Determining the Key Palestinian Interlocutors for U.S. Policy on Palestine: Abbas, Hamas, or the People?

Ahmad E. Herzallah

MES.07.06, Prof. Fishere

Determining the Key Palestinian Interlocutors for U.S. Policy on Palestine: Abbas, Hamas, or the People?

AHMAD E. HERZALLAH

INTRODUCTION

For more than 40 years (since the mid-1980s), the United States sought to identify a Palestinian leader who could negotiate a peaceful settlement with Israel. Palestine is divided governmentally into two parts: Gaza and the West Bank. Gaza is under the rule of  Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Hamas), whose motives come from the need to liberate Palestine under one state, in other words, requiring the elimination of the state of Israel. The Palestinian National Authority rules the West Bank (PNA, also known as P.A.), a result of the Oslo Accords 1993-1995, a pair of interim agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It took a decade to find a way to turn the PLO radical leader Yassir Arafat into that interlocutor. Arafat, being the interlocutor, culminated in a series of peace agreements. However, at the same time, these same efforts undermined PLO's legitimacy and strengthened the hand of its rival, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Hamas). As the PLO – and its offspring P.A. – are weakened, the U.S. finds itself today in a similar position as it was 40 years ago. In this paper, I will discuss the past attempts that the U.S. has taken to identify a Palestinian interlocutor and analyze why they were not effective and brought us back to square one.

In addition to suggesting a possible Palestinian interlocutor, the people believe that he can work his way with Hamas, PA, Israel, and the United States. Whose mission is also to reach a peace settlement: Marwan Al-Bargouthi.

CURRENT STATUS

  After Hamas' attacks on October 7, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Search conducted a public opinion poll in Gaza and the West Bank, asking participants to show either their support or opposition to a two-state solution (Figure 28 below).

The results show a 27% increase in supporters of a two-state solution in Gaza (comparing September 2023 to March 2024). These results suggest that a two-state solution would have been more on the table for discussion before, or at least would have been effective when suggested, according to the vast number of supporters in Gaza, which is the main conflict area in proximity to Israel.

The United States, Palestine, and Israel have encountered many attempts to settle. Nevertheless, the misunderstanding among all these players is the main factor that led to stages of failure falling like dominos. That has created a blind spot that caused all the shortcomings in previous peace attempts. The United States labels Hamas as terrorists, and Israel refuses to negotiate with them. Hamas has a social power in Palestine; it can move the crowd quickly with its statements, causing the Palestinians to lose hope in Abbas.

The United States has a list of issues that it focuses on, them being:

• Borders: The two-state solution suggests separate Palestinian and Israeli states. Most international diplomacy backs reverting Israel to its pre-1967 borders. Yet, there's no agreement on how to include Palestinians in these borders. There's also no agreement on how to manage Jewish Israelis living beyond them.
• Jerusalem: There is a dispute over Jerusalem. It straddles Israel and the West Bank. Disputes grew when Trump said it is Israel's capital and moved the U.S. state there. A two-state solution would require a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem.
• Refugees: Wars in 1948 and 1967 made one million Palestinian refugees. They and their families live in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. They want to return to Israel, backed by a 1948 UN resolution. Yet, a debate rages on. It questions if their descendants should also be refugees with the same rights. Israel sees this as a threat. It prefers the refugees to live in the future Palestinian state, part of a two-state solution.
• Security: Israel views some Palestinian militant groups as existential threats, particularly Hamas. Its suicide bombings and rocket attacks usually target Israeli civilians. Israel wants these groups to disarm. It wants to demilitarize the Palestinian state. But, it accepts that Palestinians should have a strong police force. The Palestinians seek an end to Israel’s military occupation. They want full control over their security but accept limits on their arms. Israel wants to keep the ability to act in Palestinian territory. It wants to act against threats to its security.
• Mutual recognition: Each side seeks recognition of its state from the other side. They also seek it from the world. Most Israeli Jews want Israel recognized as a Jewish state. Palestinians want Israel to acknowledge their forced displacement in the Nakba.
• End of conflict: Israel and Palestine seek a peace agreement to end their conflict and normalize Israel’s relations with all Arab states.

