The Public Good of AT&T Stadium
Abstract
This paper looks at the Dallas Cowboy’s initiative for a new stadium and how eminent domain was used to seize property needed for the new stadium. In order for eminent domain to be justified, the land must be used for the “public good,” yet the Cowboys are privately owned. In order to determine how the Cowboys portrayed themselves as a public good, I examine local laws and politics to understand the legality of the situation. Then I examine the attitude of the media surrounding the project and how grassroots organizations resisted the initiative and were defeated. By promising a great economic improvement and using the multitude of varying business connections afforded by a strong Local Growth Coalition, Jerry Jones succeeded in using eminent domain to build a voter approved and subsidized stadium. This result reveals the disturbing ways that certain businesses influence local populations to increase their private value through governmental means.
Introduction
John Locke famously wrote that the role of a government is to protect an individual’s life, liberty and property. These beliefs became the philosophical backbone for the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence references these unalienable rights in its preamble. Considering that these are core values of the United States, the government’s power to exercise Eminent Domain seems like a modern Kafkaesque nightmare, yet in the recent years authorities have increasingly evoked this process to seize property to be used for the “public good”. The classification of what a “public good” is, has become progressively broader, and local governments have begun to use this power to seize privately owned lands in order to make room for huge new sports complexes. Many sports teams get heavy subsidies and property -tax free land to build their stadiums, while private owners collect all the revenue from the new mega arenas. This may seem like an egregious abuse of governmental power and a complete misinterpretation of public good that favors large corporations, yet people still vote to raise their taxes in order to support these projects and indirectly, support eminent domain. Through analysis of local media movements, grassroots oppositions to these projects, eminent domain laws and a team’s local portrayal, the process of building a new stadium reveals polarizing local struggles.
The Construction of Cowboys Stadium
In 1994, Jerry Jones, the owner of the Dallas Cowboys, looked around his 65,000 capacity Texas Stadium and decided that it just was not impressive enough for his taste. He dreamed up an entertainment mega-plex that affirmed the mantra that everything is bigger in Texas. Although Jerry Jones’ net worth is right around 5 billion dollars, he looked toward local government for a hefty subsidy to help him pay for the state of the art, billion dollar stadium, as is precedent in the US when a team seeks to build a new stadium. Dallas, which officially claims the team’s location, quickly denied Jones’ request to offer a public vote on new taxes to fund the project; they had just funded a new basketball arena and the council did not believe they could justify raising another 425 million through new taxes. Undeterred, Jones canvassed local cities until he found Robert Cluck, the Mayor of Arlington, Texas, who jumped at the chance to host the new stadium, saying “we offered them money to come here and build their stadium, we were just trying to help them out” (Kuriloff). Cluck encouraged the city council to hold a vote to enact new taxes in order to raise 350 million dollars to subsidize the stadium, and by approving the measure, residents in Arlington essentially paved the way for a storm of corporate welfare and political power exercised to the benefit the Dallas Cowboys, a private entity.
In the ensuing months, of construction of the stadium stagnated until the city could purchase a collection of private residences and businesses in the proposed location. Some people took the city’s initial offers, yet some held out. It was not until the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kelo v. New London that the project could move on. The ruling stated that eminent domain, which is governmental seizure of private property in the name of the public good, can be used in cases in which the public good is not a specific public infrastructure, rather anything that a local area determines to be of worth to the city. In other words, the ruling broadened the definition of public good to include private enterprises. Within a day, the Mayor had announced that the town would use of eminent domain in the stadium project. After the last holdouts were settled with in court, the Cowboys had a space to build their 1.6 billion dollar stadium. The question raised due to this this political debauchery is how did the Cowboy’s use localism to portray themselves as a public good? Why did the residents agree to new taxes and the ostentatious hassles of a billion dollar construction for a business that could fund itself? Through an analysis of local media, laws, and corporate response to activist movements, the answer becomes clear.
