnerable, with little way of stopping or slowing the pandemic (Besada & Moyo, 2008). On top of all that there was a mass exodus from the country, not just white flight, but anyone who had the agency to do so did (Besada & Moyo, 2008). This meant that large amounts of educated and trained professionals left the country to its own devices, leaving behind a huge work gap that could not be filled (Besada & Moyo, 2008). Droughts only further exacerbated structural, social, and economic issues caused by the political agendas of the elite (Besada & Moyo, 2008). Zimbabwe’s hopes for its future at independence were completely shattered, with the rise of yet another system of domination and violence in power.
ZANU-PF the incumbent party, has managed to maintain power for the four decades since independence. Through out Mugabe’s reign, elections were where the power struggle really happened. MDC presented a very real threat, on which was counteracted by underhanded and nefarious activity during elections. The 2000 and 2002 elections presented the broach of this electoral participation, despite international attention and civil oversite (Dorman, 2005). The attention to reports and consequences were minimal, sanctions ineffective, and allowed for manipulation to continue (Dorman, 2005). Voter registrations and electoral roles after investigation were found to be very corrupted and fraudulent, with many deceased individuals registered, incorrect registration information and opposition supporters barred from registering (Dorman, 2005). Constituency delimitation worked in favor of the incumbents, giving them the majority zoning (Dorman, 2005). There was outright violence and persuasion practiced during the polls (Dorman, 2005).
Much of the elections continued in this manner, and in spite of it MDC still posed a threat. Such a threat that with the great debacle of the 2008 election, which called for a second round as neither Tsvangirai nor Mugabe had majority, a coalition government was made under the Global Political Agreement (GPA) mediated by South Africa (Onslow, 2011). This fell apart with the 2013 elections where Mugabe won (Wikipedia, 2020). Then in 2017 a coup forced Mugabe to resign as former military allies who were being pushed aside to make way for Mugabe’s wife’s succession, decided to push back (Beardsworth et al., 2019). Things were quiet as they transitioned into the 2018 elections only to implode with yet another ZANU-PF win, making Emmerson Mnangagwa president, who was the main player in the coup (Beardsworth et al., 2019). Protests broke out in the capital only to be quashed by the army opening fire on the crowd (Beardsworth et al., 2019). Since then Zimbabwe has been anything but peaceful, with the skyrocketing of fuel prices, yet another downturn for industry and economy, as well as perpetuating drought and all the consequences that come with that (Beardsworth et al., 2019). There have been multiple stayaways and strikes in response to all the violence and corruption (Beardsworth et al., 2019). It is not likely that Zimbabwe will accede to democratic change, only hold the veneer of democracy and multi-party free elections for many years to come.
Works Cited
Beardsworth, N., Cheeseman, N., & Tinhu, S. (2019). Zimbabwe: The coup that never was, and the election that could have been. African Affairs, 118(472), 580–596. doi: 10.1093/afraf/adz009
Bratton, M., & Masunungure, E. (2008). Zimbabwe’s Long Agony. Journal of Democracy 19(4), 41-55. Doi:10.1353/jod.0.0024.
Dorman, S. R. (2005) ‘Make Sure They Count Nicely This Time’: The Politics of Elections and Election Observing in Zimbabwe, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 43:2, 155-177, DOI: 10.1080/14662040500151010
Hammar, A. (2008) In the name of sovereignty: Displacement and state making in post-independence Zimbabwe, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26:4, 417-434, DOI: 10.1080/02589000802481999
History of Zimbabwe. Wikipedia (2020, March 17). Retrieved April 18, 2020, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Zimbabwe
Jackson, P. (2011). The Civil War Roots of Military Domination in Zimbabwe: The Integration Process Following the Rhodesian War and the Road to ZANLA Dominance. Civil Wars, 13(4), 371–395. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2011.629865
Moyo, N., & Besada, H. (2008). Zimbabwe in Crisis: Mugabes Policies and Failures. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1286683
Onslow, S. (2011) Zimbabwe and political transition. IDEAS reports – strategic updates, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) (SU006). LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Raftopoulos, B. (2006). Reflections on opposition politics in Zimbabwe: the politics of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Reflections on Democratic Politics in Zimbabwe.
Ranger, T. (2004) Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: the Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe, Journal of Southern African Studies, 30:2, 215-234, DOI: 10.1080/0305707042000215338