Abbas has been in power for more than 19 years, yet we have yet to see any progress in any peace plans. All possible peace plans were destructed due to Abbas's fears of losing his political power in Palestine and prioritized his political survival at the expense of his people's needs, said Jared Kushner, President Trump's son-in-law and top adviser on the Middle East.

To be able to understand the history between Abbas, Hamas, Israeli prime Ministers, and the United States, We should take into account the history of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its transition into the Palestinian Authority, and the creation of Hamas and its stands since its formation. 

DEFINITION OF THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)

After the Nakba, a few years after the existence of the Israeli state (1953 - 1960), a lot of Palestinians tried to recover their lost property, went back to their corps, and visited their relatives. Israeli forces met with the Palestinian refugees and resulted in the death of thousands, mostly unarmed, Palestinians. As more of these Israeli authorities and gangs began to increasingly occupy more lands, like Haganah, a uniting Arab movement began to show up. Arab leaders began to recruit and train Palestinian commando fighters, called fdāʾiyin, to launch cross-border raids on Israel. Ergo, armed Israeli forces fought them in an attempt to eliminate the Palestinian commando fighters. As a result, On May 28, 1964, the Arab League, at Egypt's behest, announced the creation of the PLO under the leadership of Ahmad Shuqeiri, a Palestinian lawyer who had briefly served as a minister in the defunct All-Palestine Government (APG).

The PLO did not receive any official recognition from the U.S. government. However, an unofficial PLO Information Office was permitted to be established in New York in 1964. It was run by Sadat Hassan, who served as Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations. It did not last long until the United States closed the office in 1968. Afterwards, On May 1, 1978, the PLO was allowed to open the Palestine Information Office (PIO) in Washington, D.C. The PIO was registered with the Justice Department as a foreign agent. The relations between the United States and PLO were not that bad. Nine years later, in 1987, the United States Congress adopted the Anti-Terrorism Act, which they have considered the PLO as a terrorist organization, resulting in the closure of its office (PIO).

The PLO's mission was to replace Israel with an independent Palestine state. The United States has viewed any Palestinian government as a threat to Israeli and Jordanian territories. Over time, the U.S. had to accept the idea of a Palestinian state. A 1961 State Department memo denounced the idea. It called it a "Palestine Government in exile." They saw it as a step back in Arab-Israeli relations. However, it advised against a direct attack on the idea. Such an attack would only make it stronger.  As the U.S. and Israel grew closer, the U.S. blocked Palestinian political representation. This coordination aimed to maintain regional peace. Fatah and other Palestinian groups were ignored until Fatah began attacking Israel in May 1965.

By late 1966, Fatah was labeled the leading Palestinian terrorist group. U.S. policy towards the PLO took shape by then. The U.S. saw the PLO as a tool in Arab power struggles. Nevertheless, as it grew, the U.S. began to engage with it. As I have mentioned, the U.S. never officially recognized the PLO as the voice of Palestinians. It saw the PLO as a group aimed at destroying Israel.

The U.S. worked to prevent the PLO from gaining U.N. recognition. The PLO was first seen as a peaceful group in 1965. However, by 1966, the CIA labeled it a terrorist organization despite no attacks on Israel. This was before Fatah and other fdāʾiyin groups took charge, or the PLO started fighting. From then on, the U.S. did not recognize the PLO. It kept its distance, only working together when needed. The U.S. also continually associated the PLO with extremism and terrorism.

The U.S., the PLO, and Israel's Prime Minister needed to improve relations, so they also sought better ties with the U.S. This push led to events before Oslo, the "Oslo Accords," and its outcomes, which widened the gap between Palestine and Israel.