Methods
Hyperlocalism
The big idea I will use to examine the discussion behind the construction of the new arena in Arlington is hyperlocalism, a term that Hess defines as “the use of localized knowledge and local social networks as a source of corporate profit” (Hess 5). This can be applied to how teams in the National Football League, all of which have a local identity, generate private revenue. By forcing themselves into the culture of a place, many residents of that place identify themselves with the team just as they identify themselves with the region. Even if they are not avid fans, some people still show an inclination to root for the home team if they are doing well, just look at the lyrics of Take Me out to the Ball Game: “Root, root, root for the home team, if they don’t win it’s a shame.” The true “shame” however, is how teams threaten their local region for new stadiums so that they don’t relocate, just as the former St. Louis Rams did, when they did not receive funding just two months prior (Hanzus). In order to entice teams to stay bounded to their town, cities have to be willing to give up both money and vast amounts of property.
LGCs and Corporate Welfare
One key term that appears in many scholarly articles when dealing with the new forms of eminent domain is Corporate Welfare. This term is an ironic phrase that parallels impoverished people and welfare with corporations and government subsidies. Its irony is derived from the ideology of the capitalist US economy in which businesses are supposed to create success for themselves without the help of dirty words such as “handouts” or “entitlements”. This is obviously not the case as many businesses, like big agriculture, constantly benefit from some government subsidization, yet it is not beneficial for them to admit it, as it may make them appear weak in the long run. This is the case with stadium construction, yet large subsidies for teams come in the form of money, land, and property tax breaks.
The driving force behind many of these movements to subsidize public stadiums are local growth coalitions, or LGCs. An LGC may seem like a local force to try improve economic justice in a region, through initiatives aimed at helping local businesses succeed, however they almost exclusively help large corporations. Delany states that growth coalitions are “dominated by corporations, real estate firms, political elites, financial organizations, and the local media”, (Delaney 73). LGCs focus on large publicly funded projects because “land exchange values increase with development projects and thus generate profits,” (Lekakis 6). These coalitions focus on the “exchange value” of land and ignore the “use value”, thus creating a rift between local elites who benefit from the sale and development of land and the residents who use the land for less profitable ventures. Because LCGs have pervasiveness in many aspects of business, they are often have a large influence on public perception, and this “overwhelming influence on urban affairs results in opposition” (7). In terms of eminent domain, LGCs are likely to support its use in order to raise the exchange value of the land with a new stadium and reduce its use value for the people who live there.
Kelo v. New London
In 2005, the Supreme Court made a landmark ruling that broadened the definition of what is a “public good” by allowing local governments to make the decision themselves. The case originated in New London, Connecticut, where the local government used eminent domain to give to a real estate developer land for the purpose of “economic development.” The residents who had been removed from their homes argued that “economic development” and “public good” were not synonymous, and led by Susan Kelo, the case made its way to the US Supreme Court. In a 5-4 decision, the Court said that “public use” was not just limited to “use by the public,” thus establishing a precedent where local governments could make their own decisions as to the extent that they would use eminent domain (Cornell Law). This decentralization favors the states and allows them to “adjust restrictions to eminent domain on the state level,” (Poirier 111). As Justice Stevens writes in his case opinion, “State courts are fully competent to adjudicate challenges to local land-use decisions,” (118). This sets the stage for LGCs and impassioned mayors to push for and make decisions that may not be in the local resident’s best interests, as happened in Arlington, Texas.
Results
Benefits
When a team requests a new stadium, they always use the same argument; something along the lines of “this new stadium will bring an economic revival to the city.” It’s a compelling argument, of course it seems like a gorgeous, new, high-tech stadium will bring people from all over to the city, causing nearby businesses to flourish. The stadium will provide needed jobs and will lift a “blighted” area to prosperity. Jerry Jones has championed these beliefs over and over, saying,
“As far as 15 years ago I’d go to the floor of the Texas Legislature and I’d say: ‘You’re not creating a subsidy to build a stadium, you’re priming the pump for people intoxicated with being involved with sports. Use them to prime the pump with private dollars, because invariably, they’ll spend more than you’d ever imagine,” (Sandomir).
