WRIT 5.04: What is Knowledge?

What does it take for a belief to be justified? Most would agree that justification requires some level of evidence, internally accessible information for or against a proposition. But can justification be based entirely off of information at hand, as an evidentialist would claim? Pragmatic encroachment is a theory that practical matters (stakes) “encroach” upon the epistemic nature of a belief, which is (according to the stance of purism) clear-cut. If pragmatic encroachment is true, then—under the traditional analysis that knowledge is justified true belief—practical affairs affect knowledge.

In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath present an argument for pragmatic encroachment based on the stakes of practical actions. A competing, evidentialist model of justification is provided by Baron Reed. Reed presents a number of cases as counterexamples to pragmatic encroachment in his paper. These cases work well to reinforce his hypothesis, but they do not necessarily rule out responses from the viewpoint of a supporter of pragmatic encroachment. In this paper, I aim to provide some of these responses by responding to Reed’s cases in the same way that Fantl and McGrath might analyze them.

Cake and the bar to knowledge

We can motivate pragmatic encroachment with a case from Reed:

For example, suppose that Jamie hears the waiter say that the cake she has just been served does not contain any nuts. “Too bad,” she thinks, as the waiter returns to the kitchen. Jamie has no reason to distrust the waiter, and she comes to believe what the waiter has said. Most philosophers would agree that the following assertion is true:

(7) Jamie knows the cake does not contain nuts.

Sasha, who has been served a piece of the same cake, also overhears the waiter. But her reaction is quite different from Jamie’s – Sasha is extremely allergic to nuts and could die if she eats any. Many, perhaps most, people think that Sasha should not simply start eating the cake. Given the risk of dying, the rational thing for her to do is to check with the waiter and have him confirm the recipe with the chef. But surely, the defenders of pragmatic encroachment say, this would be unnecessary if Sasha really knew the cake was nut-free. For that reason, they think, most speakers would not assert:

(8) Sasha knows the cake does not contain nuts. (99)

Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath follow “Clifford’s Link” to arrive at their argument for pragmatic encroachment, which suggests that there is a direct link between knowledge and permissible action. If you know a proposition, they argue, you should be able to safely perform any action suggested, in your practical situation, by that proposition. Once you surpass your evidentiary bar and you know that p, you can always act as if p. If pragmatic encroachment is true, then Sasha does not know that the cake is nut-free, but Jamie does—even though they have the same evidence, Sasha has higher stakes and therefore a higher evidentiary bar than Jamie; she cannot safely eat. The contrapositive of Clifford’s Link is also helpful. It states that if you cannot act as if p in any given situation, then you do not know that p. If Clifford’s Link is true, we can identify a lack of knowledge based upon individual situations. For instance, if Sasha is not warranted in eating the cake because of allergy concerns, then Clifford’s Link implies that she does not know whether it is nut-free.

Once you know that p, you can always act as if p.

Reed offers a counter-proposal to this stance. He claims that knowledge is based entirely upon evidence and reliability, but that you need a “higher degree of knowledge”—more confidence—to rationally act on a proposition. Even if your belief is justified and you know that p, you cannot necessarily act as if p. If pragmatic encroachment is false, then Sasha and Jamie both know that the cake is nut-free. Even though they both know, Reed claims, Sasha has a lower degree of knowledge and therefore a higher bar to rational action than Jamie; she cannot safely eat.

To clarify: both Fantl and McGrath and Reed agree that actions depend on stakes. The dividing line between their proposals is whether stakes become a factor in the threshold to knowledge (indirectly, by justification) or in the threshold to rational action.

Cumin and the relativity of knowledge

One of Reed’s objections to pragmatic encroachment is the “relativity of knowledge”. He argues that when presented with two identical decisions—one with low stakes, one with high, a situation can arise in which an agent simultaneously knows and does not know a proposition. In our cake example, perhaps Sasha is also offered to make a $1 bet if her cake is nut-free. It makes sense for her to take that bet given the stakes and her evidence, even though she shouldn’t necessarily eat the cake; does she know the cake is nut-free? Reed argues that situations like this, under pragmatic encroachment, relativize knowledge to one’s “practical situation” when we want to rely upon knowledge as a context-independent factor.