HISTORY OF THE PLO AND HAMAS

PRE-OSLO

The PLO and Israel's Prime Minister Shamir were critical players before the Oslo era (1987-1993). The struggle between Palestinians and Israelis was an unequal war, making settlements unlikely. Palestinians sought international pressure to counter Israel's military and economic power. In 1988, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat said that the PLO had accepted Israel's right to exist. He also said it had rejected terrorism. The U.S. responded by offering to dialogue with PLO representatives. Arafat's move improved relations with the U.S. and Israel. It added pressure on Shamir's government to negotiate. However, Israel rejected the US-PLO dialogue. Shamir proposed a four-point initiative, including free elections. The PLO saw it as a plan to continue the occupation and dictate who represents Palestinians. The PLO liked the US-PLO dialogue. It focused on topics beyond terrorism. This fit within their overarching goal to pressure Israel towards a settlement.

Hamas was founded in 1987, marking the first opposition to Arafat and the first non-PLO-affiliated challenge to Arafat. Local Palestinian leaders are becoming more prominent in the West Bank and Gaza, and a credible Islamist opposition is joining them. The PLO feared the rise in local leadership would sideline them during the Intifada. The United States later, in 1997, designated Hamas a terrorist organization.

Hamas and other local Palestinian groups played an essential role in the first Intifada, which "made mainstream American policymakers recognize the Palestinian issue as the central and core issue." This had resulted in an issue of representation. The Palestinian people did not have an official representative since the first Intifada.

OSLO & THE DILEMMA OF A PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE

On September 13, 1993, in Washington, D.C., Palestinians and Israelis signed the Oslo Accord. They agreed to recognize each other. Israel committed to leaving the West Bank and Gaza. They would hand control to Yassir Arafat's new Palestinian National Authority (PNA). On September 28, 1995, the signing of Oslo II took place. It granted Palestinians self-rule in parts of the West Bank and set the stage for elections. It also divided the West Bank into A, B, and C areas. Area A was Palestinian-controlled. In B, Palestinians managed civilian affairs, while Israelis handled security. C was under Israel's exclusive control. A month later, an assassin killed Yitzhak Rabin at a peace rally in Tel Aviv on December 8. After this, Yasser Arafat met with Shimon Peres. They met to again promise to the Oslo Accords. On January 20, 1996, Hamas, a group opposing the Oslo elections and urging a boycott, was already active. Despite this, Palestinians supported Arafat's peace efforts and achieved a significant victory.

Hamas believes that the Oslo Accords gave the Palestinians much less than their due under the international resolutions related to the conflict; it refuses to accept the prerequisite of recognizing Israel, yet that does not mean that Hamas would reject negotiations as a concept and mechanism; instead, Hamas rejects the terms of these negotiations.

Critics said the agreement favored one side. Palestinians agreed to Israel's right to peace. In return, Israel recognized the PLO as the Palestinian people's representative. Even some in the Palestinian mainstream opposed the deal. 

Signing Oslo empowered Hamas and other militant groups. The security measures under Oslo widened the PA-Hamas rift and eroded the P.A.'s credibility. Tensions between Fatah and Hamas worsened during this time. Suicide bombings in Israeli cities in 1996 killed 59 Israelis, prompting the U.S. and Israel to pressure Arafat to act. The PA's crackdown on Hamas led to a brief calm in 1997, but bombings resumed soon after.

In the eyes of the Palestinians, Oslo has failed; it did not grant the Palestinians the land that the United States promised them. Breaking such a promise to the Palestinians will not do any good; instead, it would empower organizations like Hamas and Jihad and will put the Palestine-Israel case back to square one.