Aside from the slightly disturbing analogy of people who are intoxicated with being sports fans pumping money into Jones’ pocket, this quote relays the overall sentiment of stadium construction projects all over the world, yet there as actually little truth to it. While Lakakis states that “Sports stadia can generate civic pride, image improvement, and increased community visibility,” he also adds that they “can create congestion, vandalism, graffiti, noise and litter” (Lekakis 5).
In addition to these less measurable disadvantages, there has been extensive scholarship into the economic impact of new stadiums and the results of “empirical economic research offer virtual unanimity of findings” (Siegfried 103). According to a study that examined a large amount of research associated with new stadiums, “independent work on the economic impact of stadiums and arenas has uniformly found that there is no statistically significant positive correlation between sports facility construction and economic development (103). Much of this can be explained by the fact that public spending and lost tax revenue often exceeds the revenue generated by the stadium; when a city invests in a stadium, the revenues from naming rights, event tickets, and concession sales all go directly to the team. As far as invigorating the economy around the stadium, most people who go to games would have spent their money at other businesses had the stadium not existed, and the jobs that a new stadium produces are often insignificant as a stadium only needs around 100 full time employees that work when there is no event (105-106). When it comes down to it, the theoretically promised benefits of a new stadium do not come to fruition. The case was no different in Arlington, although Jones guaranteed an economic revival in Arlington, in exchange for the $325 million subsidy, the Cowboys only promised to pay $60 million in rent and donate $16.5 million to youth sports. The residents of Arlington should have been more skeptical of where the remaining $250 million dollars would be coming from.
Media
The impact that local media has on the opinion of its audience is tremendous, and when it comes to a questionable public project, the media’s attitude towards it can make or break it. In many places where stadiums are approved, the media organizations find themselves in a LGC that is pushing for the project’s success. In a study of the overall media positions of 23 different stadium initiatives, a perfect 8/8 projects went the way that the media had portrayed (positive media positions were approved, negative were denied) when LGCs focused on the stadium issue (Delaney 76). In this way it can be seen how large corporations work together to progress goals of corporate development. Even if there is no LGC with interest in the initiative, this allows the media an opportunity to step in and influence the people in a way that aligns with the political biases of the media. As Delany notes “the media can effectively challenge these initiatives when it steps into a power vacuum left by a corporate community lacking unity” (89). This happened in NYC when Cablevision pushed strongly against a new public stadium, seeing as they owned Madison Square Garden and there did not exist a strong LGC to oppose the project. For any new stadium initiative, the local media’s portrayal of the goals of the project is a key factor in deciding the ultimate success, and if a team can secure a positive image, they can establish their status as a “public good”.
Local Laws
The decision in Kelo v. New London set the precedent that local governments have the best knowledge of their area and can therefore best decide if eminent domain is an appropriate measure. Because of this, states have set laws that define to what extent they believe it can be used. For example, New Hampshire’s law states that “public use shall not include the public benefits resulting from private economic development and private commercial enterprise, including increased tax revenues and increased employment opportunities,” and as a state that values personal liberties this specific language makes sense (Title LI). The political cultures between NH and Texas are quite different however, and the eminent domain laws back this up. In Texas, the law “does not prohibit the taking of private property through the use of eminent domain for economic development,” and it even goes further to specifically make an inclusion for “a sports and community venue project approved by voters at an election,” (Title 10). The law in Texas specifically allows for eminent domain to be used for the creation of stadiums, so long as it is approved by voters. This of course creates the ultimate goal for a team to portray themselves as a local good so that they can get the approval of their city to build and expand on their private value. The Cowboys were able to do this in Arlington with the help of the mayor and a strong local atmosphere of positivity around the project.