I will offer a counter-proposal to this situation, drawing off of a case from Fantl and McGrath which goes as follows: do you need to go home and check if you have cumin? You can probably safely act as though you know you have cumin at home. But maybe later today you will decide to make a cumin-involving dinner, or unexpectedly could be visited by a deathly allergic relative. In these scenarios, there are higher stakes, and you might need to check. For most propositions regarding situational knowledge, there are hypothetical situations where the stakes are high enough for you to be unjustified under pragmatic encroachment. Does this mean no propositions can be known by anyone? No, respond Fantl and McGrath, knowledge only implies warranted justification for your practical situation. If it is highly improbable that you will require cumin, you can know and act as though you have it. In our previous situation with simultaneous stakes, I argue that “your practical situation” prefers the highest probable stakes; so, in this case, Sasha does not know that the cake is nut-free. This does not mean that Sasha cannot bet $1 that the cake is nut-free; that may still be the rational choice. Not knowing only means she cannot act as though the cake is nut-free for every proposition depending on it being so, including safely eating it. This clarification helps us limit the scope of the effects of pragmatic encroachment.

Even so, pragmatic encroachment is tricky in a broader context. Take, for instance, the country’s chief medical advisor. The stakes for a public figure are high when taking actions, since the public looks to them as a role model. We expect the chief medical advisor to possess superior evidence and understanding. But practical encroachment opens the possibility that this person has less knowledge overall than you or me, since—under intense scrutiny—they have less confidence in taking everyday actions. Our above clarification helps limit the relative nature of knowledge implied by pragmatic encroachment to a given context, but doesn’t implicitly “solve” it—rule it out—as Reed’s evidentialist model does.

Even so, it may be acceptable for knowledge to be relative in one’s practical situation. There are countless propositions largely unaffected by stakes—for instance, that one plus one is two. This proposition is context-independent; everyone can always act as though it is true. We only need to concern ourselves with pragmatic encroachment when the pragmatic is a factor, and most people have largely similar stakes for everyday actions.

Candy and knowledge vs. high stakes

Reed presents another case, this time with extremely high stakes: correctly answering when Julius Caesar was born will reward you with candy, but an incorrect answer will result in a painful electric shock. If you know when Julius Caesar was born, then Clifford’s Link seems to imply that you can rationally answer in face of the shock. However, Reed argues that the most rational choice would be not to answer at all, avoiding the shock altogether. While I agree with Reed’s reasoning, I don’t believe this case is a solid counterexample to pragmatic encroachment.

Reed seems to be presenting this case to demonstrate the contrapositive of Clifford’s Link. Answering the question is not a rational choice, since there is a potential to get shocked; therefore, under Clifford’s Link, you do not know when Caesar was born. In Reed’s case, you decline to answer, but whisper to yourself “I know”. Reed claims that you do know, and are warranted in saying to yourself that the proposition is true, but are unwarranted in answering the question given the present stakes. Reed writes out this analysis as though pragmatic encroachment being true would change this sequence of events. If you know and pragmatic encroachment is true, perhaps you are compelled to answer the question, or alternatively you don’t know, and can’t whisper to yourself. Neither of these are the case: under pragmatic encroachment, the same sequence of events could play out rationally.

Let us first assume that it is not warranted to answer the question. In this case, Clifford’s Link implies that you do not know when Julius Caesar was born. Here, you are not justified in whispering to yourself that you know. Previously, you possessed enough evidence to know when Julius Caesar was born given your practical situation. Now, that practical situation has changed, and your evidentiary bar has been raised along with your stakes: you do not know. (Less clear is whether you ever knew). You do not know; you do not answer.

But now let us assume that you do know. Clifford’s Link dictates that your knowledge should stand up to any practical test thrown at you—you should be able to answer. That said, assuming you’re willing to forgo candy to avoid the risk of being shocked, not answering is still a justified action in this case—the action is independent of whether you know. Even if you know you will answer correctly, you still might not feel comfortable being put on the spot or facing the possibility of accidentally receiving a shock. You know, but you do not necessarily answer.

Here, we have presented two possibilities in which pragmatic encroachment is true—one in which you know, and one in which you don’t—and have shown that not answering is still a warranted action. We can conclude that while Reed’s explanation fits his evidentialist model, it does not simultaneously rule out the competing argument for pragmatic encroachment.

Works Cited

Fantl, Jeremy, and Matthew McGrath. “Do Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know?” Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., PDF, John Wiley & Sons, 2013, pp. 84-95.

Reed, Baron. “Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know.” Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., PDF, John Wiley & Sons, 2013, pp. 95-106.