Reaction Paper 1 | Debates in International Politics

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Reaction Paper 1: The Modern Terrorist
In response to “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” by Robert Pape

I just made a fake account on “SilkRoad 2.0” via Tor and requested a quotation for a nuclear dirty bomb. I got linked to a seller who posted “1500BTC, Bulgarian import, funds first”. I may not be able to replicate Nagasaki with this bomb, but I may irradiate and incapacitate all of Hanover for at least a hundred years. By now, I won’t be surprised if the NSA has already tagged my computer and is reading this paper as I type it – in which case, “Hello! Don’t worry, I am not a terrorist. God bless America!” Nevertheless, the ease at which I am able to obtain such an offering is grievously terrifying. Terrorism has markedly outgrown the lines drawn by Pape to become more sporadic, unpredictable, and beyond issues of self-determination.

Pape understood terrorism not to be isolated fanatical acts, but strategic strikes by organized groups to “punish” democratic states through raising the costs or risks above the disputed interest. This interest classically meant recognition for self-determination or expulsion of foreign forces from a perceived homeland. He also attributed much of terrorism’s efficacy to it being claimed so that the attention received may coerce opponents and garner sympathy towards an agenda.1 While these characteristics may still hold true for terrorist organizations abroad such as the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), they fail to account for the emergence of “homegrown terrorists” and “lone wolves” as described in the Patriot Act.2, 3 Between Sept. 11 and today, only 1 out of 182 recorded incidences on American soil were explicitly organized by Al Qaeda.4 Although some individuals self identified as jihadists, their actions were independently planned with no other purpose than to kill and destroy. Some high-profile cases include the “Underwear Bomber” who attempted to blow up Northwest Flight 25345, Major Nidal Hassan who killed 13 and injured 32 at the Fort Hood, TX military base6, and the recent Boston Bombing perpetrated by the Tsarnaev brothers7. Moreover, the percentage of unclaimed terrorist attacks globally has also increased after Sept. 11, suggesting a spread of non-corporate single-cell terrorism.8 I understand two possible factors that attribute to this phenomena. Firstly, as I have personally attested, highly sensitive, dangerous, and classified resources are easily acquirable in today’s age of information technology. A commonality between all individual perpetrators was their access to deep web weapons resources and radical Islamic teaching that led to Al Qaeda. I should also note that these individuals sought out Al Qaeda on their own volition and not the other way around. This twist is likely attributable to the second factor – Al Qaeda’s new fatwah of “Al-wala w’al-bara” (Allegiance and Disavowal), which demands Muslims to be loyal only to Muslims and to “disavow the infidels” on their own.9 Because of such, one may still see these independent cases of terrorism as part of Al Qaeda’s grander scheme to have free agents weakening America on the home front as much as possible, while they secure their positions in the middle east in wake of the Arab Spring; or it may signify a change in strategy as the US becomes more difficult to penetrate with its stringent border control efforts. Regardless, our understanding and anticipation of terrorist activity in America has still evolved beyond Pape’s view and as quoting Prof. Bruce Hoffman, terrorism expert at the RAND corporation, “There really is no longer any one profile of the terrorist”10. There are no longer explicitly identifiable terrorist or targets since independent actors pursue unique agendas instead of corporate ones.

Another problem I find with Pape’s paper is its over-distinction between terrorist organizations and sovereign states. The two are less defined than what Pape makes it, for what one group, such as Hamas, would be called “terrorist” by the US, may be understood even by a NATO ally, such as Norway, to be legitimate a “opposition party”. In fact, parts of the Middle East consider Israel a terrorist state in its entirety. I believe a better definition of terrorist activity would be the unwarranted attack against civilian personnel. With that in mind, the difference between “stronger” and “weaker” states, or “denial” and “punishment” methods, don’t really come into play between state affiliated terrorism. Just yesterday, 16 suicide bombs were reported to have swept Free Syria Army (FSA) controlled areas11, which is believed to be in response to the car bomb FSA set off at a Hezbollah stronghold two weeks ago, which itself was in response to the assassination of Mohamad Chatah, an anti-Hezbollah minister.12 We are approaching an age where terrorist methods and espionage are substituting open warfare in complete disregard of the Geneva Convention. In fact, I doubt most of the “terrorist groups” even know what the Geneva Convention is. How could they? They’re constantly fighting, suffering, and the members most likely grew up under the pressure cooker of the America n military with little to no formal education.

This leads then to my final critique of Pape – all his suggestions for intervention are military. What if instead of soldiers, the US sent businessmen, teachers, doctors, and agricultural experts to its enemies? Our military expenditure would be lower, we’d be doing the world a true service, have fewer enemies, grow future trade partners, and we can spend what we’ve saved on the national debt or on homeland security. I know this would seem borderline treasonous as that would mean assisting enemies of the state, there is low guarantee of return, and development may well be impossible without preestablished security. However, foreign resentment against the US isn’t completely unfounded, and perhaps we may redeem ourselves by approaching these issues as Lincoln hoped for amidst the civil war in asking “Do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?”13

Bibliography
“16 suicide attacks target Syrian rebels in one week: NGO.” Khaleej Times, Jan 12, 2014. http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2014/January/middleeast_January127.xml§ion=middleeast (accessed January 13, 2014).

Fisher, Dennis. “Changing Enemies Into Friends.” Our Daily Bread, July 26, 2012.
Global Terrorism Database. College Park: University of Maryland, 2013. s.v. “All Incidents Regardless of Doubt Between 2002 and 2012 in the United States.”
Goldberg, Emily. Anonymous Terror: The New Threat. master\., American University, 2008.

Jacobs, Sally, David Filipov , and Patricia Wen . The Fall of the House of Tsarnaev. Boston: Boston Globe, 2013.

Kenber, Billy. “Nidal Hasan sentenced to death for Fort Hood shooting rampage.” Washington Post, Aug 28, 2013. http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/guilty-plea-09-underwear-bomber-stand-21514009.

Khawla, Abu. “Understanding Homegrown Terrorism.” American Thinker. http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/12/understanding_homegrown_terror.html (accessed January 13, 2014).

Liu, Edward. Congressional Research Service, “Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.” Last modified June 16, 2011.
Page, Clarence. “Terrorists who defy every stereotype.” Chicago Tribune, March 14, 2010.

Pape, Robert. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. The University of Chicago, 2003.

Rami, Ruhayem. “Beirut blast kills at least five in Hezbollah stronghold.” BBC News, Jan 2, 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25577642 (accessed January 13, 2014).

White, Ed. “Underwear Bomber’s 2009 Guilty Plea Will Stand.” abcNEWS, Jan 13, 2014. http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/guilty-plea-09-underwear-bomber-stand-21514009.