Does Bigger in Texas Mean Better in Texas ? [1]
Introduction
John Locke famously wrote that the role of a government is to protect an individual’s life, liberty and property. These beliefs became the philosophical backbone for the American Revolution, and the Declaration of Independence references these unalienable rights in its preamble. Considering that these are core values of the United States, the government’s power to exercise Eminent Domain seems like a modern Kafkaesque nightmare, yet in the recent years they have increasingly evoked this process to seize property to be used for the “public good”. The classification of what a “public good” is, has become progressively broad, and local governments have begun to use this power to seize privately owned lands in order to make room for huge new sports complexes. Many sports teams get heavy subsidies and property -tax free land to build their stadiums, while private entities collect all the revenue from the new mega arenas. This may seem like an egregious abuse of governmental power and a complete misinterpretation of public good that favors large corporations, yet people still vote to raise their taxes in order to support these projects and indirectly, support eminent domain. Through analysis of local media movements, grassroots oppositions to these projects, eminent domain laws and a team’s local portrayal, the process of building a new stadium reveals polarizing local struggles.
The Construction of Cowboys Stadium
[2] In 1994, Jerry Jones, the owner of the Dallas Cowboys, looked around his 65,000 capacity Texas Stadium and decided that it just was not impressive enough for his taste. He dreamed up an entertainment mega-plex that affirmed the mantra that everything is bigger in Texas. Although Jerry Jones’ net worth is right around 5 billion dollars, he looked toward local government for a hefty subsidy to help him pay for the state of the art, billion dollar stadium, as is precedent in the US when a team seeks to build a new stadium. Dallas, which officially claims the team’s location, quickly denied Jones’ request to offer a public vote on new taxes to fund the project; they had just funded a new basketball arena and the council did not believe they could justify raising another 425 million through new taxes. Undeterred, Jones canvassed local cities until he found Robert Cluck, the Mayor of Arlington, Texas, who jumped at the chance to host the new stadium. Cluck encouraged the city council to hold a vote to enact new taxes in order to raise 350 million dollars to subsidize the stadium, and by approving the measure, residents in Arlington essentially paved the way for a storm of corporate welfare and political power exercised to the benefit the Dallas Cowboys, a private entity.
In the ensuing months, of construction of the stadium stagnated until the city could purchase a collection of private residences and businesses in the proposed location. Some people took the city’s initial offers, yet some held out. It was not until the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kelo v. New London that the project could move on. The ruling stated that eminent domain, which is governmental seizure of private property in the name of the public good, can be used in cases in which the public good is not a specific public infrastructure, rather anything that a local area determine to be of worth to the city. In other words, the ruling broadened the definition of public good to include private enterprises. Within a day, the Mayor had announced that the council would vote on use of eminent domain in the stadium project. This of course, passed and the subsequent battles were not simple, but in a matter of time Jones secured the proper amount of land needed for his project. [3] The question raised due to this this political debauchery is how did the Cowboy’s use localism to portray themselves as a public good? Why did the residents agree to new taxes and the ostentatious hassles of a billion dollar construction for a business that could fund itself? Through an analysis of local media, laws, and activist movements, the answer becomes clear.
Methods [4,5,6]
Hyperlocalism
The big idea I will use to examine the discussion behind the construction of the new arena in Arlington is hyperlocalism, a term that Hess defines as “the use of localized knowledge and local social networks as a source of corporate profit” (Hess 5). This can be applied to how teams in the National Football League, all of which have a local identity, generate private revenue. By forcing themselves into the culture of a place, many residents of that place identify themselves with the team just as they identify themselves with the region. Even if they are not avid fans, some people still show an inclination to root for the home team if they are doing well, just look at the lyrics of Take Me out to the Ball Game: “Root, root, root for the home team, if they don’t win it’s a shame.” The true shame in this situation is how teams threaten their local region for new stadiums so that they don’t relocate, just as the former St. Louis Rams did, when they did not receive funding just two months prior (Hanzus). In order to entice teams to stay bounded to their town, cities have to be willing to give up both money and vast amounts of property.
LGCs and Corporate Welfare
One key term that appears in many scholarly articles when dealing with the new forms of eminent domain is Corporate Welfare. This term is an ironic phrase that parallels impoverished people and welfare with corporations and government subsidies. Its irony is derived from the ideology of the capitalist US economy in which businesses are supposed to create success for themselves without the help of dirty words such as “handouts” or “entitlements”. This is obviously not the case as many businesses, like big agriculture, constantly benefit from some government subsidization, yet it is not beneficial for them to admit it, as it may make them appear weak in the long run. This is the case with stadium construction, however subsidies for teams come in the form of both money, land, and property tax breaks.