Discussion
Jones’ Public Image
Creating a positive public perception of a large private corporation is not an easy thing to do, however Jerry Jones needed to, in order to secure public support for his new stadium initiatives. According to the head of the public relations firm in charge of the campaign, he campaign was “100 percent about how America’s team can help make Arlington America’s City,” (Ross). The use of this common nickname plays into local pride that the Cowboy’s incite, and this artificial pandering on behalf of this large entity is hyperlocalism at its finest. Rather than become a public figure in the campaign, the billionaire owner of the Cowboys rarely made appearances in support of the initiative. By sidelining himself, he attempts to stay out of the spotlight as people think about the logic of the situation. If he made frequent appearances they might start to realize that public money is going to a private business that is owned by a man worth more than could even imagine. As one resident says, “Jones has taken the part of the welfare queen in this deal… the money we give him is going to go in his pocket” (Ross). While the public may be able to recognize when certain projects are corporate welfare in disguise, it still may be hard for them to oppose the initiative using a conventional grassroots organization.
Grassroots Response and Media’s Influence
Through the power of LCGs and the media, a group called “Vote Yes! A Win for Arlington” raised over 5 million dollars in support of the initiative (Kuriloff). Pretty impressive until you realize that this group was funded by the Cowboys, and the disparity between their funding and the opposition group, “No Jones Tax Coalition”, is astonishing. Compared to the $5 million in support of the stadium, the “No Jones Tax Coalition” raised only $43,000, and when faced with opposition funding that high and a media that is biased against them, their chances of influence were low (Ross). The media further enforces this by selectively covering events that align with their beliefs. For example, “The Dallas Morning News constantly reminded readers of the recently built (and highly subsidized) American Airlines Arena….that actually had little measurable [economic] impact,” (Delaney 81). In addition, the “No Jones Tax was accorded significant legitimacy form the media’s coverage,” meaning that in Dallas, the media spun the project in a negative light and the lack of an LCG allowed this to shape public perception against the initiative (82).
On the other side of the spectrum in Arlington, where the No Jones Tax movement was actually better organized than the one in Dallas, it utterly failed in its objectives. This is due to the Arlington media, which “failed to give any legitimacy to a fairly substantial grass-roots campaign against the stadium deal”, and thus “the framing of this initiative was clearly tilted toward stadium advocates through selective presentation and omission of facts and opinions” (81). The Arlington media was powerful in skewing opinions in favor of the Cowboys, and suppressing opposition, which is a common problem when “local elites exert an overwhelming influence on urban affairs” (Lekakis 7). Simply put, money talks and the residents listen; a 5 million dollar campaign is going to change public perception and private businesses will use these campaigns to ensure funding and approval to get whatever they need done, done.
Eminent Domain Takings and the Mayor
Once the stadium initiative had received its initial voter approval, one more obstacle stood in the way of breaking ground in Arlington, Texas. Around 150 businesses and homes were still situated on the land that the stadium was to be built on. The Cowboys began by purchasing the homes of those who did not wish to fight, offering cash incentives between $5,000 and $22,500 to people who would move quickly (Joyner). This still left a significant amount of land, and many of the people felt like the Cowboys were not offering fair value, and this is where the use value and exchange value of a piece of land come into great tension. For someone who has lived in the same place for many years, that place becomes worth more than the actual value of the land; it holds memories, familiarity, and a sense of community that is not intrinsically factored into the price of a property, making it hard to give away for some amount of money that a real estate agent evaluates it at. This is the case for Paul Jordan, an Arlington resident whose home was taken for the new stadium, he says “It’s one of those rare neighborhoods that you don’t often find that had a sense of community, I knew everyone around me on a first-name basis.” (WFAA). It is interesting to note that the man Jordan might have voted for, Mayor Robert Cluck, rallied hardest to take that community way.
Jerry Jones needed a political ally to support the initiative in order to complete the process of passing his private business off as a public good, and he found that ally in the Mayor. From the inception of the project, Robert Cluck supported it through and through and made sure that the Cowboy’s had everything they needed. He encouraged the city council to allow the subsidy vote and he promoted the Cowboy’s at every chance he had. Of the subsidy he convincingly said “I think it’s an investment by the owner here, I don’t look at it at all as if it’s corporate welfare,” (Ross). Others vehemently disagreed, a local lawyer said that Cluck “sold out and the council went right along… we don’t provide basic infrastructure, yet we subsidize a team.” (Sandomir). With the strongest opinions against the actions of the mayor, it is clear that the mayor did not represent the people, rather siding with the most valuable sports franchise in world (Ozanian). Furthermore, on the day that followed the Kelo decision, Cluck announced that the city would use eminent domain to seize the rest of the properties that had not been purchased yet (Joyner). Cluck clearly acted on behalf of the Cowboys, and thus helped the Cowboys succeed in putting up a new stadium, at the expensive of hundreds of evicted people. By promoting federalism in eminent domain decisions, Kelo v. New London favors LGCs who can impact the government and push for its use in “grey area” cases.