Camp David 2000 Summit & Taba talks

President Bill Clinton held a 2000 peace summit with Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak. Israel offered 66% of the West Bank to Palestinians. Barak later proposed 91-95% of the West Bank and all of Gaza, but Arafat rejected it. Clinton blamed Arafat for the summit's failure. Clinton then appointed George J. Mitchell to lead a fact-finding committee. After the summit, Barak launched a media campaign, calling Arafat uncooperative. The Clinton Parameters proposed a Palestinian State with 94-96% of the West Bank. In 2001, Israel presented a new map at the Taba summit, offering to give up some West Bank areas. However, Prime Minister Barak ended the negotiations, and the summit failed. The PA insisted on Israel's abiding by international resolutions, such as its withdrawal from the occupied lands and granting the right of return for refugees. Even though Ehud Barak backed down from the deal and dragged its feet over almost all provisions, Clinton blamed Arafat for the failure of the peace negotiations while complimenting Barak.

The death of Arafat, a past possible partner.

The year 2005 was vital for peace and Palestinian politics. Yasser Arafat died on November 11, 2004. Then, on January 9, 2005, Palestinians chose Mahmoud Abbas as their new leader. He took over as president of the Palestinian Authority (P.A.). He also became chairman of the PLO, succeeding Arafat. The rate of violence decreased. Palestinians and Israelis felt more optimistic for the first time in over four years. This was partly due to Israel's planned withdrawal from Gaza later that summer. It created a chance to move past the conflicts and standstills of the past few years.

On February 8, 2005, Abbas had a ceasefire with Sharon. After that, he gathered Palestinian factions in Cairo. They aimed to strengthen the truce with Israel, ending four years of violence. Despite Hamas' past attacks, it reduced violence against Israelis. Israel's security agency, Shin Bet, praised the Palestinian agreement for this decrease. It highlighted how Palestinian unity influenced Israeli security.

Abbas's first seven months as president sparked cautious hope. Violence decreased. Palestinian security forces reclaimed significant towns from the IDF. Nevertheless, in Washington, the Israeli-Palestinian issue lost priority. It is the drop in violence that reduced U.S. interest. The administration faced more urgent tasks, like the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The situation in Iraq was deteriorating, with a growing anti-U.S. insurgency. We missed Abbas's election. It and the drop in violence were crucial goals of Bush's 2002 speech. The planned Gaza withdrawal weakened Abbas's leadership. It happened at a critical time and led to his decline.

It should be mentioned that during the George W. Bush Administration, foreign policy towards Palestinians was always based on refusing any Israeli-Palestinian agreement that would require Israeli concessions and ruling out any possibility of creating a Palestinian state. Similarly, Obama's policies involved:

• Not imposing political pressure on Israel.
• Objecting to Palestine's membership in the United Nations.
• Supporting Israeli demands for Palestinians' recognition of the Israeli State's Jewish character.

During 2002-2005, Abbas was not the most liked president in Gaza. Politically, he is seen as a sell-out for many Gaza. Economically, when Israel had left the Gaza territory, it had turned into a failed entity. With a poverty rate of 65  percent and 35 percent unemployment, with high instability both inside and outside. Moreover, Abbas was aware of Hamas' plan to take over Gaza. Thus, Abbas hoped to use the disengagement from Gaza to demonstrate the efficacy of his negotiation approach and weaken Hamas as a result. Nevertheless, Sharon's disengagement plan slightly improved the status quo, which does not offer much. 

Abbas sought clear political and economic gains. He wanted Gaza to remain open and linked to broader goals. It has promised support, pledging $50 million and $1.2 billion from donors. However, Bush and Sharon doubted Abbas's leadership, which proved costly. Rice got a commitment to keep Gaza's borders open. However, Israel refused to sign the AMA agreement. This led to closed borders, economic decline, and eventually, Hamas claimed victory.

Hamas's win in the election demonstrated the people's interest and more support for anti-US and anti-Israeli ideas, which Hamas was calling for in their chants and during the two Intifadas.

Gaza Election

Hamas's surprise election victory in 2006 posed serious challenges for U.S. policymakers and the peace process as a whole. The idea of Hamas's elections came as an unwelcome and unexpected shock to both Middle Eastern and international regimes. The United States, many European nations, and Israel had all issued clear warnings before the elections that they would not deal with a Palestinian Authority led by Hamas. Based on usually reliable polling, they had concluded that Hamas was unlikely to win an absolute majority. However, that was not the case at all.