The driving force behind many of these movements to subsidize public stadiums are local growth coalitions, or LGCs. An LGC may seem like a local force to try improve economic justice in a region, through initiatives aimed at helping local businesses succeed, however they almost exclusively help large corporations. Delany states that growth coalitions are “dominated by corporations, real estate firms, political elites, financial organizations, and the local media”, (Delaney 73). LGCs focus on large publicly funded projects because “land exchange values increase with development projects and thus generate profits,” (Lekakis 6). These coalitions focus on the “exchange value” of land and ignore the “use value”, thus creating a rift between local elites who benefit from the sale and development of land and the residents who use the land for less profitable ventures. Because LCGs have pervasiveness in many aspects of business, they are often have a large influence on public perception, and this “overwhelming influence on urban affairs results in opposition” (Lekakis 7). In terms of eminent domain, LGCs are likely to support its use in order to raise the exchange value of the land with a new stadium and reduce its use value for the people who live there.
Kelo V. New London
In 2005, the Supreme Court made a landmark ruling that broadened the definition of what is a “public good” by allowing local governments to make the decision themselves. The case originated in New London, Connecticut, where the local government used eminent domain to give to a real estate developer land for the purpose of “economic development.” The residents who had been removed from their homes argued that “economic development” and “public good” were not synonymous, and led by Susan Kelo, the case made its way to the US Supreme Court. In a 5-4 decision, the Court said that “public use” was not just limited to “use by the public,” thus establishing a precedent where local governments could make their own decisions as to the extent that they would use eminent domain (Cornell Law). This decentralization favors the states and allows them to “adjust restrictions to eminent domain on the state level,” (Poirier 111). As Justice Stevens writes in his case opinion, “State courts are fully competent to adjudicate challenges to local land-use decisions,” (Poirier 118). This sets the stage for LGCs and impassioned mayors to push for and make decisions that may not be in the local resident’s best interests, as happens in Arlington, Texas.
Results
Benefits
When a team requests a new stadium, they always use the same argument; some along the lines of “this new stadium will bring an economic burst to the city.” It’s a compelling argument, of course it seems like a gorgeous, new, high-tech stadium will bring people from all over to the city, causing nearby businesses to flourish. The stadium will provide needed jobs and will lift a “blighted” area to prosperity. Jerry Jones has championed these beliefs over and over, saying,
“As far as 15 years ago I’d go to the floor of the Texas Legislature and I’d say: ‘You’re not creating a subsidy to build a stadium, you’re priming the pump for people intoxicated with being involved with sports. Use them to prime the pump with private dollars, because invariably, they’ll spend more than you’d ever imagine,” (Sandomir).
[7,8] Aside from the slightly disturbing analogy of people who are intoxicated with being sports fans putting money into Jones’ pocket, this quote relays the overall sentiment of stadium construction projects all over the world, yet there as actually little truth to it. While Lakakis states that “Sports stadia can generate civic pride, image improvement, and increased community visibility,” he also adds that they “can create congestion, vandalism, graffiti, noise and litter” (Lekakis 5).
In addition to these less measurable disadvantages, there has been extensive scholarship into the economic impact of new stadiums and the results of “empirical economic research offer virtual unanimity of findings” (Siegfried 103). According to a study that examined a large amount of research associated with new stadiums, “independent work on the economic impact of stadiums and arenas has uniformly found that there is no statistically significant positive correlation between sports facility construction and economic development (Siegfried 103). Much of this can be explained by the fact that public spending and lost tax revenue often exceeds the revenue generated by the stadium; when a city invests in a stadium, the revenues from naming rights, event tickets, and concession sales all go directly to the team. As far as invigorating the economy around the stadium, most people who go to games would have spent their money at other businesses had the stadium not existed, and the jobs that a new stadium produces are often insignificant as a stadium only needs around 100 full time employees that work when there is no event (Siegfried 105-6). When it comes down to it, the theoretically promised benefits of a new stadium do not come to fruition. The case was no different in Arlington, even though Jones guaranteed an economic revival in Arlington, in exchange for the $325 million subsidy, the Cowboys only promised to pay $60 million in rent and donate $16.5 million to youth sports. The residents of Arlington should have been more skeptical of where the remaining $250 million dollars would be coming from.