Conclusion
As much as Americans love rooting for their local sports teams, they better hope that their team does not want a new stadium. History dictates that the team will threaten to leave the area if they do not receive a large subsidy for a new venue, a venue where will generate huge revenues for the owner. If they do get the subsidy and they choose to build on developed land, there is a precedent that if all the factors fall into place, they can slap the label of “public good” on the initiative and proceed to use eminent domain to secure land. The factors that can transform these private entities into public goods work together to alter public opinion. A strong local growth machine in favor of the stadium connects all types of local business owners who use their collective resource pool to enhance public perception. Selective positive media bombards a population with a dearth of pros and virtually no cons. Grassroots opposition is attacked by multi-million dollar advocacy groups funded by the same people who stand to make millions from the new stadium. Federal laws are interpreted at local levels to take advantage of leniencies in the legal system and local politicians do everything in their power to modernize their city and keep teams in the area. With regard to stadiums, the only thing more magical than a young kid’s first time inside, are the convoluted reasons it is there in the first place.
Comments
Some very impressive synthesis of a wide array of source, here, Mike. You have work to do in clarifying your document structure on several levels, I think. But you’ve gathered an impressive pool of material. Some questions and thoughts to organize our conference discussion: > Methods – I think you could attend more carefully to paragraphing (topic sentences, transitions, focus). – Try to do more to connect your methods section internally. Does the hyperlocalism idea allow you to re-think what eminent domain seizure means, for example? (see the comments on page 5) – I think you could integrate hyperlocalism into the rest of the essay more effectively. > Results – Consider how your results relate to the question you ask in the introduction (see the comments on pages 6, 7, and 8) – relatedly, you’ll want to work a bit harder to get your local paragraphs to more clearly relate to one another in this section. Think of this as a kind of mini-essay. – I think some methods are still cropping up here (see page 8) Discussion – I worry that you have results creeping into this section. (see page 9-12) – In this section, you’ll need to continue thinking about how paragraph-level claims fit together. I’m struggling to follow the overall logic of your document structure.
– Cowboys argue for the stadium as a public good by presenting it as an economic engine. – The mounting evidence contradicting Jones reveals how calculating his rhetoric was. – **But Jones success with the media ultimately allowed him to obscure that evidence. indeed, the local media shift to… – **There was also a tangibly bad effect on local community, which Jones had to ignore. (the loss of community) – We have pretty good reason to believe that this was a crucial factor in the outcome – **Using the focus on federalism afforded by Kelo v. New London, Jones exploited local politics. – In order to pass off his hyperlocal project as a genuinely localist one, Jones had to remove himself from the public eye. – The consequences of the building ** [add the par. from discussion]
Plan for Revision
My plan for revision required a mass shifting of ideas to the previous section to better fit the IMRD structure, these points constitued my plan.
Final Project 2 Revisions
- Bring end of introduction to discussion, more of a hint in the intro
- Public/private infrastructure
- Restructure question to not hint at an answer
- Create a better flow from paragraph to paragraph
- Methods: hyperlocalism, public infrastructure and private corporations relate
- Keep using the word “hyperlocalism” later on
Results
- Here is what jones is doing even though he knows what he’s is saying is false
- Here is mounting evidence against Jones argument
- His success with the media was a determining factor
- This was a crucial factor because of this scholarly evidence
- Kelo vs. New London in methods, then explain how that helped the project
- Jones exploited local politics
Discussion
- In order to pass of his hyperlocalized project as localism, he needed to stay out of the public eye