Abbas faced a challenging situation. The Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) collapsed, and Gaza's border closed before the elections. Hamas decided to take part, sparking intense debate. The Intifada weakened Hamas leaders. They sought to enjoy Abbas's new leadership and Fatah's declining popularity. Israel and the U.S. tried to block Hamas from the elections. However, Abbas argued that this would hurt the election's legitimacy. Hamas won a majority, but Israel and much of the world refused to recognize its government. The U.S. cut off financial support, demanding that Hamas disarm and recognize Israel. This led to a policy change: the U.S. stopped supporting a powerful prime minister and focused on Abbas instead.

Israel's tax withholding and boycott hurt the Palestinian economy. Abbas proposed a unity government with Hamas, but the U.S. rejected it, demanding new elections. Fatah's failures led to Hamas's win. The U.S. ignored Hamas's moderation and increased pressure on Palestinians. Abbas formed a unity government, angering the U.S. and ending peace talks. The U.S. failed to support Abbas, while Iran backed Hamas, letting Hamas take control of Gaza.

Since Hamas's victory in Gaza, it has been carefully and consciously adjusting its political program for years. It has sent repeated signals that it is ready to begin a process of coexisting with Israel, but not under Abbas's administration. 

Israeli–Palestinian talks in 2007 and 2008

Palestinian and Israeli governments met 36 times from 2006 to 2008. Olmert was the Israeli PM, and Abbas was the Palestinian President. They aimed to negotiate for peace and a Palestinian state. Olmert proposed a detailed plan. It included a border based on an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Abbas wanted to let most Israeli settlers stay. Both leaders agreed on close cooperation. However, the talks ended with each side blaming the other. Hamas took over Gaza. Egypt brokered a ceasefire, which led to the 2008-2009 Gaza War.

When Hamas took over Gaza, it stated itself as the actual representative of the Palestinian people, and they did not legitimize Abbas's ruling over Palestine, where they believed that Abbas had no legitimacy to negotiate in the name of the Palestinian people. Direct talks with Hamas are pointless and likely to be counterproductive because there is nothing to talk about regarding any future peace plans. This assumption is reinforced by Hamas's virtually identical stance concerning its talking with Israel, though Hamas is eager to speak with the United States. However, even though Hamas would like to talk with the United States, Israel would not allow that, and the United States would like to maintain better US-Israeli relations since it is more beneficial for the United States.

2013–14 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks

Talks started on July 29, 2013. They followed U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's effort to restart peace talks. The U.S. appointed Martin Indyk to lead the negotiations. Hamas rejected the move. They said that Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, lacked authority to negotiate.  The goal was to resolve the conflict by mid-2014. Justice Minister Tzipi Livni led Israel's team, while Saeb Erekat led the Palestinians. The talks began in Washington, DC, but failed to meet the deadline of April 29, 2014.

Israel opposed the Fatah-Hamas Gaza Agreement on April 23, 2014. The deal united the two groups under a joint government and planned new elections. Israel stopped peace talks. It refuses to work with a Hamas-backed government. Israel considers Hamas a terrorist group. Israel threatened sanctions, including cutting Palestinian debts. Prime Minister Netanyahu accused Abbas of sabotaging peace. He said Abbas must choose between Hamas and Israel. Abbas promised the new government would recognize Israel and shun violence. Israel responded with economic penalties, canceling West Bank housing projects. Abbas threatened to dissolve the Palestinian Authority but has not followed through.

Abbas' 2014 Peace Plan

Abbas proposed a peace plan to Kerry in 2014. It included nine months of talks and a three-year withdrawal from the 1967 borders. East Jerusalem would be Palestine's capital. The plan required Israel to halt building and release prisoners. The U.S. rejected the plan. If Israel refused, Abbas threatened to file ICC charges. He would also seek U.N. approval for a Palestinian State.