Media
The impact that local media has on the opinion of its audience is tremendous, and when it comes to a questionable public project, the media’s portrayal of it can make or break it. In many places where stadiums are approved, the media organizations find themselves in a LGC that is pushing for the project’s success. In a study of the overall media positions of 23 different stadium initiatives, a perfect 8/8 projects went the way that the media had portrayed (positive media positions were approved, negative were denied) when LGCs focused on the stadium issue (Delaney 76). In this way it can be seen how large corporations work together to progress goals of corporate development. Even if there is no LGC with interest in the initiative, this allows the media an opportunity to step in and influence the people in a way that aligns with the political biases of the media. As Delany notes “the media can effectively challenge these initiatives when it steps into a power vacuum left by a corporate community lacking unity” (Delaney 89). This happened in NYC when Cablevision pushed strongly against a new public stadium, seeing as they owned Madison Square Garden and there did not exist a strong LGC to oppose the project. For any new stadium initiative, the local media’s portrayal of the goals of the project is a key factor in deciding the ultimate success, and if a team can secure a positive image, they can establish their status as a “public good”.
Local Laws
The decision in Kelo v. New London set the precedent that local governments have the best knowledge of their area and can therefore best decide if eminent domain is an appropriate measure. Because of this, states have set laws that define to what extent they believe it can be used. For example, New Hampshire’s law states that “public use shall not include the public benefits resulting from private economic development and private commercial enterprise, including increased tax revenues and increased employment opportunities,” and as a state that values personal liberties this specific language makes sense (Title LI). The political cultures between NH and Texas are quite different however, and the eminent domain laws back this up. In Texas, the law “does not prohibit the taking of private property through the use of eminent domain for economic development,” and it even goes further to specifically make an inclusion for “a sports and community venue project approved by voters at an election,” (Title 10). The law in Texas specifically allows for eminent domain to be used for the creation of stadiums, so long as it is approved by voters. This of course creates the ultimate goal for a team to portray themselves as a local good so that they can get the approval of their city to build and expand on their private value. The Cowboys were able to do this in Arlington with the help of the mayor and a strong local atmosphere of positivity around the project. [9,10,11,12]
Discussion
- Talk about how jones’ promised benefits really only benefit himself (hyper-localism)
- Grassroots organization were opposed strongly by massive sums of money
- Give an opposing view in the form of the Green Bay Packers
- The Mayor’s quick response to Eminent Domain
- Wrap it up
In defending the public subsidy of the Cowboy’s Saturday the Mayor of Arlington was careful to avoid this designation when talking about the project saying “I think it’s an investment by the owner here, I don’t look at it at all as if it’s corporate welfare” (Ross).
Comments
- Can you give us a sense of your case? Local-Private Partnership and the Localist Logic of the AT&T Stadium Controversy?
- Lost of great background info in this paragraph and the above paragraph to give the audience context of the situation before you dive into the subject
- This is, as stated here, is the research question in its full glory. Another good way to restate this question would be: What localist tenses did the Cowboys use to convince the people of Arlington to see it as a public good?
- In this section, I think your conceptual lens is hyper localism, the court case and the idea of “corporate welfare”. Seem to be very clear lenses to use
- You state that hyperlocalism is the focus. Your methods read more like descriptive research in terms of conceptual framework. It plays out well as you have used your lens to explain the documents.
- This is your motive starting position. You don’t revise it really, and you even have a section dedicated to it.
- Seems to be the most important piece of evidence – backs up your claim of what you were saying above with corporate welfare but also just shows Jones in a negative light which it appears you are striving to do?
- This is the strongest piece of evidence. It casts Jones as one who is not localist and wishes to make a profit, not give back to the community. As Michael, the one who is not the author, stated, Jones is put in a negative light here, but the entire essay paint the stadium and its proprietors in a negative hue anyway.
- I think this sums up your research question: is the goal of a hyper-localist public “service” like this football stadium actually a positive thing for a local area
- I think that to answer your research question, yes, the hyper localism and eminent domain only help Jerry Jones and not the public good
- I am confused as to who your audience is for the article. I can see how you can use it in class ( notice of hyperlocalist forces can pretend to be localist), but not so towards a targeted group.
- These seem to sum up your answer to your question as the body itself isn’t fleshed out yet. Essentially, the media and government are in on the plan with the cowboys and their greed allowed for the Cowboys to build the stadium as a “public good”.