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The Greater Chinese Union Needs to Consider Other Factors
In response to “A Greater Chinese Union” by Linda Jakobson

Taiwan has driven its stakes into unsteady ground. Taiwan is steadfast in its fight against subjugation under China, uses its relationship with the U.S as a buffer against China, and boldly sails on the unpredictable Taiwan Strait. Jakobson’s Greater Chinese Union (GCU) model argues for Taiwan’s “loose” reintegration with China as a federate state to resolve the tensions between the two. However, her argument forgets to account for the status quo of US-Taiwan relations, neglects the subterranean politics underneath reintegrating, and downplays the effects of Beijing’s and Taiwan’s unwavering nationalism. These elements surrounding Taiwan and China obstruct the path of partial reintegration.

Jakobson should not ignore the role of the United States in reintegrating. Even as a federacy, a more proactive Chinese presence on the Taiwan Strait could politically and economically constrict the level playing field that has been established by the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. Experts such as the late Georgetown professor Nancy Tucker have argued that Washington’s support for Taiwan has been dwindling due to the war potential of current China-Taiwan-U. S relations, but the United States has proactively corroborated its stance alongside Taiwan, presumably to promote democracy and keep balance in the Asia-Pacific. In 2016, U.S. senators drafted a reaffirmation of the Six Assurances, upholding Washington’s 35-year-old promise to the island. The United States has demonstrated its unwillingness to budge from its position, and President Donald Trump’s congratulatory call with the Taiwan President assures that. By not considering the United States in the GCU, Jakobson has neglected an actor that may greatly influence the path of Taiwan’s partial reintegration.

In her GCU model, Jakobson neglects the ideological gap between the Chinese and Taiwanese governments that impedes reintegration. China is an authoritarian, socialist government, while Taiwan is a liberal democracy. Her example of the Finland’s acquisition of the Åland Islands does not fit as a precedent for the GCU because those nations are both democracies as opposed to Taiwan and China. Taiwan’s democracy threatens China’s repressive rule. Since China sees Taiwan as its own, it will not allow for the island’s autonomy as a quasi-federate state as outlined in the GCU. Jakobson made the point herself that the Anti-Secession law was former PRC President Hu Jintao’s way of proving that his party would not yield to Taiwan’s resolve. Last month, China detained a Taiwanese democracy activist for endangering national security by simply arriving in China; events like this would make the Taiwanese government hesitant to cooperate with China because of the disparity of governance. China’s aversion to democracy makes a resolution like the Finland-Åland model inconceivable. The two nations cannot be considered as equally-weighted political entities under a federacy.

Jakobson said that, under the GCU model, Taiwan would be highly autonomous, but China would grant Taiwan a false sense of autonomy, much like it granted Hong Kong. Article 158 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law allows for China’s National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee to make any final interpretation of Hong Kong’s law. In fact, in 1999 China used their power over the Basic Law to pass judgement over the residence of children of Hong Kongers living in China. This was a clear violation of the “one country, two systems” model that China promised Hong Kong under reintegration that it would have political, judicial and economic freedom over the region. In 2016, China abducted and detained multiple Hong Kong booksellers who sold politically-charged books––a human rights violation. If China infringes on judicial freedom and free speech for its “autonomous” territory, then it cannot be trustworthy in providing autonomy to Taiwan.

China would still repress Taiwan’s participation in international organizations because of its nationalism. Jakobson presents that the GCU may pave the way to give Taiwan the international representation it has been fighting for. There are two problems with this: first, Taiwan seeks independent membership as a sovereign state. It does not wish to be aggregated alongside banks, institutes and courts as an observer of an international organization. It wishes to be fully recognized organizations such as the United Nations; but it is obstructed by China’s influence and policies such as UN’s “One China” stance. Secondly, China sees Taiwan solely as its own, a province that has simply gone rogue. Therefore, as part of a union, China would want to be represented in one way––by name of the mainland, as opposed to the multi-faceted representation that Jakobson envisions. If China wholeheartedly believes in “One China,” it will also believe in “One Voice.” These two ideologies directly oppose each other. China exemplified this ideological conflict when they denied Taiwan’s application to become a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China’s nationalism would continue to hurt Taiwan internationally by creating these ill-placed conflicts.

The GCU’s attempt to mold Taiwan’s future needs to consider more factors that affect reintegration. A plan for integration must consider other factors, such as the United States’ role in cross-strait relations. While the Finland-Åland model might have worked a hundred years ago for two politically homogenous entities, that same principle cannot be applied to Taiwan and China. China’s stout nationalism may not guarantee Taiwan’s autonomy nor the international representation that it desperately wants.

Works Cited

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Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States. Anti-Secession Law. March 14, 2005. http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm Accessed April 12, 2017.

Jakobson, Linda. A Greater Chinese Union. 2015. Washington Quarterly. 28(3): 27-39.

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Yates, Stephen. The Challenge of Taiwan’s Democracy for the United States and China. The Heritage Foundation. April 12, 1996. http://www.heritage.org/report/the-challenge-taiwans-democracy-the-united-states-and-china (Accessed April 16, 2017).