Trump’s Plan

President Donald Trump took office in 2017, and people wondered about a new peace effort. In 2018, a potential peace initiative emerged for Israel and Palestine. The White House revealed its plan in two steps. The economic part, "Peace to Prosperity," was announced in June 2019. The political part followed in January 2020. However, Palestinian leaders boycotted the announcement in Bahrain and criticized the plan.

A POSSIBLE PALESTINIAN FIGURE?

Abbas tried many times to negotiate peace with Israel and the U.S. But, their failure led to a decline in Palestinian trust in his leadership. As a result, many Palestinians began to lose faith in his ability to deliver a better future for them. In contrast, many Palestinians in the West Bank liked Hamas's message. It was about armed resistance. There, people felt frustrated with the constant pressure to back Hamas's militant stance. It often led to devastating results. They refused to suffer silently for actions that did not benefit them directly. However, for Gazans living in the Gaza Strip, the reality was different. They faced the brunt of the wars caused by Hamas. They endured frequent airstrikes, casualties, and infrastructure damage. The memory of these conflicts lingered. It fueled desperation and hopelessness among Gazans.

Gazans are starting to see the advantages of a two-state solution. This shift in view is due to their growing unhappiness with how Hamas governs the Gaza Strip. For years, Hamas has dominated politics. However, its failure to improve life in Gaza has led to a loss of confidence in its leadership. As a result, many Gazans are now searching for a new leader. They want someone who can unite the split Palestinian territories. They want someone who can speak for all Palestinians; these range from those in the Gaza Strip to those in the West Bank, and this leadership vacuum is emerging. It presents a unique chance for a figure to step forward.

Abbas has lost the trust of Palestinians, and they should no longer rely on his announcements. Israel views Hamas as a terrorist organization determined to destroy it. The next leader of Palestine must not be a terrorist. This person must be willing to talk. They must also be able to make a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine.

Marwan Al-Barghouti emerges as a strong contender. Supporters of both Hamas and Fateh back him. A desire drives this well-educated person. They want to secure the best future for Palestine and its people. He is a passionate advocate for Palestinian rights. He has shown his willingness to work for a two-state solution.

In addition, in the same poll conducted in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, a question was asked: "Who would you vote for to be the next president in the next election?" Al-Barghouti gets the highest votes against Hamas and Fateh's leaders. (See Figure 19 below)

However, a significant obstacle stands in his way. Al-Barghouti is serving five life sentences in Israeli jails. Authorities convicted him for his involvement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Israeli authorities saw the PLO as a threat to their security. He faces charges of organizing terrorist attacks. He also posed a risk to Israel's safety.

Israel is unlikely to release Al-Barghouti. They cite the case of Yahya Al-Sinwar, a freed Hamas leader. During his incarceration, Al-Sinwar had supported a two-state solution. He had promised to make Hamas and Israel work together. However, upon his release, he went back to Gaza. He then helped increase Hamas's resistance against Israel. Today, we are witnessing the consequences of that decision.

Works Cited

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“ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS: PROSPECTS FOR THE UPRISING AND THE PEACE PROCESS.” Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 June 1989, www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/06124202.

Farrington, Jane. Exploring Alternatives to the Two-State Solution. Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton University, 2012.

Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians, from Balfour to Trump on JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1zctt0s.

 World Bank, “Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlements” (Washington: World Bank, June 23, 2004), pp. 2–3.

David. “Jared Kushner Criticizes Abbas, Questioning His Ability to Make Peace.” The New York Times, June 24, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/world/middleeast/kushner-abbas-peace-deal-israel.html.

Scham, Paul, and Osama Abu-Irshaid. “Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility.” US Institute of Peace, 2009. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12273.

ERDOĞAN, AYFER, and LOURDES HABASH. “U.S. Policy Toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict under the Trump Administration: Continuity or Change?” Insight Turkey 22, no. 1 (2020): 125–46. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26921172.